Time and again, as I’ve tried to categorize New Hampshire—by its history, culture, and demographics—and I’ve been unable to nail down its proper place in the American political landscape.

While my deep ties to New Hampshire may explain my particular fascination with its politics, there is something to be said about the curious ideals of the Granite State. This ideology is unabashedly libertarian—possibly to a fault.

Libertarianism in America has lost its way—its party less influential with each passing year, its support splintering off to both sides of our insurmountable two-party system.

Yet as we look forward to the impending political reset of 2028, New Hampshire gives us hope for a brighter political future, combining the best parts of Democrat and Republican platforms—with a pinch of its own outrageous ideas.

Demographics

With this brief history lesson out of the way, it’s time to recognize the citizens of the Granite State. As of July 1st, 2024, New Hampshire has 1.4 million residents, making it the 41st most populous state. Its largest cities, Manchester and Nashua, are in the state’s southern region and are part of the Greater Boston metropolitan area.

The Granite State’s population grew immensely from 1960 to 1990, nearly doubling, and has seen steady growth in the 35 years since then, which is slightly below the national rate but exceeding all other New England states. New Hampshire is expected to reach a peak population of 1.5 million people in 2040.

Like its neighbors Vermont and Maine, New Hampshire’s population is racially homogenous and significantly older than the national average—90% of residents are white. Interestingly, just 40.36% of New Hampshire residents were actually born in the state—36% of them were born in neighboring Massachusetts.

Education and Wealth

New Hampshirites are considerably more educated than the average American—94% and 41% of the population over the age of 25 have received high school and college diplomas, respectively—and wealthier; the median household income is $96,838, the 4th highest of any state. Perhaps because of the last several statistics, New Hampshire also boasts the lowest poverty rate in the nation: 7.42%—almost half the national level.

Religiosity

The Unchurched Belt—a spoof of the Bible Belt—describes areas of the country with low church attendance. New Hampshire, where 66% of adults say they never or seldom attend church or religious services, lands itself in the direct center of one of these regions, sandwiched between Vermont and Maine—the two other states with the highest share of unreligious adults.

While 36% of New Hampshire residents are unaffiliated with a religious group, the remainder are, predictably, overwhelmingly Christian. 26%, 16%, and 13% of residents are Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant, respectively, with a mere 5% practicing non-Christian faiths.

The absence of religious fervor among New Hampshirites may help explain their progressive stance on social issues. New Hampshire was the 5th state to legalize same sex marriage, all the way back in 2010—beating out more liberal states like New York, California, and Washington.

Governance

At the time of writing, New Hampshire’s state government has a Republican trifecta—control of the governorship and both chambers of the state legislature, along with the offices of secretary of state and attorney general. The GOP has held control of the governorship since 2017 and the House and Senate since 2021. Historically, the state government has had a Republican tilt; since 1992 there have been 14 years of Republican trifectas, compared to only 4 years for the Democrats.

Governor

Governor Kelly Ayotte was first elected this past November, succeeding the popular 4-term Republican Chris Sununu, of the famed Sununu political dynasty. Ayotte handily defeated Democrat mayor of Manchester Joyce Craig by 9.3 points, significantly outperforming the polls—where she averaged a 2.5-point lead—and Donald Trump, who lost New Hampshire by 2.8 points. Ayotte had previously served one term in the senate, but lost reelection in 2016 to former Democrat governor Maggie Hassan by a mere 0.15 points, just 1,017 votes.

To place a check on the governor’s power, New Hampshire uniquely employs an Executive Council—known colloquially as the Governor’s Council—comprised of five members who each represent a district of about 275,500 residents and are elected for an unlimited number of two-year terms.

With the power to overrule pardons and executive branch nominations issued by the Governor, as well as to approve the state budget and military and judicial appointments, the Council has the final say on most executive branch duties. It is currently split 4-1 in favor of Republicans, thus giving Governor Ayotte a rubber stamp of approval on the bulk of her initiatives.

House of Representatives

New Hampshire has, by far, the most unique House of Representatives in the nation. The state of 1.4 million people has a lower chamber with a whopping 400 representatives—one per 3,448 residents. For comparison, Pennsylvania is runner-up with 203 reps—one per 64,098 residents—and California holds the title of most constituents per rep at 494,755.

This gives the miniature New England state the astonishing distinction of having the third-largest elected legislative body in the English-speaking world, after the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.K. House of Commons. To field such a vast body, representatives are paid just $100 dollars a year—a number in place since 1889—which makes it effectively a volunteer legislature.

In the 2024 election, Republicans increased their control over the lower chamber, which they had held onto in 2022 by a single seat (201 to 199). They flipped 21 districts, expanding their modest majority and continuing GOP control of the house into its third legislative session.

Senate

New Hampshire’s Senate more closely resembles those of other states its size, with 24 members—one per 57,462 residents. In last November’s election, Republicans grew their already sizable control of the state senate—from 14 to 16 seats—giving them a veto-proof supermajority.

One of the two seats the Republicans flipped belonged to Democrat Donna Soucy, the Minority Leader, who represented the 18th District. This was a huge blow to the Democrats—who were hopeful of chipping away at the GOP’s majority—and safely puts the upper chamber in GOP control for the foreseeable future.

Congress

While New Hampshirites prefer a Republican-run state government, they opt for a Democratic Congress. It has been more than a decade since a Republican has won a house race in the Granite state, and more than 14 years since one has won a senate race—Kelly Ayotte all the way back in 2010. While Democrats have a clear edge in House and Senate races in New Hampshire, the state’s two aging Democrat senators could threaten to upheave this.

1st Congressional District

Democrat Chris Pappas has represented New Hampshire’s 1st Congressional District—comprising the southeastern portion of the state, including the coast, Manchester, and its suburbs—since 2019. Pappas, a former state representative and executive councilman, succeeded Democrat Carol Shea-Porter, who declined to run for reelection, and handily beat former South Hampton Police Chief Republican Eddie Edwards in 2018 by 8.6 points. In a show of New Hampshire’s social progressivism, Pappas is the first openly gay man to represent the state in Congress.

Until recently, the 1st District has been one of the most competitive in the nation, changing parties in all but one election from 2006 to 2016. The district bounced from Republican Jeb Bradley to Democrat Carol Shea-Porter in 2006, to Republican Frank Guita in 2010, back to Shea-Porter in 2012, again to Guinta in 2014, and finally back to Shea-Porter in 2016.

While Donald Trump carried the district—47% to 46%—in 2016, Biden easily flipped it blue 4 years later—by 6 points. Trump cut into this margin this past November but still lost the district to Harris by just under 2 points.

2nd Congressional District

New Hampshire’s 2nd Congressional District covers the Connecticut River Valley in the west, extends to Canada in the north, and includes Nashua and the state capital, Concord, in the south. In November, residents elected Democrat Maggie Goodlander—the wife of Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan—to represent the district, replacing retiring six-term Democrat Annie Kuster. Goodlander delivered a 5-point victory against Republican Lily Williams, an impressive feat for a non-incumbent.

Slightly more liberal than its sister to the east, Democrats have won the 2nd district in all but one election since 2006, with the exception being the landmark Republican victory in the 2010 midterms. It was the 2nd that kept New Hampshire blue in 2016—Hillary Clinton carried it 48% to 45%—while the 1st, as you might remember, just barely went for Trump.

Swing State Status

The true modern era of New Hampshire presidential politics, when the Granite State gained its status as reliably purple, began in 1992. Prior to this, New Hampshire was a Republican stronghold from the birth of the party in 1856—excluding the victories of Democrats Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and 1916, FDR in 1936, 1940, and 1944, and LBJ in 1964.

In the election of 1988, Vice President George H.W. Bush carried on where President Reagan left off, defeating Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis in New Hampshire with a commanding 62.5% of the vote. Not a single county in the state went blue, which is especially impressive considering even Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower lost one county in the state during his first election in 1952—Hillsborough, the home of Manchester.

The election of 1992 saw an unprecedented three-way race between President George H.W. Bush, Democratic Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton, and billionaire businessman Ross Perot. Perot’s grassroots campaign, which garnered support across the nation, focused on balancing the budget and protecting American industry, with a sheen of pragmatic populism that appealed to working class voters. In a fiscally conservative, business-friendly state like New Hampshire, this spelled trouble for the incumbent Bush.

That November, Clinton edged out Bush 38.9% to 37.7%, while Perot finished a distant third with a nonetheless respectable 22.6% of the vote. While this could have been a fluke, it was almost certainly Perot’s candidacy that sunk Bush in the state—as it turned out, it was the metaphorical straw that broke the camel’s back.

The Fall

Beginning in the 1980s, Republicans in New Hampshire faced several unfavorable conditions, the harshest being changing demographics. As you may remember from earlier, most New Hampshirites weren’t born in the state; 36% were originally from Massachusetts. During the 1970s and 80s, New Hampshire experienced the most significant population growth in its history, with well over 150,000 of these new residents since 1980 being former Bay Staters. These Massachusetts transplants brought their more liberal politics with them to the Granite State, greatly contributing to the Democratic victories of 1990s.

Another detrimental shift that occurred was in the Republican Party platform, one that placed social issues front and center. The “Moral Majority” movement within the Republican Party, which began in the late 1970s, may have helped Ronald Reagan wrestle evangelical voters in the South away from Jimmy Carter, but in New Hampshire, it won him no supporters.

The low religiosity—and by extension, socially progressive views—of New Hampshire voters did not align with the Republican Party’s increased emphasis on issues like abortion, school prayer, and family values. As the GOP platform of the 1980s and 90s trailed away from placing economic policies front and center, New Hampshire voters increasingly turned elsewhere, notably to Ross Perot and Bill Clinton.

Republican No More

New Hampshire embodies the political shift that has occurred since the 2016 election—a shift that, while favorable to Republicans nationally, doesn’t apply universally, including in the Granite State. While Donald Trump was propelled to his first victory almost entirely by white voters, educated and uneducated, this coalition shrank considerably in his two following races.

Republicans made considerable inroads with minority groups who were previously considered the base of the Democratic Party. This allowed Trump to trounce Kamala Harris in the swing states without his old level of support from white Americans. The former President won 55% of Latino men—a net improvement of 33 points from 2020—and lost Black men to Harris by 56 points, up significantly from a 60-point loss to Biden and 69-point loss to Clinton.

This is all well and good for the GOP in ethnically diverse battleground states like Florida, Nevada, Georgia, and Arizona—and to a lesser extent, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. However, in New Hampshire, with its well-educated, white electorate, this spells trouble.

2016

Trump won white voters with a college degree by 3 points—a significant decline from Mitt Romney’s 14-point margin four years prior. However, this was still enough to put him over the finish line in the Rust Belt. It wasn’t white voters with college degrees that won Trump states Romney had lost; it was the non-college vote that made the difference. Trump won white voters with no college degree by a remarkable 37 points, compared to Romney’s 26-point margin with this group.

Trump lost New Hampshire to Hillary Clinton by 0.37 points—2,736 votes—the narrowest margin of the election besides Michigan. This was a 5.21-point improvement on Mitt Romney’s numbers in 2012 and marked the best performance for a Republican in the state since George Bush in 2000.

2020

This time, amid a global pandemic, Joe Biden won white voters with a college degree by 3 points—a considerable gain for the Democrats. White voters without college degrees held strong for Trump, favoring him by 35 points, slightly below 2016 levels.

Unlike four years prior, election night in New Hampshire was not a nail biter. Biden carried the state by 7.35 points—59,277 votes—the best showing for a Democrat since Barack Obama in 2008.

2024

Last fall, in what was initially his rematch with Joe Biden—and later, Vice President Kamala Harris—Donald Trump was back with a vengeance.

All of Trump’s controversies since the last election: the “Big Lie,” January 6th, being found liable for rape, and a felony hush money conviction, to name just the most memorable—may have galvanized his MAGA base but did little to change the trajectory of New Hampshire’s socially liberal, old-school fiscally conservative electorate.

Of course, just like in every county of every state in the nation, it all came down to one or two big issues: inflation and the border—and in the Granite State it was no different. This amounted to an over-performance compared to 2020, but still a considerable decline from the former President’s 2016 numbers.

Harris won New Hampshire with a slim majority—50.65% of the electorate—while Trump netted 47.87%, a deficit of 2.72 points, or some 22,965 votes. This gave the Granite State the distinction of being the lightest blue state of this election cycle—the closest to falling to Trump.

We constantly were bombarded with updates on polling from the swingy seven: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, all throughout last fall. But if one other state could have been added to the bunch—rounding it out as the not-so-catchy Erratic Eight—it would’ve been New Hampshire.

Senate 2026

As I hinted at earlier, the disconnect between a GOP-dominated state government, led until recently by the heir to a political dynasty treated like royalty—and a fiercely blue congressional delegation could come to a head, if one figure threatened to make a leap between the two.

This now appears to be becoming true after it was reported in early September that John Sununu, former governor Chris Sununu’s elder brother, and a former Senator himself, is exploring a run to reclaim his old seat—which he lost to Jeanne Shaheen in 2008. Shaheen, who also served as Governor from 1997 to 2003, is quickly approaching 80 and announced that she is not seeking a fourth term.

This leaves Democrats in a precarious position: a popular senator retiring in a state that barely went for Kamala Harris last year—and with an equally, if not more, popular Republican family ready to snatch the seat.

Democratic Representative George Pappas has already announced his candidacy to fill the open seat. However, his relatively short tenure in Congress and—perhaps more consequentially—his lack of statewide name recognition could give Sununu a key edge in the race, if he does decide to run.

Of course, only time will tell whether the GOP will go the distance, defying a decade’s worth of voting trends. Needless to say, this will be a closely watched race in the Midterms—potentially giving Senate Republicans a much-needed buffer against expected losses elsewhere.

But if there was any state where an anomaly like this could happen, it’s the always eccentric, proudly independent Granite State.

The states Arizona, Nevada, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Georgia decided the 2020 election, and were predicted to determine whether Vice President Kamala Harris or former (at the time) President Trump would take the Oval Office in 2024. And in the end, they did.

But in 2026, only three of the above states are holding Senate elections. This represents the smallest “core” playing field out of the past few election cycles. In Georgia, Democratic Sen. Jon Ossoff, who defeated incumbent Republican Sen. David Purdue alongside Sen. Raphael Warnock in a dramatic set of Jan. 5, 2021 runoffs that handed Democrats a slim 50-seat majority and set the stage for the Biden administration, is up for reelection. Slightly upwards in latitude is North Carolina, where moderate Republican Sen. Thom Tillis is retiring and popular, recently-out-of-office Democratic Gov. Roy Cooper has recently announced a run. Finally, look up north to Michigan, where two-term incumbent Democratic Sen. Gary Peters is not running for reelection and the Democratic primary is shaping up to be a bitter, hard-fought contest between MI-11 Rep. Haley Stevens — who is the favored candidate of national Democrats like former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi — and state Sen. Mallory McMorrow — who has received endorsements from many colleagues in the state legislature. Whoever emerges victorious from the Democratic primary will likely face former MI-08 Rep. candidate Mike Rogers, who in 2024 came within 20,000 votes of winning the Wolverine State’s other Senate seat.

These three races will likely be analyzed to death by forecasters and pundits, and for good reason: they will probably feature the closest results and the highest amount of spending due to the relatively large populations and expensive media markets of all three states.

Republicans currently hold a 53-seat majority in the Senate, meaning that Democrats must hold on to their current Senate seats and win four Republican-held seats to win a 51-seat, tiebreaker-proof majority. On a surface level, the cards seem to be stacked in Republicans’ favor. However, their objective should be to not only retain their majority, but expand it.

Large components of Trump’s agenda have either been derailed or delayed due to resistance from the most moderate voices in the caucus: think Alaska Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Maine Sen. Susan Collins, North Carolina Sen. Thom Tillis, Utah Sen. John Curtis, and occasionally Kentucky Sen. and former Republican leader Mitch McConnell. McConnell isn’t running for reelection in 2026, and the race to succeed him will likely be hotly contested between former state Attorney General Daniel Cameron and KY-06 Rep. Andy Barr. Of the two, Cameron represents the more mainline conservative while Barr has identified with the far right during his House of Representatives tenure. As mentioned earlier, Tillis is retiring and his seat is up for grabs in 2026, but his proven success as a quasi-moderate Republican in a state where far-right lunatics like former Lt. Gov. Mark Robinson were punished by voters (he lost the state’s 2024 gubernatorial election by 14.8 percentage points) might caution the state party about nominating a more Trumpy successor. Collins is running for reelection in 2026, but again, her track record of success in a Democratic-leaning state should hold off the party from considering a primary challenger despite her moderate voting record in D.C. Finally, Murkowski and Curtis aren’t up for reelection in 2026.

To summarize: at least two (and likely more) members of the moderate wing will remain for the entirety of Trump’s second term, so Republicans would be wise to target additional seats in order to strengthen the conservative core of their majority.

Democrats no longer have to deal with former Sens. Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema, both perpetual roadblocks who held up many of Democrats’ more progressive agenda items — raising the federal minimum wage, eliminating the filibuster, and the Biden administration’s signature multi-trillion dollar spending package known colloquially as Build Back Better. Their sole objective should be a net gain of four seats, but this simple-sounding task won’t be an easy one. Two of the three swing-state seats are already held by Democrats. Not only does this deprive them of pickup opportunities, but it also forces them to play defense, allocating significant resources towards Michigan and Georgia that could be spent in other areas.

All this being said: it is not just beneficial but absolutely necessary that both parties target seats outside of their “comfort zone” — which I’m defining as states which voted for a single party in both the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections.

Democrats

ALASKA: A waiting game for Peltola

For Democrats, Alaska has always been a “wait for lightning to strike” state. former Democratic AK-AL Rep. Mary Peltola has the profile to make that lightning bolt real: popular, bipartisan appeal, and already tested in tough statewide races. She first defeated former Gov. Sarah Palin in a 2022 special election by 3 percentage points, then by 10 in the regular November election. In 2024, despite Trump winning the Last Frontier by 13.1 percentage points, Peltola came within 2.8 points of winning a second full term, despite being defeated by current Republican Rep. Nick Begich III — a full 10 point overperformance. Peltola, with a unique mix of progressive and conservative policy positions — supporting gun rights while being pro-choice and an adamant defender of LGBTQ protections — and a personal brand focused heavily on regional industries like fisheries, is the real deal.

The problem? Dan Sullivan is steady, uncontroversial, and not especially vulnerable. Peltola might decide the smarter play is holding off until Lisa Murkowski’s next cycle in 2028, when an open race could be within reach.

IOWA: A democratic revival?

Iowa has been anything fertile ground for Democrats in the past decade. After former Pres. Barack Obama won the Hawkeye State by healthy margins in 2008 and 2012, the state’s voters lurched to the right and haven’t looked back since. The root cause: the state’s large rural population — primarily in the agricultural industry due to the state’s location amidst the Great Plains — has abandoned Democrats en masse as its center of influence has shifted from the Midwest to the coasts and Republicans — largely led by Pres. Donald Trump — have embraced populism and rhetoric designed to appeal to working-class whites.

In general, the Iowan picture is dire for Democrats, but in a midterm environment, the calculus can change. In 2018, Democrats took 3 of 4 House of Representatives seats despite the state supporting Trump by near-double digits in the surrounding elections of 2016 and 2020. In 2022, Democratic Senate nominee Michael Franken held longtime Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley to the lowest margin of victory in his career. In midterm environments, where high turnout isn’t guaranteed and rural, less highly-educated voters are more likely to stay home, the results have more room for variability.

Add in former Paralympian basketball player Josh Turek, who among a field of Democratic options seems to have the most compelling and authentic narrative, and Iowa might just host a real racr.

Recently, incumbent Sen. Joni Ernst dropped out of the race after delivering an oppo-soundbyte for the ages in response to concerns about Medicaid spending under Trump: “We’re all going to die.” Running to replace her is IA-02 Rep and former news anchor Ashley Hinson, who like most Republicans running for Senate has chosen to embrace Trump fully — which in a state with as strong a MAGA presence as any, might not be a misstep.

Additionally: Democratic State Auditor Rob Sand’s — the only statewide Democrat to win an election in 2022 — strong gubernatorial campaign will very likely benefit the Democratic Senate nominee as a result of its coattail effect.

Despite these favorable conditions, whoever wins the Democratic primary will be fighting a very uphill battle. This is an unavoidable reality for the Democratic party in Iowa. But looking beyond the one seat, a competitive race here (along with a dogfight at the top of the ballot) could breathe life back into the state party.

KANSAS: The independent wild card

Incumbent Republican Sen. and physician Roger Marshall doesn’t draw the same headlines as Josh Hawley or Ted Cruz, but make no mistake: he’s cut from the same ultra-conservative, hardline-MAGA cloth, and that makes him vulnerable to a centrist or independent challenge. Kansas has been trending in intriguing ways: white voters — especially those in suburban collar counties surrounding Kansas City and Topeka, as well as college towns like Lawrence — are moving left, and in 2024, the state handed Trump at 16.1 percent margin of victory while simultaneously trending left by 5.5 points compared to national averages (since the nation as a whole shifted around 6 points to the right). Coupled with a favorable national environment — which seems likely given Trump’s declining popularity numbers — if Democrats can convince KS-03 Rep. Sharice Davids to run, who has consistently overperformed national Democrats since defeating incumbent Republican Rep. Kevin Yoder in 2018, things might just get interesting.

There’s another possibly, though: remember all the way back to 2014, when independent candidate and businessman Greg Orman ran in lieu of a Democratic nominee and held longtime incumbent Sen. Pat Roberts to a smaller-than-expect 12 percent margin of victory despite a Republican-friendly national environment (it was Obama’s second midterm). This strategy has seen repeated success in tightening seemingly-safe Republican races in states like Utah and Nebraska in the years since. These states’ similar demographics —largely white, rural, and not overly religious — which seem to create an environment favorable to third-way candidacies. Kansas could become one of the cycle’s strangest but most fascinating races.

TEXAS: The Cornyn conundrum

Texas always tempts Democrats, but rarely delivers. After featuring its closest presidential race in the 21st century in 2020, with Trump winning the state by a narrow 5.6 percentage points, Texas has shifted farther back into familiar Republican terrain. In 2024, Trump won the Lone Star State by 13.7 percentage points, largely riding off record-high Latino support in southern Texas and holding off Democratic gains in the suburbs surrounding the Dallas and Austin metros.

The wrinkle this cycle is whether Ken Paxton, the scandal-plagued Attorney General, can pull off a primary against John Cornyn. After leading in most early primary polling, Paxton has seen his lead crumble after calling for prayer time in schools and reports of adultery — culminating in his recent divorce — circulated.

If Paxton manages to win the primary, which is still a ways away, he will emerge battered and bloody. Democrats will no doubt see blood in the water. Former Democratic Rep. Colin Allred, who overperformed Kamala Harris in his Senate race against Ted Cruz last November, is running again. State Rep. James Tallerico, who caught fire on the internet due to his unique mix of piousness and progressivism, also recently entered the race. A prolonged and brutal Democratic primary could set their sights off the real challenge: facing whichever Republican makes it to the November general. Ideally, one of the two Democrats eventually steps aside and lends their full support to the other — or, it becomes clear which candidate is superior and they are able to win the primary with ease. Time will tell the rest of the story on both sides of the race — and right now, plenty on time remains.

Republicans

NEW JERSEY: Cementing a Republican resurgence?

Perhaps the most intriguing under-the-rader result in 2024 was that of New Jersey: Kamala Harris only won the Garden State by 5.9 percentage points, a whopping 10 point shift right from 2020.

Incumbent Senator Cory Booker (D), first elected in 2013, has officially filed for re-election to a third full term in 2026. While he is undoubtedly a charismatic politician, and has performed well in his previous elections, he is clearly a man with ambitions for higher office. In the past half-decade, he has become more and more of a national figure, culminating in his record-breaking quasi-filibuster speech in protest of the Trump administration’s aggressive dismantling of federal programs. When politicians focus on elevating their national profile, it tends to hurt their image among their constituency (see: Beto O’Rourke). This isn’t always true, but it’s worth noting.

How Republicans perform in the upcoming gubernatorial election in November — four years after Republican state assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli came within 3.2 percentage points of knocking off incumbent Democratic Gov. Phil Murphy in what would’ve been one of the greatest upsets of the 21st century — will play a large role in determining how seriously Republicans take next year’s Senate race. Ciattarelli is running again, this time against Democratic NJ-11 Rep. Mikie Sherrill, a former naval and federal officer. Sherrill leads most of the polling aggregates by around 8 percentage points, but it wouldn’t be difficult to envision a reality where Sherrill wins by less than 5. If this is the case, I wouldn’t be surprised if national Republicans started paying more attention to New Jersey. While no serious candidates have announced a Senate run yet, there are a couple prospective Republicans who could make it a serious contest. While NJ-07 Rep. Tom Kean has announced he is running for reelection in his current seat, I wouldn’t be surprised if he switches races following an unexpectedly close result in November. Similarly, I could also see Ciattarelli jumping into the Senate race if he once again comes edges to victory in November.

VIRGINIA: A recurring, elusive target

Virginia is a similar story to that of New Jersey: states with large suburban, affluent, highly-educated populations which shifted left during the first Trump term but returned to more conservative habits during the Biden administration. Coincidentally, the Old Dominion will also feature a gubernatorial election this November, following Republican businessman and current Gov. Glenn Youngkin’s stunning upset in the 2021 gubernatorial election four years prior. Because of Virginia’s unique constitution, Youngkin cannot seek a consecutive second term; running largely as his successor is Lt. Gov. Winsome Sears, who has run into considerable controversy after making — and doubling down on — numerous homophobic and transphobic statements. Opposing her is former VA-07 Rep. Abigail Spanberger, a moderate Democrat during her time in the House. Spanberger’s 2025 gubernatorial campaign offers a window into the strategic ground Democrats intend to hold. Campaigning in rural locales across the Commonwealth—from oyster farms to Appalachian towns—she targeted communities where Trump made gains in 2024. In several rural counties (for example, Nottoway, Powhatan, Amelia, and Louisa), Spanberger had outperformed Biden in 2020 — evidence of her potential to erode GOP margins outside suburban corridors. Yet Republicans such as Earle-Sears are deploying nationalized messaging — framing Democrats as too urban and disconnected — from issues ranging from socialism to rural healthcare closures. Like in New Jersey, I wouldn’t be surprising if Virginia’s 2025 gubernatorial election acts as a bellweather for 2026 and determines just how much Republican invest in the Old Dominion.

As the Commonwealth of Virginia gears up for the 2026 U.S. Senate race, the political currents are both familiar and evolving. Incumbent Senator Mark Warner, a seasoned Democrat serving since 2009, is officially seeking a fourth term, drawing on his reputation as a pragmatic centrist in a state that has steadily trended blue over the past two cycles. His expected campaign will be tested by both demographic transformations and strategic GOP maneuvers aiming at a narrow opening.

Virginia in 2024 revealed just how volatile suburban dynamics have become. While Vice President Kamala Harris won the state with 51.8% of the vote — down from Biden’s 10 point margin of victory in 2020 — the battle lines shifted noticeably in key suburbs. The results in Loudon County were among the earliest indicators on November 5th, 2024, of a Republican resurgence in the suburbs. In fact, the whole of Northern Virginia and the D.C. suburbs lurched right in 2024.

From these shifting suburban trends emerges the strategic opportunity Republicans hope to capitalize on in 2026. The most discussed name on the Republican side of the aisle is that of Glenn Youngkin, whose aforementioned 2021 gubernatorial upset showcased his suburban crossover appeal.

Despite these battleground signs, Virginia’s fundamentals remain friendly to Democrats. In 2024, Senator Tim Kaine easily secured re-election with a 8.9 percentage point advantage over Republican Hung Cao, significantly over performing Kamala Harris’ 5.8 percent margin of victory.

NEW HAMPSHIRE: Building on a strong 2024

Whether New Hampshire’s 2026 Senate race truly qualifies as a sleeper is a matter of opinion. 2024 was by and large a successful year for Granite State Republicans: Trump came within 2.8 percentage points of winning, a significant improvement on his 7 point loss in 2020, and former Republican Sen. Kelly Ayotte won the open gubernatorial seat with ease — a 9.3 percentage point victory, to be specific — over Democratic nominee Joyce Craig. The stage is set for a dramatic 2026 showdown, but most agree that Democrats are still clear favorites.

When incumbent Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen announced her retirement in March 2025, Democrats lost one of their strongest incumbents — someone who in 2020 outperformed Joe Biden by nearly 10 points and consistently carved out crossover appeal that insulated her from New Hampshire’s swing-state volatility. Her departure opens the door for a rare open-seat contest, the kind of race that can scramble traditional partisan lines in a state where voters pride themselves on their independence.

On the Democratic side, the early advantage belongs to NH-01 Rep. Chris Pappas, who declared his candidacy in April. Pappas has built a record of overperformance in the state’s most competitive district, where he won tough reelection fights in years like 2022 that were unfavorable for Democrats nationally. His ability to survive in a swing district gives him credibility as a statewide candidate, especially in a cycle where Democrats desperately need someone who can unite progressives, moderates, and independents. Perhaps most importantly, Pappas benefits from the lack of a messy or toxic primary. With other major figures such as freshman Rep. Maggie Goodlander declining to run, the party is largely coalescing around him. That matters in New Hampshire, which holds very late primaries that often leave nominees with little time to recover before the general election. Republicans, meanwhile, are again turning to the Sununu dynasty.

The twist? This time, it’s not Chris.

Popular 4-term Governor Chris Sununu declined to enter the race, his brother, former Senator John Sununu, has stepped forward to reclaim his old seat. It may not be the Sununu Republicans initially hoped for, but the name carries weight in New Hampshire politics, evoking respect from both party loyalists and independent voters who value the family’s decades-long presence in public service. Added to the mix is another name from (relatively) long ago: Scott Brown, the former Massachusetts senator and Trump’s ambassador to New Zealand during his first term, who officially launched his campaign in June 2025. Brown has attempted to frame himself as a conservative outsider with national credentials, but his Massachusetts roots could be a liability in a state that takes its local identity seriously (read my previous article of carpetbagging for a more in-depth look at the phenomenon)

The contest is shaping up as a classic test of dynasty politics versus fresh Democratic overperformance. On one side, Republicans hope the Sununu name will resonate in the absence of the equally prestigious surname Shaheen, giving them a chance to flip a seat Democrats have held since 2008. On the other, Pappas is banking on his track record of surviving tough races and his ability to avoid internal party warfare to present himself as the steady hand for Democrats in a volatile state. Both parties know New Hampshire’s electorate is notoriously fickle, and with Shaheen no longer on the ballot, this race is as wide open as it’s been in more than a decade.

The score?

Progressives: 1

Establishment: 0.

To be more accurate (final round tally):

State Rep. Zohran Mamdani: 56.39%

Former Gov. Andrew Cuomo: 43.61%

Of course, the story of the 2025 New York Democratic mayoral primary involves far more than a single battle between perennial enemy wings of the Democratic party in a never-ending series of them. It's the story of a career politician and dynasty scion, emblematic of the hated “swamp”, attempting to regain his political clout after a quick and humiliating fall from power and grace; it’s the story of a young, charismatic lawmaker who used a mix of savvy online networking and old-school ground campaigning (he traversed the vertical length of Manhattan by foot just before the election, conversing with New Yorkers every step of the way) to rally hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic supporters to the polls.

But for all the things the 2025 election could have been about, the bottom line is this: Cuomo targeted — and people perceived — Mamdani as a leftist; Mamdani targeted — and people perceived — Cuomo as a moderate. In the minds of the electorate and the candidates themselves, this was an ideological clash above all — and there was perhaps no recent iteration of the Democratic Party more divided than the one that remained, albeit tattered, after the cataclysmic 2024 election.

Progressives blamed “empty-suit” moderates for failing to attack Trump on his many weak points — whether policy or character-wise. Moderates blamed “idealistic activist” progressives for rifling divide and schism in the party on the grounds of contentious issues like the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the Biden administration’s perceived failure in acting many progressive agenda items — whether eliminating the filibuster or raising the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour.

Mamdani, who in the span of a couple months had undergone a metamorphosis from little-known state assemblyman in Astoria to a blazing star on the frontlines of a resurrected, furious left-wing movement, has cemented himself in the minds of many — and not just those on the far left fringes — as the future of the Democratic Party. More specifically, a Democratic Party that imbued with the spirit and direction necessary to fight President Trump — who, for all of his misdeeds, cannot be faulted for a lack of conviction. Who better to lead such a crusade than a man who effectively willed himself into political celebrity and more than likely, the executive office of the most important city in the world?

Now, if the 2024 election — and the consequences that awaited Democrats’ hasty decision to nominate Kamala Harris without a fully fledged primary simply because it seemed the most appealing option at the time — taught us anything, it’s that the appealing option isn’t necessarily the right one. At the very least, it’s worth considering the pros and cons.

What can Democrats learn from Mamdani’s win? What should they be careful to accept as mantra for a party that must win not only urban voters — a historically liberal voting bloc — but also suburban and rural ones?

KEEP: Highlighting the cost-of-living reality

If Mamdani’s campaign spoke one thing more than others, it was the daily grind of living in high-cost places like New York. Groceries that burn through a paycheck, rent that demands half a month’s salary, and basic necessities that feel like luxuries — these are the pressure points that likely resonated most deeply with voters. Mamdani kept his message laser-focused on affordability, drawing a clear contrast with the perception of establishment Democrats as out-of-touch with working families’ struggles. While many of his proposals were met with pushback by more moderate minds — the most glaring example being his rent-freeze plan, criticized by even liberals as impractical and idealistic — they succeeded in showing the voters, beyond doubt, where he stood. Boldness is a quality shown to have been increasingly rewarded by voters over the last decade of elections. When applied to the right message — in this case, one about a pressing issue at the top of many New Yorkers’ minds — it can be a game-changer.

It’s no coincidence that frustration with cost-of-living has driven large shifts to the right in New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. In 2024 alone, New York City swung more than 10 points in the Republican direction, accelerating a trend dating back to 2020. Mamdani’s appeal worked precisely because he zeroed in on this issue while others danced around it.

DISPOSE: Leftism worked in New York, therefore it’s the path forward on the national level

While it may sound obvious, it’s important to remember that this was a Democratic primary. The voters who turned out were, by and large, overwhelmingly liberal. Just to hammer it home: New York has closed primaries, meaning only registered Democrats could cast a vote in the respective primary, eliminating the possibly of a Republican voting bloc significantly affecting the results. Declaring this a referendum on the American electorate is wishful thinking. Much of Mamdani’s support came from white, affluent, well-educated precincts; members of this bloc tend to identity with the far left end of the ideological spectrum. Andrew Cuomo, by contrast, performed better with working-class minority voters, and the highest-among-highly educated of voters1 — these results are in line with his campaign’s dual focus of attracting working-class minorities who had shown clear signs of frustration at Democratic governance in 2021, 2022, and 2024, (the previous mayoral, gubernatorial, and presidential elections, respectively) and millionaire socialites who generally leaned fiscally conservative. While Cuomo’s coalition proved incapable of handing him the victory in New York, it (especially the working-class minority sect) is a demographic Democrats most need to win back if they hope to stop hemorrhaging support in areas they once considered safe.

The story here isn’t that progressivism is sweeping the nation. It’s that progressive messages resonate with a certain bloc in certain contexts. To extrapolate beyond that is to risk repeating the same mistakes of the past decade.

KEEP: Young faces win races

At the risk of perpetuating ageism, the honest truth is this: younger candidates are simply better at connecting with younger voters. Before Mamdani, it was Brandon Johnson — who won the 2023 Chicago mayoral democratic primary on the back of a similar coalition and platform. Before Johnson, it was AOC. Before AOC, it was Barack Obama, who at the time of running for president in 2008 was 47 years old (equivalent to being in your early 20’s by political standards).

This is not to say that younger candidates are more electorally viable. Take, 2024, for instance: Kamala Harris, 19 years Trump’s junior, certainly didn’t benefit from any sort of “youth boost”. But there are many elections where the name of the game is turnout — think primary elections held in the middle of summer, but also midterms, where turnout historically dips from presidential elections like ‘24. Youngsters aged 18 to 24 are arguably the most difficult voting bloc to enthuse, but also one essential to a winning campaign, and for this reason candidates like Mamdani, whose baby face — hardly at all obscured by his beard — along with his jubilant smile and physical and rhetorical vitality — not just the 10-mile trek but also his headline-grabbing, viral TikTok-inducing rallies — were a perfect match.

The end result speaks for itself.

DISPOSE: Unrealistic policies

A few paragraphs ago, I praised Mamdani for going big rather than going home with his policy platform. That praise must be accompanied with a few words of caution: by and large, voters reject ideas (and the people selling them) when said ideas sound too good to be true.

Zohran Mamdani’s agenda, while bold, has drawn heavy criticism — not just from those who had a stake in the election outcome, but also ordinary, skeptical citizens — for being impractical and potentially harmful to the very communities he aims to help. His push for a $30 minimum wage by 2030 risks accelerating automation and wiping out low-wage jobs — not to mention the ever-present but equally valid question: how do we pay for it? — while his plan for city-run grocery stores—one per borough—has been slammed as symbolic at best and a logistical nightmare at worst. His rent freeze and promise of 200,000 new affordable units echo failed de Blasio-era policies that neither slowed rent hikes nor curbed homelessness, with real estate experts warning they could further deteriorate housing quality. Similarly, his call for fare-free buses, though popular with riders, would saddle the city with an annual $650 million bill without a clear funding source. To pay for all this, Mamdani proposes steep tax hikes on corporations and millionaires, sparking fears of capital flight and economic decline. Even beyond economics, his rhetoric—such as defending “globalize the Intifada”—has inflamed cultural and political divisions. Taken together, Mamdani’s proposals look less like a pragmatic roadmap for New York’s future and more like a collection of expensive experiments that could undermine the city’s stability.

I am no expert, nor am I a seasoned campaign strategist, but here are my two cents: a good policy is one that sounds good enough to inspire real support, but not so good (good meaning trade-off-less, or absolute in scale without of the any qualifiers or caveats that our necessary in an imperfect world) that it makes you wonder if it has any basis in reality. Mamdani erred on the side of too good, and while the results panned out in his favor, the too-good-to-be-true policy platform has seen a less favorable reception on the national level. Think: defund the police (blanket statement); Medicare for All (who pays?); and tuition-free public college (more of the same).

KEEP: Star rookies over seasoned veterans

Experience, once considered the cornerstone of credibility in American politics, has increasingly become a double-edged sword. Far from guaranteeing respect or authority, a long track record in government can make candidates appear jaded, compromised, or simply out of touch with the urgency voters feel in their daily lives. For many, decades of experience are no longer proof of wisdom but evidence of entrenchment within a system widely viewed as broken. The 2016 election was a watershed moment in this regard: Donald Trump’s victory underscored that charisma, outsider energy, and a raw sense of authenticity could eclipse traditional measures of competence. Since then, the trend has only accelerated. Younger, less-seasoned candidates are able to present themselves as fresh alternatives untainted by backroom deals or political baggage, and that very lack of experience becomes part of their appeal. To voters grappling with soaring costs, stagnant wages, and failing institutions, “business as usual” is a liability, not a comfort. In this environment, experience doesn’t just fail to inspire — it actively alienates, reinforcing the sense that career politicians are not just incapable of, but actually opposed to delivering the transformation that many voters crave.

Andrew Cuomo’s political pedigree should have been an asset, but in the current climate it likely worked against him. Decades of experience, from his tenure as governor to his years navigating New York’s political machinery, made him the embodiment of establishment politics at a time when voters were actively rejecting it. For many, Cuomo’s résumé was less a testament to steady leadership and more a reminder of missteps, scandals, and a governing style that felt outdated and heavy-handed. Against a younger opponent like Zohran Mamdani, who positioned himself as a fresh face unburdened by baggage, Cuomo’s deep experience became a liability. It reinforced the perception that he was part of the problem, a figure shaped by the very system people feel is broken. In politics today, bad experience is worse than no experience at all—because it ties a candidate not just to a history of decisions but to a sense of stagnation, compromise, and mistrust. Mamdani didn’t need decades of service to make his case; he needed to embody something different, something new. That contrast alone was enough to tip the balance.

DISPOSE: The notion that progressivism is on the rise again, circa November 5th, 2024

One final point: I’ve seen many in progressive circles celebrate the election results as irrefutable evidence that the progressive movement has experienced a surge of support — similar to what was seen in 2016 thanks to Sen. Bernie Sander’s insurgent and wildly successful primary campaign — since the 2024 presidential election. For context: 2024 wasn’t just a bad year for progressivism — it might have been its worst year since entering the national conversation a decade ago.

During the primary season, far-left Squad members Rep. Cori Bush and Rep. Jamaal Bowman were defeated in their reelection bids with relative ease by more moderate primary challengers. On Election Day, while progressive leaders Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib overperformed in their districts NY-14 and MI-12, respectively, compared to Kamala Harris (though gold-standard analyst Lakshya Jain has explained why AOC’s sunny numbers might be overrating her electoral viability2 ), others like Sens. Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren turned in poor performances, despite being longtime political institutions in their respective states of Vermont and Massachusetts.

With this in mind, the idea that 6 months and a single local primary race — albeit a high-profile one in the largest city in the nation — could reveal a large-scale shift in the public perception of progressivism is quite unlikely.

Here’s an example. 2021 was another disappointing year for progressives. In the 2021 New York mayoral democratic primary election, progressive candidate and New School Prof. Maya Wiley only placed third. The top two candidates, Sanitation Department Commissioner Kathryn Garcia and Brooklyn Borough President Eric Adams were both moderate Democrats, with the more conservative of the two, Eric Adams, eventually taking it all. Come Election Day, in the city of Buffalo — New York’s second largest beyond the Big Apple — the Democratic nominee for mayor, progressive activist and nurse India Walton, was defeated in the general election. Not by a Republican, but by the incumbent Democratic mayor she had defeated in the June primary and who was now running a write-in campaign, Byron Brown. Similar woes transpired in mayoral races in Seattle and Cleveland, as well as with a progressive-supported ballot initiative which attempted to replace the Minneapolis Police Department with a proposed Department of Public Safety.

Needless to say, 2021 wasn’t a pretty sight, and I’ve previously shown how dire things had gotten — even rising to the level of federal races — in 2024.

But between 2021 and 2024, Brandon Johnson, a member of Cook County Board of Commissioners and rising progressive star in Illinois, upset moderate Democrat and former Lt. Gov. Paul Vallas in the 2023 Chicago mayoral democratic primary election. Viewing this single election in isolation, you might (and many at the time did) assume that progressivism was on the rise again after faltering in 2021. Of course, the general trend across the 3-year timespan suggests anything but.

The lesson here is to never is to never extrapolate from single elections in isolation — rather, it’s more important to rationalize them in context of their surroundings. I am not going to argue that progressivism hasn't grown incrementally in popularity since November 2024. Considering Trump’s laundry list of controversial and posssibly-destructive actions committed or proposed since taking office, I would lean towards the viewpoint that progressivism is more popular than 6 months ago. That being said, a single election in the middle of summer decided by a population incredibly unrepresentative of the United States at large is unlikely to be a useful indicator nor answer.

The bottom line

In general, I believe that 2025 New York mayoral democratic primary provides much more insight about the changing formula behind a winning campaign rather than indicating specific shifts in the electorate at large — most notably, the state of progressivism. To generate an accurate picture of large-scale change, you simply need a bigger sample — bigger geographically, greater amounts of voters, and a wider variety of demographics that reflect the ideological and cultural diversity of our entire nation.

In this article, I seek to break down the results of this election and ask some important questions. What went right for Trump? But also, what could the former president have done better? Why did Kamala Harris underperform so drastically? And what made the Democrats misjudge this race so catastrophically? And finally, the most interesting question: what trends in American electorate emerged this election? Before we continue, I would like to add that it has also been two months since Harris conceded the race, which is more than can be said about the 2020 election.

To answer our first question: what went right for Trump? — a lot of things did. The 45th (and soon to be 47th) president went the distance in this race — something that cannot be said of President Biden — though he received plenty of help from a variety of sources.

Things did not get off to a great start for Trump; his campaign announcement came just days after the GOP’s disappointing performance in 2022 midterms — which was partially the result of his endorsement of weak congressional candidates — and was met with a tepid response. This was not the Trump we all remembered: he looked older, more tired, and nothing like the firebrand political outsider of the summer of ‘15. Trump slogged around the country for the next six months, half-heartedly running a primary campaign while facing new legal troubles in New York and Washington. But in this early stage of the race, Trump’s liabilities: his criminal and civil cases, proved to be his strength, rallying his base and allowing him to cruise to victory in the primaries.

Throughout the spring, Trump retained a slight edge in the polls over President Biden — whose own campaign we will discuss in detail later. There are many valid reasons why the once disgraced former president was now leading the incumbent who beat him: high grocery and gas prices, questionable foreign policy decisions by the Biden Administration, and, of course, a wide-open southern border. But conversely, Trump faced three pending criminal cases — for racketeering, mishandling documents, and attempting to overturn the 2020 election — two civil judgements: one fining him $355 million for fraud and the other $88.3 million for sexual assault, and finally, a felony conviction on 34 counts of falsifying business records, in the Southern District of New York. So, the race remained tight.

It took a catalyst to cement Trump’s lead, making it insurmountable for Biden and likely any other Democrat candidate. The June 27th presidential debate between Donald Trump and Joe Biden was the ultimate catalyst. Did I know when my friends and I sat down to watch that we’d be witnessing a moment for the history books, the moment Joe Biden ended his half-century long political career to an audience of 50 million people? No, I didn’t. As the debate went on, my initial laughter at the president’s gaffes — we finally beat Medicare — turned to sadness for a man who was clearly in decline. And while Trump consistently went off topic and spouted a myriad of lies, it didn’t matter; it was over for President Biden, and Trump’s similarly disappointing performance was completely irrelevant.

In July, Trump’s campaign was handed another political boost — in the form of a bullet to the ear. The tragic events in Butler, Pennsylvania that left two dead — a rallygoer and the shooter himself — came but millimeters from changing the course of American history, for better or for worse. I must admit, Trump’s defiant fist in the face of near destruction was truly inspiring — and it spawned a photo for the ages.

The final piece of good luck Trump had was with his criminal cases. While his New York trial ended with a guilty verdict last May, none of Trump’s three other cases made it to trial before election day; Jack Smith’s mishandling documents case was dismissed last July, his overturning the 2020 election case was delayed in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s ruling on presidential immunity, and Fani Willis’ racketeering case in Georgia was hampered by a romantic relationship she had with the case’s special prosecutor. Additionally, Trump’s sentencing in New York was repeatedly pushed back throughout the summer and fall — finally being set for January 10th. This streak of delays and dismissals allowed the former president to take his legal troubles out of the spotlight during the final months of the campaign.

This race — from the very beginning — was Trump’s to lose, and he came very close to doing so. While Trump was more restrained in this campaign than in his prior two — which isn’t saying much — the former president still constantly put his foot in his mouth. From declaring that illegal migrants are “poisoning the blood of our country,” to saying his political opponents “live like vermin,” Trump handed the Democrats ammunition — all the Hitler comparisons.

Additionally, Trump’s choice of Ohio Senator JD Vance as his running mate was a massive stumble. Vance — a white man from a safely red state — brought very little to the ticket. But he was shockingly effective at isolating women voters with his comments about abortion and the infamous “childless cat ladies.” And while JD did deliver a solid vice-presidential debate performance against Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, if Trump had chosen a woman, minority, or resident of a swing state instead — the race would have been lights out.

From late June to mid-July of last year, Donald Trump was on a roll. After watching his opponent self-destruct on live TV and surviving a bullet to the head he had the chance to cap off the month — arguably the greatest for a presidential candidate in history — with his speech at the RNC. Either unfortunately or fortunately — Trump squandered this moment by delivering a rambling 90-minute speech where he praised “the late great Hannibal Lecter” instead of seeking to unify the country against political violence. Only three days later, Biden would be out — and Harris would have all the momentum behind her.

Lastly, Trump’s performance in his debate against Kamala Harris certainly didn’t help him. In similar fashion to the June debate, Trump dodged most of the questions. But unlike the first one, now he was center of attention — the old man struggling to stay on topic. Harris did a masterful job at getting under the former president’s skin — from the size of his rallies to his criminal sentencing — making him look weak and unhinged — “they’re eating the dogs.” In the aftermath of this disastrous debate, Harris reached her highest lead over Trump in the polls — 2.1 points nationally. Yet despite this major setback, the former president was able to claw his way back over the next 55 days.

Now, we must turn to Democrats. While Joe Biden’s term as president got off to a solid start with the American Rescue Plan and Covid-19 vaccine rollout, it hit an inflection point that August — the withdrawal from Afghanistan. This operation was nothing short of a disaster for the newly elected president. Images of Afghan citizens running on runways and clinging to military transport aircrafts broadcasted incessantly — greatly damaging Biden’s image as a competent Commander-in-Chief. And a suicide bombing on August 26th, 2021 at Kabul’s airport killed 183 people — including 13 US service members. Prior to the withdrawal, Biden had enjoyed a net positive approval rating — afterwards, he would never again see it crack 50%.

Joe Biden’s presidency came to be defined by two crises: inflation and the border. Coming out of the pandemic, a perfect storm of supply chain issues, rising energy prices, and high consumer demand fueled by government stimulus triggered a surge in inflation. The consumer price index (CPI) ballooned from 1.4% in January 2021 to 9.1% in June 2022. Despite having very little control over inflation, Biden has been seen by many voters as responsible — Republicans seizing on this attack.

On the border crisis, the president’s negligence deserves considerably more blame. In his first 100 days, Biden reversed 10 of Trump’s executive orders on immigration — halting construction of the border wall, stopping deportations, and reversing the “Muslim ban.” This relaxed border policy emboldened millions to cross the southern border, with the Biden Administration doing extremely little to address the crisis until mid-2023. There have more than 8 million encounters at the southern border since President Biden took office — an enormous gift to Trump and the GOP.

In 2020, Biden ran as a transition candidate with the singular aim of defeating Donald Trump and beginning the “return to normalcy.” Americans assumed the 78-year-old would be a one-term president — but Biden disagreed. The president’s reluctance to step aside allowed him to coast through ‘22 and the beginning of ‘23 without any Democrat challenging him. And when Biden finally announced his bid for reelection on April 25th, 2023 — the culmination of two years of careful planning. The party stood by him despite uneasiness about his age and mental acuity — allowing him to secure the nomination basically unopposed.

From this point on, many mistakes were made. The Democrats miscalculated by throwing Biden into a debate with Trump — unable to ‘Weekend at Bernie’s’ their way across the finish line. And those 24 days from Biden’s catastrophic debate and to the president finally seeing the writing on wall were squandered — letting Trump run away further with the race. Finally, when Biden dropped out on July 21st, the immediate rallying behind Kamala Harris ended any hopes of an open primary — and she would go on to clinch the nomination in a single day.

It’s admittedly ironic how the Democrats — the party that loves to talk about democracy — denied its voters the right to choose who their presidential candidate should be. Kamala Harris was handed the nomination, and elevated as the face of the Democratic party, without ever receiving a primary vote. This was an incredible error — one that both made the party look shady, denied its voters the opportunity to choose their favored candidate, and propped up an arguably less-than-ideal nominee. But regardless of whether it was the right call — from a moral, ethical, and strategic standpoint — on July 22nd, Harris was effectively the Democratic nominee for president.

Kamala Harris’ ascent was rapid — one that caught many off guard. After all, Harris had the lowest approval rating of any vice president in modern history — 37% at the beginning of July. Her high-profile role as Biden’s “border czar” was likely a large contributor to this unpopularity — whether she actually held this position or not. However, the moment Harris became the nominee, all this bad press appeared to vanish. The vice president raised $81 million in the first 24 hours of her campaign — the largest amount in American history — and by the end of July her approval rating had risen to 42% — an incredible 6-point gain in just one month.

To state the obvious, even with the immediate hype surrounding her campaign, Harris was fighting an uphill battle against Trump. “Kamala IS brat” and falling out of coconut trees — while successful digital strategies — weren’t the proper foundation for a presidential campaign. Instead of attempting to build a platform that was differentiable from Biden’s in any way, Harris chose to spend the first month of her campaign running on vibes — specifically “joy.” The vice president went a mind-boggling 39 days — July 21st to August 29th — without giving an interview, relying on highly controlled campaign events instead. And while Harris did completely erode Trump’s lead in national polls by early August, her inability to define her campaign would come back to bite her that fall.

So, why did Kamala Harris lose so bad? Besides the obvious reasons — inflation and immigration — there were many smaller ones. It would be thoughtless to discount the role her sex and race played. The sad fact is millions of Americans won’t vote a black woman for president — whether they would admit it or not. Trump used this to his advantage, attacking Harris’ race by commenting about how she “happened to turn black.” This predictably sowed doubt about her identity — mimicking the ‘birtherism’ Trump had pushed over a decade before — and was a reminder to Americans that Harris was ‘the other.’ But let’s be clear: Harris did not lose this election just because she is a black woman.

A key error Harris made in her campaign was abandoning the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. While some — like Bill Maher — would argue it was “wokeness” that damaged Harris, the exact opposite is the case. The vice president overcompensated for the extremely liberal platform she ran on in 2020 — “Medicare for All,” decriminalizing border crossings, and banning fracking — by shifting too far right. Her environmental platform — something extremely important to younger voters — was that she actually did support fracking. Her healthcare plan — while infinitely better than Trump’s “concepts of a plan” — was simply a continuation of the Affordable Care Act. And her immigration policy went from that of a border dove to that of a border hawk — supporting the allocation of funds for Trump’s wall. To many liberal Democrats, Harris started to sound a lot like Trump — not giving them enough of a reason to come out and support her on election day.

But in the end, this race was settled long before Kamala Harris entered it. It was $4.80 for a dozen eggs, $5.60 for a pound of beef, and $5 for a gallon of gas that sent Trump back to the White House. The vice president failed to realize that campaigning on “protecting democracy” would not win her the rust belt — no matter how often they brought Liz Cheney on stage. Moreover, this race — more so than any other in recent memory — showed cracks forming in the Democratic coalition. While African Americans stayed relatively strong for Harris — with 86% support — Latinos shifted 14 points towards Trump. The former president won Latino men 54% to 44% — an incredible jump from 36% in 2020. Clearly economic issues were more far important to Latinos than Trump’s rhetoric.

And now, we must answer our final — and most interesting — question: how has 2024 changed the face of the American electorate? Of course, the obvious one was that Trump dominated. After all, Harris didn’t flip a single county blue — a first for a presidential candidate since Herbert Hoover’s reelection bid against FDR in 1932. But if we dive deep into the results — beyond the battleground states — what do we find?

Let’s begin with my home state, New York, and its neighbor to the south, New Jersey. After this election, the Empire State’s reputation as solidly blue may no longer be appropriate. New York swung 10.72 points towards Trump — the most of any state in the nation — with Harris winning it by 12.4 points, a narrower margin of victory than in the once fierce battleground state of Florida. And while New York’s move was drastic, New Jersey’s was even more astonishing. The Garden State shifted 10.02 points towards Trump, with Harris winning it by a mere 5.91 points. For comparison, Trump won Arizona — one of the big seven battleground states — by a very similar margin of 5.53 points. So, while New York’s journey to the right may take a while, New Jersey’s is much further along, and I expect the state to get much more attention in 2028.

Next, we have resilient Washington state. While so many other solid blue states yielded to Trump, the Evergreen State did so the least — by a minuscule 0.98 points. And granted, while this was still an improvement for Trump, in an election where the average state moved 3.9 points to the right, 0.98 begins to look very impressive. So, why was Washington so resilient? To put it simply — in words other than my own — Trump’s populist rhetoric and social conservatism doesn’t fare well with Washington’s growing secular, suburban, and highly-educated population. I expect this part of blue wall to stay perfectly intact — something that can’t be said for Washington’s two southern neighbors.

What do Illinois, Louisiana, and Mississippi have in common? Besides having above-average African American populations — not very much. Nevertheless, these three states share one very important distinction: they are the only where Kamala Harris received fewer votes than Hillary Clinton. In Louisiana and Mississippi, this was small decline — 13,284 and 18,463 votes, respectively. However, in Illinois, the drop was much more pronounced: Harris lost 27,866 voters while Trump gained 303,064. Trump’s ascent in Illinois makes sense; outside of Chicago, the state greatly resembles its neighbor Indiana, which Trump just won by 19 points. So as Chicago’s population continues to steadily decline and Illinois’ rural regions shift further to the right, we might have one more battleground state in the rust belt.

Colorado is a ray of sunshine for the Democratic Party. Harris just won the state by 11 points. From 2016 to 2024, while the average state moved 0.7 points to the right, Colorado shifted 6 points to left — more than any other. But this fact is unsurprising when you consider the path the Centennial State has taken over the last half-century: Colorado shaken off its rural Republican roots and embraced metropolitanism. The first state to legalize marijuana has seen rapid urban growth and an influx of highly educated workers — extremely favorable to the Democrats. The largely Republican rural residents are a declining portion of the voter base, and the state will likely continue to turn a brighter blue.

Analyze the 2020 election results state by state, and Wyoming will quickly stand out. The least populated state in the nation is also the most Republican — 69.94% of its residents cast votes for Donald Trump, beating out West Virginia’s 68.62%. And while this number is undoubtably impressive, it was just short of a major milestone: the 70% mark. Throughout the fall, I pondered this question: would Trump crack 70% in the Cowboy State this time around? Considering the former president only needed to win over 0.06% of Wyoming voters — or about 166 people — this seemed all but a certainty. On election day, Trump didn’t just crack 70%. When all was said and done, the former president received 192,663 of the 269,048 votes cast — or 71.6%.

And last — but certainly not least — let us look at the two lightest states in the nation: Wisconsin, the lightest red, and my soon-to-be home state, New Hampshire, the lightest blue. The Badger State boasts the distinction of having the closest race of the presidential election; Trump won Wisconsin by 29,397 votes — just 0.86 points. Conversely, Harris won the Granite State by 22,965 votes — a more comfortable margin of 2.72 points. It was predictable that New Hampshire would be relatively close and the lightest blue state in the case of a battleground sweep by Trump. On the other hand, Wisconsin’s result was a much greater surprise. Polling and precedent had both indicated that Michigan would have the closer race. After all, in 2016, Trump won the state by 10,704 votes — 0.23 points — an even smaller margin than Biden’s infamous 11,780 vote win in Georgia. In 2020, Michigan once again leaned closer to the left than either Wisconsin or Pennsylvania, going to Biden by 2.78 points. So, in 2024, in a race as tight as the one between Trump and Harris, Michigan was thought to be the most likely battleground state victory for the vice president. A poor showing in Detroit, loss of support from Michigan’s sizable Arab American population, and the vice president’s lack of appeal to blue collar workers are possible reasons for her considerable loss. But regardless of why Harris lost Michigan, going forward, Wisconsin might just be the most contested state in the nation.

There are two morals to this story: the American people are quick to forgive and forget, and the Democrats can no longer take their base for granted. The night before the election, I penned that ‘if the man who left office in disgrace four years ago can win back the presidency as we predict, it will no doubt be the greatest political comeback in American History.’ Donald Trump did exactly that — in even swifter fashion than I predicted. There is no doubt that the second Trump Administration will be more organized than the first, but there is also no doubt that Trump himself will be more unhinged than 4 years ago — he no longer must hide it to win reelection. It’s going to be an extremely turbulent four years, ending either in immense catastrophe or victory. My only advice is to buckle in and prepare for a wild ride.

Currently, Trump sits at 230 electoral votes, to Kamala Harris’ 200.

He will almost certainly win Georgia and North Carolina. He is the favorite in Arizona.

For Kamala to reach 270, she’d need to sweep the Rust Belt. That doesn’t look likely. Trump is the favorite to win in all three of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania.

Coming into the election, the prime question of speculation was this: would 2024 look more like 2016 or 2020?

Option A: 2016

The origin of modern, modern politics. The election that introduced Donald Trump into the political arena, where he has steadfastly remained in the 8 years since. The drama was centered up north, in the Upper Midwest: Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania each underwent massive rightward shifts (R+8, R+11, and R+6, respectively) amidst a tide of blue-collar resentment towards Democrats.

Option B: 2020.

The year when Joe Biden (partially) won back the Rust Belt by the knife’s edge. He failed to bring back onboard the millions of working-class voters who had abandoned the party in 2016 and even underperformed Hillary Clinton in major urban areas and among minority voters — but on the bright side, he continued Clinton’s upward trend in the suburbs enough so that he could win Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania in spite of other disappointments.

Here’s what nobody really expected, but what seems to be on the horizon.

Option C: 2016, but worse.

The Rural, White, Working-Class Abyss

The groups of voters that secured Hillary Clinton’s demise in 2016 (and very nearly toppled Biden in 2020) haven’t shown much love to Kamala Harris, either. In the vast majority of sparsely-populated, white, blue-collar counties across the Midwest and Southeast, Harris is coming up short compared to Biden’s 2020 numbers and is matching (or even underperforming) Hillary’s in 2016. While in hindsight, Harris’ lackluster showing hardly seems surprising, consider the pre-election circumstances.

Polls had consistently shown Kamala Harris matching — and even improving on — Joe Biden’s numbers with white, older, voters. Just days before the election, a Des Moines Register poll conducted by the (seemingly-) infallible J. Ann Selzer, showed Kamala Harris leading Trump in Iowa — which supported him by a 9% margin in 2020 — by 3%. The results seemed in line with polls done of other Midwestern, rural, white states — namely Kansas and Nebraska, where Harris posted impressive margins (coming within 4 points in Kansas, where Biden lost by 15%, and consistently winning NE-02 by double digits, compared to Biden’s 6% win).

Back to reality: currently, Trump is on track to win Iowa by double digits, and Kamala will likely underperform Biden in Kansas and Nebraska (with the exception of NE-02, largely because of Omaha’s explosive growth).

Today’s results decisively puncture any and all of these hopes.

Minority and Urban Drop-Offs

In 2020, two of Joe Biden’s major weak areas came in the form of urban and minority voters — which often come as a package.

It made sense, at the time.

Nowhere is this issue more prevalent than in New York City, where Democrats seem to be in for an absolute bloodbath. All five boroughs shifted to the right by over 10% — and in at least one, this figure might be closer to 20. In 2020, Biden won Queens County by 46 points. As of right now, it seems likely that Kamala Harris will come within 25 points of losing it.

In Pennsylvania, Kamala Harris is ahead in Philadelphia County (A.K.A. Philadelphia) by less than 60 points, compared to Biden’s 63% victory and Hillary’s 67% win. The fact that she is continuing a downward trend rather than simply stagnating suggests a bleak picture for Democrats. How much farther will they continue to fall?

Stagnant, Even Backsliding Suburbs

Now, between the 2016 and 2020 elections, Democrats are no stranger to landslide defeats with rural, working-class white voters and lackluster margins with urban minorities. But at the very least, they had the solace of one friendly demographic, and a powerful one at that: affluent, highly-educated suburban (mostly white) voters.

These voters prevented Clinton from losing the Rust Belt by a larger margin than she actually did in 2016. In 2020, they helped lift Biden to victory in this very region, along with the Sun Belt states of Georgia and Arizona.

In 2022, despite Biden’s poor favorability numbers and a generally Republican-friendly national environment (evidenced by the R+1.5 adjusted House vote), Democrats held up remarkably well in suburban America.

Most politicians, analysts, and election-watchers of all stripes went into 2024 with the assumption that, at the very least, Democrats would hold up in the suburbs — many of which had trended left in every presidential election since 2012. Unfortunately, this was far from the case.

Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is Loudon County, VA. Located in NOVA, the D.C. suburb is a cornerstone of the historically-Republican, anti-Trump breed which fled from the Republican Party in the years since 2016. Biden’s 25% victory in Loudon cemented this transformation.

But in 2024, Harris won Loudon by a mere 16% — nearly 10 points to the right of 2020.

Now, you might be saying: Biden’s margins in Virginia were pretty inflated. No Democrat since (or before) then has come close to his 10% margin of victory.

To that I would offer:

Look at Atlanta’s collar counties.

Look at Oakland County and Macomb County, in Michigan.

Look at Dane County, DeKalb County, and Lackawanna County, in Wisconsin, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, respectively.

They all tell the same story: the floor has truly given in, and the sky is falling for Democrats.

The Takeaway

2016 will always be remembered (by Democrats) for the gut-wrenching, nausea it instilled in the stomachs of millions.

2024 is nowhere near as surprising: pollsters adjusted their weighting, and they seem to have been pretty spot-on this year (with slight overestimations of Harris support across the board).

But looking at them side-by-side, on the whole, 2024 might actually be more awful. If 2016 was a supreme disappointment, 2024 is an all-out, flashing-red alarm bells disaster.

2024 doesn’t just put a wrench in a Kamala Harris presidency. It doesn’t just shatter Democratic hopes of a Trump-free Washington D.C. It arguably represents the worst (and most worrisome) result for the party in the 21st century thus far.

The only question Democrats can ask themselves is this:

Where do we go from here?

Now, this election isn’t over. The Rust Belt states are yet to be called, with nearly half of their votes remaining to be counted. It is entirely possible (albeit unlikely) that the 2024 presidential election results in a Kamala Harris victory — a happy ending — and my dejectedness is decidedly that: pessimism.

Please, prove me wrong.

It’s hard to think of a state in this election with greater consequences and implications – both this year and beyond – than Georgia. The fate of both the Democrats and Republicans, along with their future trajectory in the ever-bitter fight for national dominance, will depend on which candidate Georgians vote for, and how these results vary based on demographics, geography, and industry, 

You’re likely asking: “Why? Sure, Georgia will be important: everyone says it’s one of the 7 swing states, and 16 electoral votes are nothing to laugh about. But why is it more important than Michigan, with its 15 electoral votes? Or Pennsylvania, with 19?”

Let me ask you to look beyond electoral votes for a moment. Georgia is located at the heart of the Deep South, both geographically and demographically. It lies between South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee. Its population, which is around two-thirds white and one-third black and heavily religious across the board, is in line with these surrounding states. For most of the 21st century, the South has been among the least favorable regions for Democrats across the nation. But when Democrats won Georgia by 0.2% in 2020 – breaking a 28-year-long Republican voting streak in the state – on a coalition of Black voters and suburban voters, it represented a turning point not just for Georgia Democrats, but for Southern Democrats on the whole. No longer were they reliant on the ancestrally-Democratic rural white voters who had long forsaken the party: Democrats could count on a stronger, higher-propensity, and above-all, consistent coalition. Or so they thought.

In 2022, Republicans nearly swept the board in Georgia. Apart from the Senate race, where Republican nominee Herschel Walker ran his campaign into the ground amidst reports of domestic abuse, carpetbagging, and funding past abortions, Republicans won every statewide office up for election by large margins. Incumbent Republican governor Brian Kemp won reelection by nearly 8% in 2022, a significant improvement from his sub-2% victory in 2018. Lieutenant Governor Brad Raffensberger, who received widespread national attention after refusing to entertain Trump’s election challenges in 2020, won reelection by more than 10% – the highest among all statewide Republicans that year.

On a national level, 2022 represented a promising electoral landscape for Democrats: one where suburban and independent voters’ recent gravitation towards the left might not have simply been caused by Trump, but was instead a more lasting ideological shift. In Georgia, however, the results told a different story. Voters in the heavily-suburban, highly educated, mostly secular, fast-growing, and historically-Republican counties surrounding Atlanta (think Gwinnett, DeKalb, and Forsyth) had supported Democrats by record margins in 2020. But in 2022, they largely shifted away from the party. Additionally, where minority voters turned out in record margins in 2020 (across the nation, but especially in Georgia), these numbers had shrunken substantially – even considering that midterm elections usually depress turnout compared to presidential contests.

With this in mind, let’s look to the present. 2024 will either confirm Georgia’s purple tint or reaffirm its redder-than-blue hue. Democrats enter the race with a crucial starting advantage, or so it might seem. Donald Trump is running again – remember, he is arguably the man who instigated Georgia’s massive leftward shift in the first place, winning the state by 5% in 2016 (compared to Romney’s 9% in 2012) and outright losing in 2020. However, there is evidence to suggest that Trump is not the political toxin he once was. Since leaving D.C., Trump’s favorability numbers have risen to a career-high: many polls show him at a near-even standing with voters. Additionally, where in 2020, Democrats coasted on a tide of out-party favorability ratings, in 2024, Democrats’ standing has fallen. Biden’s four years in office have seen notable accomplishments been made – not limited to the Inflation Reduction Act and pivotal American Rescue Plan – but have been marred by high inflation, and a generally-sluggish economy in the aftermath of COVID-19. Although the economy has sped up in recent months, the (perception) damage has been done. 

Thankfully for Democrats, Biden isn’t their nominee. Kamala Harris is: and it doesn’t seem she has bore the blunt of the blame for the unpopular Biden administration, despite being his No. 2.

Current polls indicate a highly competitive race in Georgia. A Marist College poll shows a tie between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, each securing 49% support among likely voters. Similarly, a FiveThirtyEight aggregation reports Trump leading by a narrow margin of 1%. 

In a state as significant as Georgia – both for the next 4 years and the next decades – the closeness of the race is maddening. It is impossible to confidently predict, in good faith, who will come out on top. But we’ll give it our best guess. 

When in doubt, stick with the fundamentals. It’s not at all difficult to believe that Republicans, now the ‘out’ party facing a damaged Democratic party whose struggles have especially manifested among minority voters, will claw their way back to victory in Georgia. 

This is where we stand (albeit on shaky and wobbly feet): Trump +0.5%.

WISCONSIN

Historically the reddest of the Rust Belt 3, Wisconsin may again prove pivotal in 2024. 

Democrats’ clearest path to victory come Tuesday is through the Upper Midwest: if they win Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, while holding NE-2, Democrats win a 270-268 victory in the electoral college.

The most common reason for this belief: while Kamala Harris has shown relatively weak numbers (compared to Biden’s 2020 showing) among minority groups including Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans, she’s held up surprisingly well among white voters – including older, working-class ones. For this reason, the conventional narrative has shifted the focus from the Sun Belt states of Arizona, Georgia, and North Carolina (which were arguably the more notable and important results from 2020) towards the Rust Belt – a region that has been no stranger to supporting Democratic candidates since the 1980’s but has taken a sharp turn to the right in the Trump era.

Currently, most analysts believe that Pennsylvania is the shakiest of the three. Polling-wise, this assessment seems to be (tentatively) correct.

Let’s compare the two states, starting with Pennsylvania. An Echelon Insights poll conducted from October 27-30, 2024, showed Donald Trump leading Kamala Harris by 6% – a significantly larger margin for Trump than what most other polling has shown. For instance: a Marist College poll found Harris ahead by 2 points. 

In Wisconsin, the race is similarly close – albeit the slightest bit more friendly for Democrats. The same Echelon Insights poll reported a tie between Harris and Trump, at 48% each. The FiveThirtyEight polling average indicates Harris leading by approximately 0.7 percentage points, roughly equivalent to Biden's 0.6% victory in the state in 2020.

So here’s the polling picture: while Wisconsin and Pennsylvania are bound to be close, it seems that Wisconsin is poised to be slightly more blue than Pennsylvania in the coming election.

There’s reason to believe this is true. Although Wisconsin has supported Trump by the largest margins out of the Rust Belt 3 in his two runs for president, the elections preceding 2016 tell a different story. In 2008 and 2012, Wisconsin supported Barack Obama by 14% and 7%, respectively, while Pennsylvania supported him by 10% and 5%, respectively. Small, but notable differences.

Looking even farther back, Wisconsin has been a cornerstone of Progressivism in the United States. The La Follette dynasty, a political family that led the Progressive movement in the early 20th century, called Wisconsin home. In 1988, Wisconsin was the only one of the Rust Belt states to support the ‘Massachusetts liberal’ Michael Dukakis against incumbent President George H.W. Bush. In the early 21st century, Wisconsin thrice voted for Senator Russ Feingold – a champion of modern progressive causes until he was defeated for reelection in 2010, and denied a comeback victory in 2016.

For Harris to win, she must do a couple of things.

First, she must turn out the core coalition: the majority-minority residents of Milwaukee and Madison, the two major cities in Wisconsin. National demographic polling of the race has painted a potentially dire picture for Harris among minorities: she’s consistently polled worse than Biden (in 2020) among Hispanic, Black, and Asian voters. We will see in the coming days how much of this alleged racial depolarization comes to fruition, but I would be inclined to believe the story the polls and experts are communicating. 

Because of this dropoff in minority support, Harris must do some heavy lifting among Wisconsin’s other core political factions. She must hold the fort in rural areas across the state, where only 15 years ago Barack Obama had won but have shifted heavily rightward in the years since.  More importantly, however, Harris must build on Democrats’ strong recent performances in suburban Wisconsin – both the bluer areas and the red. 

For the former category, Dane County (which contains Madison and its surrounding suburbs) is Democrats’ prime target – not just to win, but to win by a lot. In 2022, Gov. Tony Evers won nearly 80% of the vote in Dane, turning out a massive 236,000 voters. Harris will need to replicate this margin of victory, or at least come extremely close, in order to win statewide. 

For the latter category, Harris must continue Democrats’ struggle in the WOW counties surrounding Milwaukee. Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington County have supported Republican presidential candidates by over 60% since the turn of the century. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the counties have began shifting leftward in the last few years. In 2022, Evers narrowed the Republican shares of the vote in Waukesha and Ozaukee below 60%. Harris should hope to continue Evers’ efforts in 2024.

All this being said, it is easier than easy to see Wisconsin going either way in 2024. Amidst a sea of uncertainty, my one personal insight is this: if Pennsylvania is going Republican, so will Wisconsin (with one caveat). Wisconsin is whiter and more rural than Pennsylvania, and its metro areas are just as prone to depressed turnout as those in the Keystone State. 

With this is mind, you might think that we’re predicting a narrow Trump win. But we’re not.

Here’s that caveat: Wisconsin’s geographic situation near the Great Plains means that the supposed ‘blue surge’ polling has predicted in Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa (looking at you, Selzer!) might have more of an impact of Wisconsin’s rural electorate compared to Pennsylvania’s. Because of this, we predict Kamala Harris will ever-so-slightly beat Trump in Wisconsin, likely by a fraction of a percentage point. To be any more specific would prioritize precision at the cost of accuracy.

MICHIGAN

Go Blue! Or will it…

If there was any state out of the Swingy Seven we were confident in making a prediction about, it would be Michigan. Out of Rust Belt Three, Michigan is generally agreed to be the bluest – but don’t let this fool you: it’s still a purple, purple state.

If you’ve been paying any attention to the political development of the last 8 years, you likely know a great deal about the Upper Midwest – how three reliably-democratic states abandoned Democrat Hillary Clinton amidst a storm of white, working-class resentment towards Democrats fueled by decades of perceived apathy and outright disdain from the party.

After decades of voting consecutively Democratic in presidential elections since 1988, the state flipped to Donald Trump in 2016 by around 10,000 votes. In 2020, however, Joe Biden reclaimed Michigan for the Democrats, winning by 2.8%

Michigan is about three-quarters white, 14% Black, 5% Hispanic or Latino, and 3% Asian. This racial makeup is remarkably similar to the nation’s at large, albeit with a slightly higher white proportion of the population.

The substantial Black population (primarily concentrated in urban areas such as Detroit and Flint) will play a significant, if not crucial role in deciding the election. Poor turnout in these areas in 2016 arguably made the difference between a Clinton win and her actual 0.2% loss in the state. Suburban counties around Detroit and other metro areas have grown and diversified within the last decades. Latino and Asian communities have helped contribute to shifting political dynamics.

There are a few counties that hold outsized importance in Michigan’s politican landscape, starting with Wayne County, home to Detroit. Wayne is Michigan’s most populous and a stronghold for the Democratic Party. In 2020, Biden secured approximately 68% of the vote here, bolstered by high turnout among Black voters. As we mentioned, this is an area where Harris must turn out voters: or else, she’ll have to claw her way back with less friendly voters.

In terms of suburban Micigan, Oakland and Macomb are perhaps the most important. Oakland County, a historically Republican-leaning suburb, has trended Democratic in recent elections due to its increasingly diverse and educated population. Biden won Oakland County with about 56% of the vote in 2020. The county serves as a bellwether for suburban voters nationwide and will be a primary target for both parties in 2024. Macomb County is another proto-typically conservative country which exemplified the “Reagan Democrats” of the 80’s. Macomb County exemplifies the blue-collar voters who swung to Trump in 2016 but showed more mixed results in 2020, with Trump winning narrowly. This county's response to the economic policies and populist rhetoric of the candidates will be a key indicator of working-class sentiment in the state.

Urban centers such as Detroit, Flint, and Ann Arbor are Democratic bastions, driven by racially diverse and younger populations. Suburbs, particularly around Detroit, have become increasingly important as their populations have grown and become more competitive. In contrast, Michigan’s rural areas, including the Upper Peninsula and regions in the northern Lower Peninsula, tend to vote overwhelmingly Republican. It’s a pattern replicated across nearly the entire country, and one that will hold true for the foreseeable future.

Educational attainment might be the most important factor in Michigan’s political dynamics, apart from ethnicity. Counties with a higher percentage of college-educated residents, such as Washtenaw County (home to Ann Arbor and the University of Michigan), lean heavily Democratic. On the other side of the coin, areas with lower levels of college education (typically rural and whiter) tend to favor Republicans, especially as of late. Turnout in these areas and among these voters – who tend to be lower-propensity – will be crucial if Trump hopes to improve his standing in the Wolverine State.

Religiosity also plays a similar role here, particularly in more rural and conservative parts ofthe state. Evangelical Christians and Catholic communities in West Michigan and the rural north often align with the socially-conservative platform of the modern Republican Party. We saw this come to fruition in the 2022 elections and abortion referendum, when heavily-religious counties actually shifted rightwards in the wake of the Dobbs ruling while the rest of the state bolted left.

Michigan's economy has long been associated with manufacturing, particularly the automotive industry. Detroit, historically known as the “Motor City,” has been the epicenter of auto manufacturing for decades. The prominence of unions, particularly the United Auto Workers (UAW), has historically aligned with Democratic policies that support labor rights and job protections. The 2007 recession arguably caused Michigan voters – especially those in the auto industry – to back Barack Obama by over 15% in 2008. However, many of these same voters flocked to the Republican side of the aisle less than a decade later, for the exact same reason: their struggles went utterly unnoticed by a D.C. which seemed to prioritize coastal elites above all other Americans.

Michigan’s importance in the 2024 election cannot be overstated. For Democrats, maintaining robust turnout in urban centers and growing suburban support is essential, while Republicans will seek to amplify their rural base and recapture voters swayed by economic and cultural issues. We believe Kamala Harris will win Michigan: whether by a 0.1% or 5% margin, we are far from certain, though we’ll wager it’s closer to the former.

NEVADA

Although it may be the only swing state this election that Donald Trump didn’t win in 2016, Nevada is far from being a newcomer to this club. In the last 12 elections, the Silver State has gone red 6 times and gone blue the other 6. From 2008 through 2020, the state exclusively voted for the Democratic presidential candidate. Most recently, Joe Biden won the state with 50.1% of the vote to incumbent Republican Donald Trump’s 47.8%. Nevada was one of only 7 states that Trump performed better in 2020 compared to his 2016 run, an indicator of the state’s shift to the right in recent years. Today, Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris are in a tense race to take Nevada’s 6 electoral votes. Will Trump become the first Republican to win the state since George Bush way back in 2004? Or will Harris be able to retain Nevada for the Democrats?

Nevada is one of the fastest-growing states in the nation. Its population has almost tripled since 1990, from 1.2 million to 3.2 million people, largely due to the growth of Las Vegas into the 21st largest urban area in the US. In fact, Clark County, which includes Las Vegas and its suburbs, contains 73% of the state’s population, making Nevada the most centralized state in the nation. This rapid population growth has been fueled in large part by immigrants from Latin American nations. While in 1970 non-Hispanic whites made up 88% of Nevada’s population, today that number is just 45.93%. Hispanics are now 28.68% of the population, with Blacks, Asians, and Mixed-Race people coming in at 9.4%, 8.57%, and 5.38%, respectively. Tellingly, as Nevada’s non-Hispanic white population decreased from 65.21% in 2000 to 45.93% in 2020, so too did Republican performance decline. Historically, Hispanics as a whole have supported the Democratic Party; with 66% of them voting for Clinton in 2016. But in 2020, Biden’s performance with this key group slipped; he received just 59% support. Moreover, examining the results based on the educational divide, in 2020 Trump won 41% of Hispanics without a college degree. This is very important in Nevada, as the state has the 7th lowest percentage of residents with a college degree, coming in at a mere 27.57%. So, Trump’s path to victory in the state is simple: win over working-class white and Hispanic voters.

Recent polling has shown that Trump has completely erased the Democrats’ lead with Hispanic men; now he and Harris draw equal support from this group. Additionally, Harris now has the support of just 54% of all Hispanics, down 5 points from Biden 4 years ago and a whopping 12 points from Clinton 4 years before that. These numbers aren’t good for the Democrats and certainly point towards a Trump victory in Nevada, where even a minor shift in the preferences of this key group of voters can determine the outcome of the entire race.

Now, looking at Nevada’s polls, Trump has taken a narrow lead over Harris of 0.9 points in the RealClearPolitics average. Interestingly, Trump actually underperformed expectations in Nevada in 2016, losing the state to Clinton by 2.42 points when the polls had him up 2 points on November 1st. However, in 2020, Trump overperformed, losing the state to Biden by 2.39 points when the polls had him trailing by 4 points. With this in mind, we’ve decided that trusting this election cycle’s numbers is our best bet at predicting the winner. Therefore, we believe that Donald Trump will win Nevada by between 0.5 and 2 points.

NORTH CAROLINA

The only swing state this election that went red in 2020, North Carolina proved to be an unlikely tossup; after all, Trump won the state by 1.34 points against Democrat Joe Biden four years ago. In an election where Trump is expected to perform significantly better than his last run, how can North Carolina possibly not go Republican? Well, there’s been a perfect storm of bad circumstances for the GOP, and I mean that literally; the state was just devastated by Hurricane Helene in late September, which took over 101 lives and caused over $53 billion in damages. Helene ravaged the western portions of the state that heavily supported Donald Trump back in 2020, raising questions of whether disruptions from the storm will lower turnout in this key region for the Republicans.

But the other storm in the state is over their Republican Candidate for Governor, Mark Robinson. Having been narrowly elected North Carolina’s Lieutenant Governor back in 2020, Robinson took the logical next step and announced his bid for the governorship last year, cruising through the Republican primary. And while Robinson being both a Republican and the first African American major party nominee in a state that is over 20% Black might make him seem like a shoo-in, he turned out to have more skeletons in his closet than any politician in a long time. For starters, Robinson has been criticized for his stance on abortion. After openly calling it “murder” even in cases of rape and incest, he admitted that back in the 1980s he paid for his girlfriend to have one. Additionally, he has met backlash for comments made about the LGBTQ community; Robinson has previously called homosexuality “an abominable sin” and just this past February supported arresting transgender people for using a restroom that doesn’t match their birth sex. The Lieutenant Governor has also faced resistance for his alleged antisemitism, such as in a Facebook post where he declared that the movie Black Panther was “created by an agnostic Jew and put to film by satanic Marxists.” But these controversies from earlier in his campaign pale in comparison to the firestorm that was released in September when CNN found posts Robinson made on the pornographic website Nude Africa from 2008 to 2012. In these posts, he referred to himself as a “perv,” voiced his hate for Martin Luther King, and, most famously, declared himself to be a “Black Nazi.” Needless to say, all of these abhorrent statements have caused Robinson to tank in the polls; he now trails his Democratic opponent Josh Stein by between 15 and 20 points.

While Mark Robinson’s political career will almost certainly end after this election, he may just take Donald Trump’s with him. The gubernatorial candidate’s controversies are undoubtedly hurting Trump’s performance in the state; he now leads Vice President Kamala Harris by just 1.7 points in the North Carolina RealClearPolitics Average. There’s the possibility that the former president loses the state, and its 16 electoral votes, due to Republican voters who are already planning to not vote for Robinson deciding to skip out on voting for Trump too. But whatever the case may be, thanks to Robinson, you can expect to see many split ballots in the Tarheel State this November.

Although the controversy surrounding Mark Robinson will without a doubt hurt Trump’s performance in North Carolina, we find it unlikely that it’ll be enough to tip the state to Harris. While she may have briefly caught Trump in the state back in September, the former president’s numbers quickly rebounded and have been rising steadily since mid-October. Therefore, we predict that North Carolina will remain red for Trump by roughly the same margin it did in 2020, of between 1 and 1.5 points.

PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania:

If there’s any state that could be the tipping point in this election, it’s Pennsylvania. The rust belt state of 13 million people has played an outsized role in the last two presidential races. From 1992 to 2012, the state voted blue in every presidential election; however, in 2016, when Republican Donald Trump upset Democrat Hillary Clinton, the Keystone State went red for the first time in 28 years, albeit very narrowly. Trump received 48.2% of the vote to Clinton’s 47.5%, a margin of victory of just 0.7 points. Along with his success in Wisconsin and Michigan, it signaled the collapse of the “blue wall,” a collection of states that had gone for the Democrats in every presidential election since 1992. But in 2020, Trump’s luck in the commonwealth ran out, with the incumbent losing the state to Democratic challenger and native Pennsylvanian Joe Biden, 48.7% to 49.9%. This November, Donald Trump once again finds himself battling it out in Pennsylvania, this time against Vice President Kamala Harris. And the arguably most important question in this election remains: will Trump be able to defeat Harris and flip this all-important rust belt state back to the Republicans?

Several factors indicate that Pennsylvania is heading towards a GOP victory. For one thing, the early voting data is certainly a good sign for Republicans. According to the University of Florida election lab, as of October 29th, registered Democrats in Pennsylvania have cast 837,916 votes early, while registered Republicans have cast 458,055 votes. And although this means Republicans are being beaten by Democrats in early voting 31.6% to 57.8%, these numbers are significantly better than in 2020, when Democrats were winning this share of the vote 64.7% to 23.7%. While other factors could be at play, such as the Trump campaign encouraging early voting during this election cycle, which they didn’t in 2020, the significance of this shift can’t be overlooked when a single point sway towards Trump could determine whether he wins back the White House.

Beyond this, Trump has had several high-profile campaign moments in Pennsylvania. Most famously, he was almost assassinated at a rally in Butler, PA on July 13th. In the aftermath of this horrible event, Trump jumped significantly in the polls and saw his highest odds of winning the election to date: 66.2% on the RealClearPolitics Betting Average. His comeback rally to the site on October 5th, featuring Elon Musk, was also widely watched and turned out a crowd of over 50,000. Additionally, Trump’s visit to a McDonald’s in Bucks County and appearance at the Steelers game two weeks ago were two more bright spots for his campaign in the Keystone state. While these moments are unlikely to change the election’s outcome, their memories may persist in the minds of undecided voters and net the former President some key votes.

Turning to the polls, Trump holds a small lead of 0.6 points, which is within the margin of error in almost any poll; so, effectively, the two are tied. However, as we have seen so often in the past, the polls can get it completely wrong. Historically, Trump has significantly overperformed in Pennsylvania. In 2016, Hillary Clinton held a lead of 5.1 points at this time in the election cycle, and in 2020, Joe Biden held a lead of 3.8 points. Clinton went on to lose the state by 0.7 points, a difference of 5.8%, and Biden went on to win by just 1.2 points, a difference of 2.6%. Therefore, with Trump being ahead in Pennsylvania for the first time in an election, his odds of winning the state look encouraging.

But at the end of the day, this race is basically a coin toss. And while it’s certainly hard for us to choose between Trump and Harris, we feel that Trump has a slight edge. It’s a mixture of the near-misses, the consistent underestimation, and the promising early voting numbers that compel us to choose red over blue. We predict that Trump will carry the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by between 0.1 and 2 points.

ARIZONA

Arizona:

Arizona is a bellwether of sorts. The winners of 8 of the last 12 presidential elections have also won the state, which is exactly what Donald Trump did in 2016 and what Joe Biden did in 2020. Now in 2024, Republican Donald Trump is once again in a tense race, this time against Democrat Kamala Harris, to claim Arizona’s 11 electoral votes. But before we make our prediction, let’s find out how the Grand Canyon state has become so important for both parties.

Only gaining statehood in 1912, Arizona was largely a blue state during its early years. But after voting for Republican Dwight Eisenhower in 1952, the state has only voted for a Democratic candidate twice: Bill Clinton in 1996, and, crucially, Joe Biden in 2020. While Biden led Trump in the polls by a sizeable amount, he saw his lead shrink to less than a point by election day, and the results were even closer than that: Biden won the state by 11,057 votes, or just 0.3%. This was a spectacular fall for the Republicans, who won the state by 3.5 points in 2016, and by 9.1 points in 2012. But several signs suggest that they may be able to turn their luck around this November.

For one thing, Arizona is a border state, and the issue of immigration is front and center this election cycle. According to a report by the House Committee on Homeland Security from this April, the United States is on track by the end of the year to reach 10 million encounters at its borders since Joe Biden has taken office. This has had a massive effect on states bordering Mexico, like Arizona. In a recent NY Times/Siena poll, Arizonans ranked immigration as their 2nd most important issue, being beaten out by the economy and followed closely by abortion. 55% of respondents said they believe Donald Trump would do a better job on immigration, while only 42% said Harris would, indicating that the former President is significantly stronger on this hot-button issue. However, Kamala Harris is just as strong on abortion as Donald Trump is on immigration; an identical 55% of respondents say that they prefer the Vice President on this issue, a good sign for her campaign. Additionally, just as Trump and Harris are on the ballot in Arizona, abortion is too. Proposition 139 is an amendment to the state’s constitution on the ballot this November that seeks to provide the fundamental right to abortion up to fetal viability, or about 22 weeks. This measure is very likely to pass, with polls showing that between 60-70% of voters support it. If there is significant turnout, especially by women (a group which Harris wins a majority of in the state), then Harris may be able to overcome Trump’s lead on issues like the economy and immigration.

But perhaps the best sign for Trump in Arizona this time around is the polling; in the past two elections, the former President spent most of the race trailing his opponents in the state. This time, however, he has taken a narrow, but nevertheless meaningful, lead of 1.5 points on Harris. And while mid-August saw the newly selected Democratic candidate overtaking Trump across all 7 swing states, Arizona by far held the firmest, with Harris only holding a lead over Trump in the RealClearPolitics Average for a single day.

With this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will flip Arizona back to the Republicans this election by between 1 and 2 points. Biden’s narrow 2020 win is unlikely to be replicated by Harris, especially due to her weakness on key issues for Arizonans like the border and the economy.

Once upon a time, Colorado was a solid red state. Then it was a fierce battleground state. And now, the Rocky Mountain state is safely Democratic. After LBJ’s landslide victory of 1964, the residents of Colorado voted red in the next six consecutive elections. But in 1992, the state flipped for Democrat Bill Clinton, who won 40.1% of the vote to George Bush’s 35.9% and Independent Ross Perot’s 23.3%. But this election was greatly influenced by Perot’s dominant third-party run, which siphoned millions of votes away from the incumbent Republican; and thus, in 1996, Colorado flipped back to the Republicans after Bob Dole narrowly defeated Clinton 45.8% to 44.4%, one of only three states to do so.

In both 2000 and 2004, George Bush had slightly greater, but nevertheless close, victories in the state. However, in 2008, Democrat Barack Obama defeated Republican John McCain 53.7% to 44.7%, a margin of 9 points. Since then, the GOP has never been able to regain much ground in the state, with Joe Biden having the greatest performance for a Democrat presidential candidate in Colorado in almost 60 years.

But this election, does Donald Trump have a chance to reverse this trend and come within striking distance of Vice President Kamala Harris in the state? To put it plainly, the news isn’t good for the GOP. Taking a look at the 2022 House elections, Democrats won 55.2% of the vote to the Republicans' 42.5%, the worst performance for the party in Colorado since 2006. Even in the blowout midterm election of 2018, where Democrats picked up 41 House seats, the GOP won 42.96% of the state’s vote, a truly terrible sign for Donald Trump.

So why has Colorado been shifting so quickly to the left? The answer is that it’s likely due to many factors. For one thing, Denver, Colorado’s capital and biggest city, has seen massive population growth in the last 15 years, with the Denver-Aurora Combined Statistical Area increasing from 3.09 million people in 2010 to 3.62 million today. Additionally, Colorado’s booming tech industry, which supports nearly 140,000 jobs, has grown 37% in the last decade and brought tens of thousands of professionals from California cities to the state. This rapid urban growth and influx of highly educated workers to the state has significantly favored the Democrats and has made the largely Republican rural residents a smaller and smaller portion of the voter base.

We predict that Donald Trump will perform roughly in line with his 2020 results in Colorado. Due to the scale of his loss last time and the unpopularity of the Biden-Harris administration, Trump may be able to win some voters back. But the former president is fighting an uphill battle against a massive shift in Colorado’s demographics away from the Republican Party.

WYOMING

Wyoming has the distinction of being the single most Republican state in the nation. Yes, Wyoming barely beat out West Virginia for this title back in 2020, giving a preposterous 69.94% of its vote to Donald Trump. But could former Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney’s and her father’s, former Vice-President Dick Cheney’s, endorsements of Kamala Harris hurt Trump in the state this November?

Since the last presidential election, Liz Cheney, Wyoming’s sole Representative, was primaried by another Republican prior to the 2022 midterms. Cheney was one of the strongest critics of President Donald Trump after the alleged insurrection at the Capitol on January 6th, 2021, and vocally supported his impeachment. Later that year she was appointed the Vice Chair of the House January 6th Committee, which investigated, among other things, Trump’s actions after the 2020 election and up until the day of the riot.

Unsurprisingly, her criticism of Trump made her hated within the Republican Party, and she was primaried by Trump-endorsed candidate, Harriet Hageman; Cheney won just 29% of the vote to Hageman’s 66%. This crushing defeat showed that Wyomingians were willing to swiftly turn on their 3-term representative for going against the Republican Party.

In Wyoming’s 2022 midterms, Hageman received 68.2% of the vote, slightly lower than Trump’s percentage two years prior. Interestingly, when we analyzed the results of the prior elections for Wyoming’s House seat, we found that in 4 of the last 6 elections, the winning candidate, who was always a Republican, received 68% of the vote; during his first run in 2016, Donald Trump also received 68% of the vote.

With a state as tilted Republican as Wyoming, there must be a limit to how well a Republican candidate can possibly perform in the state. We believe Trump has reached this limit. Therefore, we predict that Donald Trump will win Wyoming with an almost identical percentage of the vote to his 2020 run. Perhaps he could crack 70%, but we don’t believe that the former President will be in for any major gains or losses.

MONTANA

Montana is often lumped in with its surrounding states in the Mountain West, in terms of its geography, demographics, and politics. And while Montana shares much of the same DNA with its neighbors, it is not identical. Where states like Wyoming and Idaho are nearly entirely rural, white, and universally Republican, Montana is home to slightly larger metros – Bozeman and Missoula – a slightly more diverse population – including a significant Native American presence – and a significantly more divided political landscape.

Now, Montana has leaned red in presidential elections. Voters have consistently backed the Republican nominee since 1996. In the 2020 election, Donald Trump carried the state with 57% of the vote, continuing the conservative stronghold. 

However, Trump’s 17% margin of victory was notably tighter than his performance across the rest of the Mountain West: as an example, he won Wyoming by nearly 45%.

While Montana has supported Republicans at the presidential level for the past three decades, it is not monolithic. The state’s voters have a history of splitting their tickets, electing Democrats to statewide offices such as the governorship and even a Senate seat.

Tester, who is up for re-election in 2024, is seen as a key player in the Democrats’ hopes of maintaining a presence in the Mountain West. His success often hinges on winning over the state’s rural and working-class voters, who might otherwise lean Republican.

As mentioned earlier, Montana’s electorate is mostly white, with less than 10% of the population identifying as nonwhite, and is predominantly rural. The state’s large stretches of agricultural land and reliance on industries like mining and logging contribute to its conservative leanings. However, Montana’s growing urban areas, such as Bozeman and Missoula, have been trending more progressive, largely due to an influx of younger residents and out-of-state transplants. These areas could play an increasingly important role in shaping the political direction of the state.

Another factor which may affect the state’s dynamics is how national issues resonate with Montanans. While economic concerns, healthcare access, and gun rights remain top priorities, issues like climate change and land conservation also carry weight in the state, where natural resources are a central part of both the economy and the way of life. Abortion rights may also play a role, though Montana’s more libertarian outlook on personal freedoms could mean the state takes a different stance than its conservative peers in the Mountain West.

Additionally, the state’s small but influential Native American population could impact the outcome. Native voters in Montana tend to vote Democratic, and their turnout could be critical in close races, particularly in areas near reservations like those in Glacier and Big Horn counties.

While Democrats face an uphill battle in Montana: there is little doubt about it. But Harris, who boasts strong popularity numbers among working-class and white voters, along with minority groups, may possess the unique traits necessary to resonate with Montana’s idiosyncratic electorate. That being said, the race will undoubtedly be won by Trump, more than likely by a 15% margin.

Located within the heart of Appalachia, West Virginia is a state unlike any other. For starters, it’s one of only two states to form after separating from another state; West Virginia became the 35th state in 1863, after separating from Virginia over the commonwealth’s secession from the Union two years earlier. West Virginia also has the lowest percentage foreign-born population of any state, with just 1.6% of residents being born outside the U.S. Additionally, according to the 2020 Census, a staggering 90% of West Virginians are white, the third-highest percentage in the nation. Finally, the state has the second-highest percentage of residents 65 and older, at 16%.

These demographics explain why West Virginia is also the most conservative state in the nation outside the Mountain West. In 2020, residents overwhelmingly voted for Donald Trump, helping the former president beat Joe Biden by 38.9 points in the state (68.6% to 29.7%); this margin of victory was the second highest of any state in the 2020 election (Wyoming’s being the highest).

So, will West Virginians support Donald Trump in great enough numbers this November to make the Mountain State the most Republican in the nation? West Virginia has gained attention in recent years for its incumbent senator, and former governor, Democrat Joe Manchin. The conservative force in his caucus, Manchin has been a key swing vote in the Senate when it was split 50-50 between Democrats and Republicans after the 2020 elections. Last year, Manchin announced that he won’t seek reelection in 2024, a move which will almost certainly flip his seat to the GOP.

In the 2022 midterms, Republicans in West Virginia performed slightly worse than two years prior, winning 66.1% of House election votes compared to 67.6% in 2020. It should be noted, however, that Democrats also did slightly worse, performing 0.7 points lower in 2022 than in 2020. Regardless, these results show extremely strong support for Republicans in the state and indicate that Trump’s numbers this fall should be similar.

We predict that Donald Trump will win West Virginia, performing slightly better than during his 2020 run. Kamala Harris will struggle to appeal to the state’s overwhelmingly white, working-class voter base and, as a result, can expect to achieve lower numbers than Joe Biden did four years ago.

OKLAHOMA

Existing for 73 years as Indian Territory before finally entering the Union in 1907 as the 46th state, Oklahoma certainly has a unique history. Throughout the 1830s, American Indians living in the Southeastern United States were forcibly removed from their ancestral homelands and forced to migrate to the newly created Indian Territory in what was later called The Trail of Tears. And while this territory remained closed to outside settlers for over half a century, in 1889 its unassigned lands were opened to the public, allowing individuals to claim up to 160 acres if they lived on the land and improved it.

This history gives Oklahoma its demographics today, where 8.4% of the population is Native, the highest percentage in the nation besides Alaska, and 63.5% of the population is White. Oklahoma is also one of the reddest states in the nation. The Sooner State has voted for a Democrat Presidential candidate only once in the last 72 years, LBJ in the election of 1964. In fact, in the 2020 Presidential election only two states had all of their counties go for Trump: West Virginia, and, of course, Oklahoma.

Trump won the state with 65.4% of the vote to Biden’s 32.3%, a margin of 33.1 points. But this victory shouldn’t be at all surprising; every Republican Presidential candidate since 2004 has won Oklahoma with over 65% of the vote; the all-time high for a Republican being Richard Nixon’s 71.8% in the blowout election of 1972.

Despite this, in recent years Republicans have failed to grow their support in the state. In the 2014 midterms, the GOP won a remarkable 70% of the votes in the state’s five House elections, but in three of the four elections since then, their share of the vote has decreased, most recently coming in at 66.36% in 2022. Additionally, in Oklahoma’s 2022 Senate race, Republican incumbent James Lankford defeated Democrat challenger Madison Horn with 64.3% of the vote, over three points less than his previous run in 2016. And while these performances are still significant victories for Republicans, they do show that the party has stagnated in the state.

Finally, while Donald Trump increased his share of the vote by 0.05% from 2016 to 2020, his margin of victory in the state shrunk considerably; Trump won the state by 36.4 points in 2016, but by just 33.1 points four years later. With this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will win Oklahoma by a similar margin to his 2020 run. You can expect Trump’s margin of victory to fall within the 33 to 36-point range, making it unlikely that he’ll net any massive gains in the state, but making it equally unlikely that Democrat Kamala Harris will make any improvements over her predecessor.

KENTUCKY

Kentucky, the northernmost state of the Bible Belt, has been a solid Republican state in every presidential election since 2000. While its neighbors to the north, Indiana and Ohio, voted for Obama in 2008, the Bluegrass State still gave over 57% of its votes to Republican John McCain. This makes sense, as Kentucky has the third-highest percentage evangelical Protestant population in the nation, at 49%, and Republicans overwhelmingly win this group. In 2020, Donald Trump won 76% of all evangelical voters, which was a decrease from the 80% of the group he won back in 2016.

This 4% decline in performance with evangelicals was a large factor in Trump’s overall worse performance in Kentucky compared to four years prior. Trump finished 30 points above Clinton in 2016 but just 26 points above Biden in 2020, although his percentage of the vote decreased by only 0.4 points (from 62.5% to 62.1%).

So, will Donald Trump be able to win members of this key group of voters back? While Trump stands to benefit from the unpopularity of the Biden administration (Biden’s approval rating with Kentuckians is below 40%), a stronger performance by the former president is not assured; the issue of abortion threatens to hurt Trump and help Kamala Harris. Abortion was made illegal in Kentucky via a trigger law immediately after the overturning of Roe vs. Wade, with no exception for rape or incest. Voters in the state, however, rejected a 2022 referendum that would’ve amended Kentucky’s constitution to deny any protections on abortion. Although the referendum failed narrowly, 48% to 52%, it signals that voters in Kentucky are extremely divided on abortion.

Furthermore, with women in the state leaning slightly more to the left than the right (46% to 44%), Trump will likely have trouble winning even close to half of women voters due to this issue. We predict that Donald Trump will win Kentucky by a slightly smaller margin this November than in 2020, due to backlash from women on the state’s abortion restrictions. Trump’s better performance with evangelical men is likely to be offset by his weaker performance with all women in the state. As a result, Harris will likely perform better in Kentucky than her predecessor did four years ago.

The home of Graceland, Vanderbilt, and the Grand Ole Opry, Tennessee is a state rich in culture and history. The Volunteer State is home to 7.1 million people (the 15th most in the nation) and has had its population more than double since 1960. In fact, Nashville, Tennessee’s capital and largest city, has had its metro population skyrocket in the last 30 years from 1.1 million in 1990 to over 2.1 million people in 2023. Nashville is now America’s 21st largest city, and Memphis, the state’s 2nd largest city, is not far behind at the 29th spot.

Certainly, this urban growth in a once agrarian state would cause a shift in its politics towards the left (like in Tennessee’s neighbor to the east, North Carolina), but it hasn’t turned out that way. GOP support in the state has remained consistently strong; Donald Trump won Tennessee in 2020 by a 23-point margin, securing 60.7% of the vote to Biden’s 37.5%. For comparison, in the same election Trump only won North Carolina by a 1.3 margin.

Interestingly, examining the results of Tennessee’s 2022 midterm elections, we see that out of the state’s nine congressional districts, eight went to the GOP. And although Republicans put up a very solid performance in the House Elections two years ago, winning 64.3% of the total votes and flipping the 5th district, it certainly doesn’t account for their eight out of nine seats… It all comes down to redistricting.

In early 2022, the Tennessee legislature created new congressional district boundaries. The bodies' GOP supermajorities drew and approved new boundaries that significantly favored Republicans, most notably splitting Nashville into three different districts. Separating the Democrat-leaning voters of Nashville into three different house races made certain that the Republicans would win all three. Now Tennessee’s 9th district, containing Memphis, is the only Democrat hold in this Republican-dominated state.

With all this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will win Tennessee by a slightly greater margin than in 2020. Tennessee’s midterm elections demonstrate strong GOP support, the highest levels in state history, and Trump will certainly ride this momentum to cement even greater gains in the Volunteer State.

VIRGINIA

The Commonwealth of Virginia certainly has a rich history. The birthplace of a whopping eight Presidents, including founding fathers George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe, Old Dominion was the most populated and influential state at our nation’s founding. During the Civil War, Richmond, Virginia, served as the capital of the Confederate States of America, with the state seeing action in the battles of Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, among others.

After the Union was victorious and Virginia was readmitted, the state spent the next 72 years voting for Democratic Presidential candidates, besides taking a break in the election of 1928 by voting for Republican Herbert Hoover. However, in 1952, it turned red for Republican Dwight Eisenhower and remained that way (minus Democrat LBJ’s landslide 1964 victory) up until 2004, although it was a swing state in those final years.

In 2008, the state at long last returned to the Democratic Party, voting for Democrat Barack Obama over Republican John McCain 52.6% to 46.3%. Since then, the Republican Party has struggled to win back the once solid red state, with Republican Donald Trump most recently finishing 10.1 points behind Democrat Joe Biden.

But could things be different this November? With a popular Republican governor and an almost evenly split House delegation, Virginia may just become a battleground state once more. The rise of Glenn Youngkin as Governor of Virginia was certainly an unlikely one. In 2021, the relatively unknown businessman ran as a Republican, beating out the state’s former Democratic Governor Terry McAuliffe 50.6% to 48.6% in what was considered a minor upset; McAuliffe had led Youngkin in the polls up until the week of the election. This also marked the first time since 2009 that a Republican had won a statewide election in Virginia.

In his first three years on the job, Youngkin has become extremely popular, earning an approval rating of 57% in a recent poll, including a 62% rating with Independents. Since Virginia has been relatively blue for going on 20 years, polls in the state have been taken few and far between. However, according to the FiveThirtyEight polling average, which unfortunately only includes 10 of them, Democrat Kamala Harris is up 7.6 points on Donald Trump, 50.4% to 42.8%. And despite the unreliability of this metric, we believe that this margin is relatively accurate.

With growing Republican support in the state led by the popular Glenn Youngkin, we predict that although Kamala Harris will carry Virginia, it will be a narrower margin than Joe Biden did in 2020. So, expect a Harris victory of between 7 and 9 points.

ARKANSAS

Arkansas may be the most forgettable state in the South, but its political history is actually one of the most interesting in the region. For one thing, Arkansans chose the Democratic Presidential candidate in 100% of elections from 1876 (the end of Reconstruction) through 1964 (the passage of the Civil Rights Act), no other state has that distinction. But since 1964, Arkansas has only voted blue thrice, once for Jimmy Carter (in 1976), and twice for former Governor Bill Clinton (in 1992 and 1996).

So, can Arkansas, once the solidest state in the Solid South, turn out this time for Kamala Harris? In 2020, Donald Trump won 62.4% of the vote in the Natural State, the highest percentage in any southern state (except Oklahoma). While Joe Biden finished with 34.8% of the vote, it was still an improvement over how Hillary Clinton, the former Arkansas first lady, performed four years prior (she got just 33.7%). Arkansas also was one of only seven states where Trump grew his margin of victory from 2016 to 2020, albeit very slightly (from 26.9 to 27.6%).

This coming election, Trump will have a key ally in Arkansas’s governorship, Sarah Huckabee Sanders. Sanders was Trump’s former press secretary and is the daughter of Mike Huckabee, who also served as Arkansas’s governor from 1996-2007. Sanders handily won election in 2022 with 63% of the vote, and in those same elections, Republicans won 70% of all House votes in the state (although this number is partially inflated due to them running unopposed in the state’s 1st district).

A good indicator of Trump’s potential performance this November is Arkansas’s 2nd congressional district, which includes most of Little Rock (the capital and largest city) and its suburbs, and is also the least Republican district in the state. In 2022, incumbent Republican French Hill won 60% of the vote, up from when he won 55% in 2020. These gains in the suburbs for Republicans indicate that Trump has room to build on his 27.6% margin victory.

Unfortunately for Harris, Arkansas doesn’t have the Black population of other deep South states (which is why it’s the most Republican). Only 12.4% of the population is Black, which is even under the national average. So, while Harris may perform stronger with Blacks in Arkansas (but even that remains to be seen), this will likely be offset by Trump’s stronger performance with the state’s suburban voters. Thus, we predict Donald Trump will build on his margin of victory in 2020 and win Arkansas with upwards of 63% of the vote.

OKLAHOMA

Existing for 73 years as Indian Territory before finally entering the Union in 1907 as the 46th state, Oklahoma certainly has a unique history. Throughout the 1830s, American Indians living in the Southeastern United States were forcibly removed from their ancestral homelands and forced to migrate to the newly created Indian Territory in what was later called The Trail of Tears. And while this territory remained closed to outside settlers for over half a century, in 1889 its unassigned lands were opened to the public, allowing individuals to claim up to 160 acres if they lived on the land and improved it.

This history gives Oklahoma its demographics today, where 8.4% of the population is Native, the highest percentage in the nation besides Alaska, and 63.5% of the population is White. Oklahoma is also one of the reddest states in the nation. The Sooner State has voted for a Democrat Presidential candidate only once in the last 72 years, LBJ in the election of 1964. In fact, in the 2020 Presidential election, only two states had all of their counties go for Trump: West Virginia and, of course, Oklahoma.

Trump won the state with 65.4% of the vote to Biden’s 32.3%, a margin of 33.1 points. But this victory shouldn’t be at all surprising; every Republican Presidential candidate since 2004 has won Oklahoma with over 65% of the vote; the all-time high for a Republican being Richard Nixon’s 71.8% in the blowout election of 1972. Despite this, in recent years, Republicans have failed to grow their support in the state. In the 2014 midterms, the GOP won a remarkable 70% of the votes in the state’s five House elections, but in three of the four elections since then, their share of the vote has decreased, most recently coming in at 66.36% in 2022.

Additionally, in Oklahoma’s 2022 Senate race, Republican incumbent James Lankford defeated Democrat challenger Madison Horn with 64.3% of the vote, over three points less than his previous run in 2016. And while these performances are still significant victories for Republicans, they do show that the party has stagnated in the state. Finally, while Donald Trump increased his share of the vote by 0.05% from 2016 to 2020, his margin of victory in the state shrunk considerably; Trump won the state by 36.4 points in 2016, but by just 33.1 points four years later.

With this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will win Oklahoma by a similar margin to his 2020 run. You can expect Trump’s margin of victory to fall within the 33 to 36-point range, making it unlikely that he’ll net any massive gains in the state, but making it equally unlikely that Democrat Kamala Harris will make any improvements over her predecessor.

TEXAS

If there was ever a single state which might determine the future of electoral politics and our two-party system as we know it, that state would likely be Texas. With 40 electoral votes and a steady Democratic trendline through the 21st century, the one-time Republican stronghold has situated itself in the competitive arena – albeit, at the outer rim of it. 

Texas has consistently supported Republican candidates since Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980. But over the last 25 years, a transformation has taken form. In 2000, Republican George W. Bush won the state by a 21.4% margin over Democrat Al Gore. But by 2020, Donald Trump only won the state by 5.6% over Joe Biden. Over 20 years, Texas experienced a 15-point shift to the left – one of the largest shifts across the nation, and similar to those experienced in states like Arizona and Georgia, which voted for Democrats for the first time in 2020.

One of the most significant demographic changes fueling this shift is the growth of Texas' Hispanic population, which now makes up nearly 40% of the state's residents. While Hispanic voters are not monolithic, they have leaned more Democratic in recent elections, especially in urban areas. This growing demographic, along with significant Black and Asian American communities, has helped bolster Democratic support in Texas’ cities. 

Suburban areas, once strongholds for the GOP, have also shown signs of shifting left, particularly in the counties surrounding Dallas and Houston. This trend is driven by demographic changes and disaffection among suburban women and college-educated voters, many of whom have grown weary of the more populist and divisive rhetoric coming from the national GOP.

Texas is geographically and politically divided between its rural, conservative regions and its urban, more liberal cities. The state's rural areas, particularly in West Texas and the Panhandle, remain strong Republican bastions, where issues such as gun rights, energy policy, and immigration resonate deeply with voters. Meanwhile, urban areas like Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, and Austin have grown increasingly Democratic, with diverse populations, younger voters, and college-educated professionals driving this trend.

Looking at the topline, one might ask: if Georgia and Arizona have become tossups, what’s stopping Texas from doing so?

For every demographic and region fueling Democratic hopes, there is one favoring Republicans. Starting off: while the state’s cities and suburbs had undergone a massive leftward shift from 2000 to 2016, there is some evidence that these movements have slowed. For instance, Harris county – which contains Houston and its surrounding suburbs – shifted less than 2 points leftward between 2016 and 2020, while it had undergone a 12-point shift between 2016 and 2020. This doesn’t mean Democrats are in danger of losing ground; rather, they have hit (or are close to hitting) a ceiling with these groups of voters. Additionally, while Hispanic voters (mainly in densely-populated metros) have indeed bolstered the Democratic coalition, the ethnic group is not monolithic: many Hispanic voters in South Texas and the Rio Grande Valley have bolted rightward during the Trump era, likely resulting from a combination of social conservatism and support for Trump’s advocacy for border control – an issue they (literally) hold near and dear.

Looking ahead to 2024, Texas will likely remain a focal point for both parties. Democrats will aim to build on their recent gains in urban and suburban areas, focusing on mobilizing younger, more diverse voters. Republicans, on the other hand, will seek to maintain their dominance in rural areas while solidifying their appeal to suburban voters who may be concerned about the state of the economy and public safety. But ultimately, Republicans will likely emerge victorious: Trump has built a durable 6-point lead in the polls, a number which is comparable to the 2020 results and would be logical in a national environment similar to that year (which seems to be where we’re heading).

Alabama, the home of the Crimson Tide and the heart of Dixie, is predictably an extremely conservative state. In the 2020 Presidential election, 62% of residents cast their votes for Donald Trump, while only 36.6% did so for Joe Biden. Trump's performance was strikingly similar to his 2016 run, where he won with 62.1% of the vote. These two races were the best ever by a Republican Presidential candidate in the state, besides George Bush in the 2004 election.

Since 1964, Alabamans have only voted for a Democratic candidate once, fellow southerner Jimmy Carter in 1976. However, Alabama did join other deep South states in voting for their infamous segregationist governor, George Wallace, in his 1968 run on the American Independent Party ticket.

But today, 56 years later, the most famous name in Alabama politics is their senator, former college football coach Tommy Tuberville. Going up against incumbent Doug Jones in 2020, Tuberville cruised to victory with 60.1% of the vote. The fact that Jones, a Democrat, was even elected to Alabama’s Senate seat in the first place is a story of its own. During a 2017 special election, his Republican opponent Roy Moore was accused of sexually assaulting several women, including two underage girls, a month out from election day. As a result, Moore lost narrowly, 48.3% to 50%, to Jones.

So, in 2020, with Tuberville not having the baggage Moore had 3 years prior, he was able to handily defeat the Democrat Jones. Since taking office, Tuberville became infamous for his blockage of military nominations in protest of the Department of Defense’s policy to grant leave and reimburse travel costs for servicewomen seeking out-of-state abortions. From February through December of 2023, Tuberville held all Department of Defense nominations, blocking over 450 promotions and leaving the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy without leaders. Although Tuberville eventually relented on his hold in the final weeks of the year, this stunt certainly damaged his reputation, but it isn’t likely to hurt the GOP’s performance in Alabama in the long run.

In fact, according to the 2022 midterm elections, Republicans are doing better than ever in the Cotton State, receiving 70.1% of the vote in the state’s house races. Additionally, in the state’s senate election, Republican Katie Britt beat Democrat Will Boyd 66.6% to 30.9%, a sizable improvement from the retiring six-term Republican Richard Shelby’s performance of 64% of the vote in 2016.

With this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will win Alabama with a significantly higher percentage of the vote than in 2020. If the former president can even come close to matching the GOP’s performance in the midterm elections two years back, he can count on big gains in this deep southern state.

LOUISIANA

In the new millennium, Louisiana voters have opted for the Republican Presidential candidate 100% of the time. The once swing state is now solidly red, with the GOP increasing their popular vote percentage in six of the last seven presidential elections.

So, will history repeat itself once again? And will Donald Trump eke out even more gains in the already MAGA-heavy state this November?

The culture war is in full swing in Louisiana; there’s no better example of this than the law passed this past spring requiring the Ten Commandments to be displayed in every public school classroom in the state. Needless to say, this law was met with fervor by all believers in the separation of church and state, and legal challenges have already been mounted by the ACLU to get it struck down. But Louisiana isn’t a part of the Bible Belt for nothing, so it remains to be seen whether this battle will alienate the state’s more moderate voters.

But there’s still good news for the Republicans; if this election turns out at all like the 2022 midterms, then Donald Trump can expect big gains in the Pelican State. To put it simply, the GOP absolutely demolished the Democrats two years back. Republicans won over 68% of the votes in the house races compared to a paltry 28% for the Democrats. This was an admirable 7% increase in vote share (only 61% of house votes went red in 2020).

All in all, we think Donald Trump will ever so slightly be able to increase his vote share in Louisiana. Kamala Harris may have a better chance to rally the state’s over 30% Black population, but it’s unlikely to make a dent in Trump’s performance. So, without any divine intervention, it seems this November Louisiana will go solidly Republican.

SOUTH CAROLINA

One of the most consistent states in the nation, South Carolina is always on the verge of becoming a swing state, but never makes it there. The Palmetto State has voted red in every election since 1980; and in the last four Presidential elections, the Republican candidate has won South Carolina with between 53.9% to 55.1% of the vote, a range of 1.2 points.

Interestingly, in the other Carolina, things are even more steady. In the last four Presidential elections, the Republican share of the vote has ranged from 49.4% to 50.4%, a range of just a single point. While voters in both states have stayed anchored to the Republican party, albeit by significantly slimmer margins in North Carolina, does Kamala Harris have a chance to change that this November?

The Vice President’s greatest advantage in South Carolina is her strength with Black voters. With the chance to be the first Black woman elected to the Presidency, Harris needs to perform well with the state’s 26% African American population. Famously, back in February of 2020, Joe Biden won the South Carolina primary with a 28.88-point victory over the front runner for the nomination at the time, Bernie Sanders. This win reenergized a campaign that had been a disappointment up to that point, propelling Biden to win the nomination and eventually the White House. The only thing that made this possible was Biden’s strength with the Black voters of South Carolina. In 2020, 92% of Black voters cast their votes for Democrat candidate Joe Biden.

But in 2024, these numbers appear to be much lower for Harris. In recent polling, Donald Trump has shown significant improvement with Black voters, receiving 16% support compared to 79% for the Vice President. While Harris is still leading Trump by 63 points, if these numbers hold, the former president will have doubled his support with this crucial group of South Carolinian voters.

Turning our attention to the 2022 midterm election results, it doesn’t get any rosier for Harris. The GOP absolutely dominated in South Carolina’s seven house races. Not only did Republicans run unopposed in two districts, but in all five others, they had significant improvements. Most impressively, in the predominantly African American district of Democratic congressman and former House Majority Whip, Jim Clyburn, Republican challenger Dave Buckner delivered a stunning improvement for the GOP, winning 37.9% of the vote, seven points more than the Republican candidate in 2020 did.

With this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will win South Carolina by a greater margin than he did four years ago. Kamala Harris is unlikely to win greater support from Black voters, which will make her path to gains in the state highly challenging. The former president should expect a massive improvement in South Carolina so long as he can even come close to matching the Republicans' midterm performance.

MISSISSIPPI

This upcoming election in Mississippi might not hold immediate national consequences, but it may determine the trajectory of a state – and region – which has long supported Republicans but shows sparks of hope for Democrats. 

The Magnolia State is known for its strong conservative lean: since Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory in 1980, the state has given its electoral votes to the Republican nominee in every presidential election. In 2020, Donald Trump secured over 57% of the vote, continuing the conservative trend.

As with other racially-polarized states in the South, Mississippi’s partisan composition very closely mirrors that of its demographics: nearly 60% of its population is white, while the remaining 40% is predominantly Black.

Several factors could influence the 2024 election in Mississippi. First, voter turnout will play a critical role. Historically, turnout in the state has been lower than the national average, particularly among Black voters in rural areas and urban centers like Jackson. Additionally, Trump has seemingly improved his standing among Black male voters since 2020, according to recent polling of the current race. Whether Democrat Kamala Harris is able to mobilize voters and stymie this supposed bleeding is an open question – and one that will likely remain unanswered until November 5th.

Another element to watch is how national political trends filter down into Mississippi: issues like broadband access, medicare expansion, and widespread economic inequality could shift political dynamics in Mississippi – particularly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, which disproportionately affected working-class and minority residents of the state. Additionally, abortion rights may mobilize certain segments of the population, as Mississippi was at the center of the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade in the Dobbs ruling. However, a vast majority of Mississippi residents on both sides of the partisan spectrum identify as Protestant Christians – a group which leans conservative on abortion and other social issues.

As Democrats face declining fortunes in regions such as the Midwest, Mississippi – and the South as a whole – presents an interesting and important opportunity for the party. But until they invest the same strategies, time, and resources into the Magnolia State as they did in Georgia, Mississippi will remain staunchly Republican. 2024 is no different: we predict Trump will win the state by a margin between 15% and 20%.

FLORIDA

Florida, where woke goes to die? More like Florida, where Democrats’ hopes go to die… Let us turn back the clock to the infamous Presidential Election of 2000, between Incumbent Democrat Vice President Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush. This election proved to be one of the closest in American history, and as the night went on and turned into the next day, one thing became clear: it’d all come down to Florida. The state had shifted from being called for Gore early in the evening to being called for Bush, which made him the winner. However, after Gore had called Bush to concede, Florida was once again moved, this time from Bush to the undecided category, prompting Gore to withdraw his concession.

At this point, Bush led Gore by slightly under 2,000 votes and a statewide recount was ordered. After the recount, Bush’s lead shrunk to just over 300 votes, although it later increased to 930 votes after overseas ballots were counted. What happened next is still fiercely debated to this day. But hanging chads or no hanging chads, Bush was declared the winner of Florida’s 25 electoral votes by the United States Supreme Court that December, and thus the entire election.

This 537-vote margin of victory for the Republicans in 2000 will certainly be greater this November. Four years ago, in 2020, despite Democrat Joe Biden leading Republican Donald Trump by 1 point in the state’s Real Clear Politics polling average, Trump went on to win Florida 51.22% to 47.86%, a margin of 3.4 points. Florida was one of only seven states that Trump won by a greater margin in 2020 than in his prior run; he carried it by just 1.2 points in 2016. So even though Trump lost the general election to Biden, his victory in Florida was significant; it signaled that the state was no longer purple, but that it was red.

In this election cycle, Florida, for the first time in 36 years, isn’t being considered a swing state. This makes sense, as all you have to do is look at the 2022 midterms. While nationally the GOP underperformed, in Florida they absolutely destroyed the Democrats. They won 58.3% of the vote in all the state’s House races, an increase of 6.2 points from their 2020 performance. And perhaps more notably, in the Gubernatorial election, Republican incumbent Ron DeSantis beat former Republican Governor turned Democrat candidate Charlie Crist in a landslide victory. DeSantis, who had gained national attention for his battle against Covid Lockdowns, Vaccine Mandates, and the so-called “Woke Ideology,” performed significantly better than during his first run for Governor in 2018, where he won the election by just 0.4 points.

And while since his reelection DeSantis launched a failed bid for the Republican nomination for President and has seen a massive decrease in popularity, he is merely a product of Florida’s shift to the right, not the cause of it. Today, Trump is up 8.4 points on Harris in Florida according to the Real Clear Politics polling average, and we find this number to likely prove accurate. Trump will certainly win Florida; the once prized swing state is now safely Republican. And although his margin of victory will almost definitely be less than the GOP’s in the 2022 midterms, it will also almost unquestionably be greater than in the 2020 race. Therefore, we predict Trump will win Florida by a margin of 6-9 points, roughly in line with the polls.

This drive for victory, more intense than ever before, places outsized value on a candidate’s spoken word, and a campaign’s every dollar. All is in service of victory. 

Driven by these pressures, campaigns have looked beyond by-the-book electoral strategies such as advertisements, in-person campaign events like speeches, or even digital forms of outreach in order to turn out possible voters.

Instead, new higher-risk, higher-reward strategies have emerged, including one focused on reshaping the general election matchup itself: interfering with the opposing party’s primary to ensure a weaker opponent is nominated.

The question is: do the potential rewards of this novel strategy outweigh the catastrophic consequences of its failure?

Primary Interference: How It Works

Not all candidates are created equal: ideological extremism, zealous rhetoric, and background issues like political inexperience and scandals can all negatively affect how voters perceive a candidate.

In many cases, facing the weakest possible opponent can present a more powerful advantage than outspending and out-campaigning a stronger opponent.  Increasing numbers of political campaigns are capitalizing on this, investing serious resources in influencing the opposite party’s primary and helping platform candidates they believe they can defeat. 

Here’s how this works: campaigns will air big-dollar advertisements, and repeatedly single out an anointed opposing candidate in speeches, in order to boost their name recognition and highlight their policies among primary voters.

Knowing that advertisements will be seen by voters of all stripes and affiliations, campaigns don’t actually praise a candidate on the other side of the aisle; they do so implicitly, framing their praises as denigrations, but in the process, raising that candidate’s visibility.

Here’s a great example: in the 2012 Senate election in Missouri, incumbent Democratic Senator Claire McCaskill spent millions of dollars funding ads which offered thinly-veiled support to Republican House member Todd Akin, whose campaign hadn’t attracted significant funding prior to this. The McCaskill campaign likely targeted Akin due to his far-right profile as a House member and his propensity for controversial statements. McCaskill labeled Akin “the most conservative congressman in Missouri” and a “crusader against bigger government.”1

McCaskill effectively boosted Akin’s support among the state’s Republican voters and catapulted his campaign from a distant third to front-runner in the state’s primary - which Akin would go on to win.

In the general election, McCaskill’s strategy paid off: Akin went on to attract widespread criticism for stating that "legitimate rape” could not cause pregnancies among a host of other mishaps.

Come November, while Missouri voted R+9 at the presidential level, McCaskill won re-election by 15.7% - a stunning overperformance, and a resounding affirmation of this strategy’s viability.

There are two reasons this strategy works.

One: most fringe, ideologically-extreme primary candidates tend to be political newcomers rather than experienced politicians, running underfunded and low-visibility campaigns. In primaries, where the best-known and best-funded candidate usually wins, even a small investment can transform a campaign from unserious to seriously competitive. Therefore, from a value-per-dollar perspective, campaigns have realized money may be better spent boosting a weak opponent rather than aiding one’s own campaign.

Secondly, the rise of political tribalism has created primary electorates that veer closer to the ends of the spectrum than the center. As a result, primary voters are increasingly likely to base their support on which candidate is the most extreme. But in the longer term - this disadvantages them in the general election, where candidates often must appeal to voters on all sides of the electorate.

Primary Interference: The Best-Case Scenario

At its best, primary interference can yield incredible benefits for a campaign - especially in competitive states.

In 2022, Democrats across the nation benefitted from primary interference — but most notably in swing states.

Take Pennsylvania’s 2022 gubernatorial election, for instance:

Democratic state Attorney General Josh Shapiro, long positioned as a successor to incumbent Governor Tom Wolf, sought to bolster his chances at victory in Pennsylvania, a highly-competitive swing state. The Republican primary, which was hotly contested between former House Rep. Lou Barletta and state senator Doug Mastriano — a far-right Christian nationalist who had attended the January 6th rally — seemed like an opportunity in waiting.

Shapiro’s campaign poured millions into television advertisements, lambasting Mastriano’s far-right positions on all issues from abortion to democracy and tying the Republican’s potential victory to a win “for what Trump stands for.”2 Of course, these attacks held a double meaning: for every viewer appalled by , a conservative viewer read these same denunciations as endorsements, and these same deterrents to vote as encouragements.

It seemed a risky bet: Pennsylvania, which had reliably supported Democrats through the late 20th and early 21st centuries, is now one of the most politically-divided states in the nation. In 2016, the Keystone State was won by Republican Donald Trump, and in 2020 the state backed Joe Biden by a narrow 1.2% margin of victory — around 80,000 votes out of a total 7 million cast.

But Shapiro’s strategy showed sparks of brilliance. Pennsylvania, while possessing a large rural, blue-collar population which celebrated Trumpism, also contains equally large suburbs and urban centers whose residents detest far-rightism with fervor. And in a midterm election, where voter enthusiasm is typically limited to more civically-engaged voters, the balance shifted heavily in favor of the more highly-educated suburban- and urbanites.

In the end, Shapiro won by 14.8%, turning a potential nail-biter into a blowout. His victory had immediate and far-ranging impacts: not only did Shapiro keep an important governorship in Democratic hands, but by taking the race off the competitive board, he allowed the party to streamline valuable resources into more competitive races — possibly making up the difference between defeat and victory: for example, Wisconsin’s concurrent gubernatorial election, where Democrats only narrowly came out on top.

It was a similar story in numerous other states that year, including Arizona, a fast-growing, heavily urbanized state in the Sun Belt. Democratic candidates for governor and attorney general won by thin (in the latter race, extremely thin) margins against their far-right, election-denying Republican opponents. These victories handed Democrats nearly half of Arizona's state row offices after a decade of Republican dominance.

Primary interference’s consistently resounding success across different regions and different national environments suggests that Democrats have no plans of abandoning the strategy.

Why Primary Interference Could Be Here To Stay

You might be thinking that this strategy isn’t going to be around much longer.

With the American electorate’s increasing acceptance of extremism and extremist candidates and the prominent weight of Trump’s endorsements in Republican primaries across the nation, skeptical readers might be asking: won’t Trump-endorsed candidates win their primaries, without Democratic boosts?

It’s an important question — after all, the utility of primary interference rests on its necessity.

With Donald Trump willing and able to manipulate Republican primaries at the flick of his wrist — or the tap of his finger on Twitter — has primary interference become a strategy of the past?

The answer is no, for two reasons.

Number one: Trump’s endorsed candidates don’t always win their primaries. And because of this, Democrats can still boost them.

To illustrate how Trump’s endorsement holds considerable but not unlimited sway, we can look to 2022. In that year, Trump endorsed numerous fringe candidates facing Republican incumbents who he had deemed disloyal to him; although some endorsees won notable victories in their primaries, numerous campaigns ended in failure.

Take Georgia, a state in the Deep South whose Republican coalition is extremely conservative. The Peach State rejected Trump-endorsed candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor in their respective primaries by landslide margins: in the Governor’s race, Trump-endorsed former Senator David Purdue lost to incumbent Governor Brian Kemp in a 73-21 point wallop.

Bottom line: Trump’s endorsement, while still the most powerful of any living politician, is not limitless. It’s influence over the Republican electorate has declined in tandem with Trump’s own grip. Between his 2020 loss and his 2024 rebound, Trump has seen his grip on the Republican Party falter. And regardless of whether Trump wins or loses on November 5th, this trend will likely continue: it’s difficult to see how Trump can maintain his same level of influence in 20, or even 10 years. Barring extremely unlikely circumstances, Trump will be permanently out of elected office by 2030: either he wins this election and will be forced to leave office by 2029, or he loses and is likely unable to win the Republican nomination again, having lost not once, but twice.

Trump’s endorsement losing its swaying power (and thus, a decline in Trump-like figures winning nomination) may seem detrimental to Democrats’ electoral prospects — but it also leaves an opening for them to continue their meddling.

Reason number two for why primary interference is not obsolete: Trump doesn’t always endorse the most extreme candidate in the race. In this case, Democrats can prop up the more extreme candidate.

To illustrate how Trump doesn’t always endorse the most extreme candidate: In the 2022 Senate elections in Alabama and Missouri, Trump endorsed more conventional Republican Senate candidates Katie Britt and Eric Schmidt against their far-right alternatives. And in this year’s elections, Trump seems to have learnt from his previous mistakes, seemingly approaching his endorsements more strategically and taking into account electoral viability in 2024 where he largely dismissed it two years earlier.

And this year, Trump is choosing his endorsements even more tactfully. in Montana’s 2024 Senate race, Trump endorsed veteran and businessman Tim Sheehy over MT-02 Representative Matt Rosendale, one of the most far-right members of the House and a staunch Trump ally. In West Virginia’s Senate race, Trump supported Governor Jim Justice over WV-02 Representative Alex Mooney despite Mooney being far more conservative than Justice on issues such as government spending, Medicare expansion, and LGBTQ+ rights. In Maryland, Trump even endorsed former Governor Larry Hogan — a moderate Republican who had called for Trump’s removal from office in the wake of the January 6th insurrection.

Trump has (ever so slightly) developed strategic insight since 2022, as he and his party seem more in step in terms of their objectives: both want to see Republicans win a trifecta.

Where Trump’s main desire in 2022 was to retain his grip on the Republican Party despite being out of office, in 2024 — now that he is the party’s standard bearer once again — he seems to acknowledge the importance of victory for his party (and for his presidency).

To summarize: Trump’s endorsements are neither all-powerful nor all-impulsive, leaving the door open for outside influence.

In my opinion, primary meddling will remain an effective strategy — but although its benefits are immense, they are not infinite.

Limits and Disadvantages of Primary Interference

Like all strategies, primary interference has its trade-offs and limitations. 

Starting off with the most obvious: some primaries aren’t so easily manipulated. Even with outside support, a candidate may still lose their primary.

Since many extremists have little experience running for office, they enter the field underfunded and virtually unknown. In a field of candidates which likely includes more experienced candidates running more serious campaigns, gaining electoral momentum is an often-insurmountable challenge — even with the implicit aid of the opposing party.

Because of this, primary meddling poses the risk of wasted money.

Take Nevada and Colorado, for instance. In 2022, Democrat-affiliated groups poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into Republican gubernatorial and senatorial primaries, respectively. In both races, the mainstream Republican won their primary, rendering Democratic efforts (and investments) useless.

Second: even if an extremist candidate does manage to advance to the general election, there is no guarantee that they will lose.

In our hyper—polarized environment, where more and more voters seem to vote for political parties rather than individual candidates, the personal has taken on far less importance compared to the partisan. Even an abhorrent candidate may be a favorite to win if the partisan composition of the electorate favors their party.

A state’s baseline partisanship is by far the best indicator of an electoral outcome, and in states where Republicans or Democrats are supported by a clear majority of voters, it’s often a metric that is difficult to overcome. There is no objective definition for this benchmark, but, it’s safe to assume that states which regularly support one party by 10 points or more are likely to do in any given election — regardless of candidate quality.

On top of that, increasing amounts of voters have migrated from the center of the ideological spectrum to its far ends. Simply put, extremist candidates are not rejected with the same consistency and force as they would have been only a decade ago.

The most obvious example of these changing dynamics is Trump’s groundbreaking success. In 2016, Trump won the electoral college and nearly won a majority of the popular vote, owing to his popularity among blue-collar Americans and his surprising retention of support from suburban voters.

With the American public becoming increasingly comfortable with extremism, primary meddling poses an inherent risk: setting up an extremist for failure only for them to emerge victorious.

This is the disaster scenario: not only losing the election, but helping elevate another extremist to political relevance — whether in a county municipal office, a state legislature, or even the halls of Congress.

To see this reality very nearly play out, look to Missouri.

Missouri’s 2022 Senate Election: A Close Brush With Disaster

Some quick background on Missouri: the Show-Me state, while once extremely competitive and even considered a presidential bellwether (meaning predictor), is now considered a Republican stronghold. In 2016 Donald Trump won the state by over 20 points, and four years later he held the state by a 16-point margin. 

Fast forward to 2022: Democrats were defending a barebones majority in the Senate and sought potential pick-up opportunities wherever they might have lied.

Some even looked at Missouri, and as nonsensical as this may sound, there was some validity to their hope.

Running for Senate, and current frontrunner in the Republican primary, was former Governor Eric Greitens. And to say Greitens was a poor candidate would be an understatement.

Eric Greitens stood out as an abhorrent candidate even among the flood of second-rate Republican candidates who won nomination in concurrent Senate races in other states.

Greitens had committed the same cardinal sins which had doomed fellow candidates Doug Mastriano and Kari Lake: he was a die-hard Trump supporter and made numerous far-right statements, including one supporting the far-right Great Replacement theory. 

During his first year as governor, Greitens was accused of having an extramarital affair, sexual and physical assault, and illegally using a veteran’s charity email list for his political campaign; he was indicted on the latter charge, as well as invasion of privacy. 

On June 1st, 2018 – only 508 days after the start of his gubernatorial tenure – Greitens resigned after facing an impeachment effort supported by north of three-quarters of members in both houses of the state legislature. 

Four years later, Greitens returned to politics by entering his name in the 2022 Senate election. 

And unsurprisingly, his entry fueled Democrats’ hopes in a state where they had long been deprived of any political power (aside from the governorship, where Democratic Jay Nixon served up until 2017). Many Democrats reasoned that even Missouri, a Trump +16 state, would refuse to back a man who likely committed sexual and physical assault.

When pitted against two of the leading Democratic candidates in the race — Lucas Kunce and Trudy Busch Valentine — Greitens prevailed in every poll except one (where he tied), but only by single-digit margins – a non-significant ‘feat’ in a state which regularly supported Republicans by over 15 points, and certainly indicative of a competitive race.

But Republicans seemed to recognize this reality, too, and were quick to put an end to Democratic hopes. Greitens’ standing in the polls fell, and he routinely placed behind other Republicans like Rep. Vicky Hartzler and state Attorney General Eric Schmitt.

Ultimately, Greitens finished a distant third in the Republican primary while Schmitt came out on top — as he would again in November.

Perhaps wistful Democrats had looked back to 2012 — the aforementioned Senate election in Missouri where Claire McCaskill’s bet payed off — as a source of optimism.

Unfortunately, 2012 was a different era – especially for Missouri, which only voted against Obama by 9 points that year– and this no better demonstrated than in McCaskill’s own 6-point loss in 2018.

In the end, Greitens’ loss was for the better: even if Democrats’ primary meddling were to have been successful, it was entirely likely (and indeed, more likely than not) that Greitens would have won the November general election simply due to Missouri’s heavy conservative telt. And although Schmitt himself is no moderate — he was one of the many Republican AG’s who challenged the results of the 2020 election — Senator Schmitt is a far better reality than a Senator Greitens, which would have been an indictment of our moral principles and standards for those holding office.

In meddling with primaries, we play a dangerous game. Even though Greitens didn’t win the Senate election, was it worth aiding his campaign at all?

Is primary meddling a bridge too far?

Is Primary Interference Feeding Election Skepticism

Accompanying primary interference is a concern transcending the binary win versus loss dilemma: in a time where public trust in elections is at an all-time low and our democracy seems more endangered than ever before, is primary interference — which inherently involves manipulating the will of the people and the circumstances of the general election — exacerbating these problems?

This consequence remains under-discussed. How do we measure the impact of primary interference on public trust in elections?

Even when it works, primary interference can actually strengthen extremism and anti-democratic forces:

Take the 2022 House of Representatives election in MI-03. Republican Rep. Peter Meijer, who had voted to impeach Trump in the wake of the January 6th insurrection and had taken a defiant stance against right-wing conspiracies. Meijer earned the praise and admiration of many Democrats for his valiant actions, but unfortunately, Meijer had something which Democrats wanted: MI-3.

MI-03 voted for Joe Biden by just under 10% in 2020, making it a prime target for Democrats in 2022. Therefore, it wasn’t a surprise when reports arised that the DCCC had spent nearly $430,000 on ads promoting Meijer’s Republican opponent, John Gibbs, as a “tough-on-immigration, pro-Trump conservative.”3 Despite Meijer’s own extensive campaign treasury (owing to his massive personal wealth), he was narrowly defeated by a 3.6% margin.

Fast forward to November: Democrat Hillary Scholten defeated John Gibbs by a landslide 12.9% margin. Scholten’s victory galvanized Democrats in a state which had swerved rightward in previous years.

But it didn’t come without a cost.

Which is more valuable? Another rank and file Democrat, or, a truly principled Republican in a position of power (i.e. Meijer) who can use their influence to reshape their party? As the moderate faction of the GOP continues to recede, a standard-bearer is desperately needed — and Meijer, a charismatic and likeable politician who never shied away from mocking the far-right, was well fit for this position.

But instead, Meijer was voted out of office less than two years after he began his tenure.

Meijer might well have lost the primary without the “aid” of Democrats. Other House Republicans who voted to impeach Trump, such as WA-03 Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler and SC-05 Rep. Tom Rice, lost renomination against Trump-endorsed opponents.

Was it necessary for Democrats to involve themselves in the primary? Would our nation have been better served if Meijer had a fairer opportunity to win re-election?

Primary Interference: Exploring the Question

Just like anything else, this is not a black-and-white situation, and there is no single, all-encompassing, correct answer.

If we think about victory only in the context of the horserace, then primary interference might seem like a blatantly unethical (and needlessly risky) strategy — quasi-manipulating the will of the voters for no other reason than chasing the coveted win.

But victory, in our current political era - where the difference between a win and a loss can determine the fate of democracy - can appear to be a necessity.

Primary interference can have overwhelmingly positive or downright catastrophic political consequences, and the ethical questions it raises may be (partially) justified/rectified/answered by the moral necessity of victory — for our democracy, for our country.

As we saw with the aforementioned 2022 Senate election in Missouri, primary interference edges us closer to victory at the cost of a far more devastating defeat: elevating another extremist possibly at the expense of a more moderate and more principled candidate.

Primary Interference: Where I Stand

With great power, comes great responsibility. With these important questions and ramifications in mind, primary interference should be used sparingly and with great caution. It should not be used, for example, to impact contests where a candidate begins as an underdog for the sole purpose of making the race competitive: the potential negative consequences are too great.

So far, Democrats have shown themselves to be wise in choosing where (and where not) to meddle in primaries.

In my opinion, primary interference is best used as a means of shoring up a likely victory, rather than improving the odds of a tossup, or (dreadfully) attempting to make a usually out-of-reach race competitive. 

The most optimal (highest reward with the least risk) places for employing this strategy are in races where a campaign or party is favored from the get go. Take the 2022 elections in Illinois and New Hampshire. In both states, the incumbent Democrats – Gov. J.B. Pritzker and Sen. Maggie Hassan – were considered the favorites to win their election.

Illinois, being a Democratic stronghold federally, was a safer bet than New Hampshire, where Joe Biden won the state by a solid yet not overwhelming margin of 7 points. 

Pritzker, a billionaire, boosted Republican State House Rep. Darren Bailey in his primary.

The latter was considered an extremist by many, being an outspoken opponent of mask mandates during the height of the coronavirus pandemic to the point that was forcibly removed from the Illinois State House session by an 81-27 vote; of course, he was also an ardent Trump supporter. 

Pritzker likely didn’t need to aid Bailey in order to win the election.

However, seeing as how he had the money to do so, and considering that his 12-point margin of victory was rather low for Illinois standards, it was a move which stood only to benefit himself and Democrats. Who knows how close the margin might have been had Pritzker faced a more competent opponent?

In New Hampshire, Republican Don Bolduc eked out a 1-point win over State Senate president Chuck Morse in their respective primary. 

Considering that Democrats spent $3.2 million on ads supporting Bolduc’s primary candidacy, it’s a fair assumption that Bolduc likely would have lost the primary without the additional aid. 

Democrats’ gamble proved to be a success: Hassan prevailed by a 9-point margin of Bolduc, despite some late polling showing her losing the election by 1 or 2 percentage points. 

While Morse likely would have lost the election as well, he was a far more experienced candidate with institutional support. 

Perhaps he would have narrowed the margins further, thus giving Democrats more to worry about (and devote precious resources towards) in an already-dire election cycle.

The greatest strategies balance effectiveness with likeliness. 

The allure of victory can cloud one’s judgment, and while it is a common saying, perhaps there is no more universal one than this: it’s better to be safe than sorry.

Once a contested swing state, Washington has become a Democratic stronghold in both presidential and down-ballot races. Since 2000, Democrats have held the governor’s office, both Senate seats, and a majority of House seats, even as Republicans occasionally won less partisan state offices with moderate candidates. Despite Republicans frequently targeting statewide races, they consistently fall short.

Washington’s consistency contrasts with national trends, where Democrats struggle down-ballot even in blue states. This raises the question: why has Washington grown steadily bluer?

In case you missed it, read Washington, Part 1: A Democrat's Utopia

Part 2 Preview: Exploring Washington’s Unique Blue Trend

Seattle and the “Blue Wall”

The Smiley-Murray race is just one example of a repeated pattern in Washington State: Republican rurals are overcome by a “blue wall”1 located in the western half of the state, preventing Republicans from winning more than 43 percent of the vote in most elections.

The blue wall I'm referring to is King County, which includes the state’s largest city, Seattle, and its heavily urbanized surrounding counties.

Seattle, the state’s largest city, has seen remarkable growth—between 2010 and 2020, it was one of the six fastest-growing metro areas in the country,2adding over 128,000 residents. It’s one of only 14 American cities to grow by more than 100,000 people during that period.3

King County’s suburban areas have also expanded, growing by over 50% compared to the national average of 32%, with an influx of more than 338,000 residents in the last decade,4 , bringing the total population to 2.27 million. Only four other counties in the U.S. saw increases of this magnitude.

Reflecting national trends, King County has also become more diverse over the past decade. The non-Hispanic white share of the population fell by over 10 percentage points, while the Asian population rose by more than 5 points to 19.8%. The Black and Hispanic populations both grew by a little over 1 percentage point.5

Washington’s High Engagement Political Culture

In terms of the state’s political culture, I’d characterize King County voters as high propensity voters - because they go out to vote a ton - turning out at an astonishing 86.% 6in the 2020 election (compared to an already high 76% turnout in Washington state at large7 and 66% turnout nationally). King County voter turnout also significantly surpassed turnout in cities like New York City (63.3% turnout), Los Angeles county8 (57% turnout) and Chicago and Cook County (72.2%), that same year.

They're also reliable voters - and this culture/pattern of high turnout and participation— already seems to be in place looking across several election cycles (not just 2020). King County voter turnout was as high as 81% in both 2016 and 2012. Compared to a more uneven voter turnout in New York City which saw 56.3% voter turnout in 2016, Chicago and Cook County (71.54% turnout in 2016), and Denver County9 which saw 2020 turnout 76.24%, 2016 turnout at 72% and 63.48% turnout in 2012.

Washington’s High-Engagement Political Culture

King County’s political culture stands out for its high voter engagement and its notably secular character, both of which play a role in shaping its Democratic lean. Washington’s voters are also more likely to be politically engaged. They probably do know what the candidates look like; maybe even how they talk, and what exactly they say.

And the numbers reflect this. King County voters are high propensity voters - and demonstrate a pattern of consistent high turnout across election cycles. In the 2020 election, King County saw an extraordinary 86% turnout, surpassing both Washington state’s overall turnout of 76% and the national turnout of 66%. This turnout also outpaced major cities like New York City (63.3%), Los Angeles County (57%), and Chicago's Cook County (72.2%).

This pattern isn’t limited to 2020; King County turnout was similarly strong in previous elections, with 81% turnout in both 2016 and 2012. In contrast, cities like New York City saw lower turnout, with 56.3% in 2016, while Denver County’s turnout varied more dramatically, from 63.5% in 2012 to 76.2% in 2020.

Washington voters are also highly educated. According to the Washington Post’s exit polls, 80 percent of the Evergreen State’s voters had at least a college degree (with the same poll showing that voters without a college degree comprised 59 percent of the total voting population, with no data on further levels of higher education).

Another defining aspect of King County’s political culture is its secularism. Seattle, at the heart of King County, has some of the lowest levels of religious affiliation in the U.S., and this secular tendency is evident in the county’s politics. High turnout and secular values go hand-in-hand here, contributing to a consistent pattern of support for Democratic candidates and progressive policies across election cycles.

All these factors contribute heavily to the state's Democratic lean and help set the state up as what I believe to be a Democratic' 'utopia'. 

Defying National Trends: Seattle’s Steadfast Urban Support for Democrats

Across much of the country, Democrats have struggled with a gradual erosion of support in core urban constituency, where Republicans have made inroads with minority voters, capitalizing on concerns over crime and socialism.

For example, in New York City—a long-standing Democratic stronghold—Joe Biden underperformed Hillary Clinton’s 2016 margins in 2020, despite overperforming her nationally. In 2022, Democratic Governor Kathy Hochul continued this downward trend, winning New York City by less than 70%, a drop from Democrats’ previous 80%+ margins.

Seattle, in contrast, has shown no evidence of this urban backslide. On the contrary, from 2012 to 2020, Democrats increased their share of the vote in Seattle from 83% to 88% of voters, underscoring Seattle's overwhelming and expanding Democratic base of support.

Suburbs That Stay Blue: Washington’s Reliable Democratic Base

Washington’s suburbs are solidly and consistently blue—a stability that contrasts with the national battleground status of suburban areas.

Suburbs have emerged as a key battleground nationally, with many election outcomes across the nation turning on this pivotal voter segment. For example, in 2020, Joe Biden flipped key swing states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania after Democrats had lost all three of these states only 4 years earlier - partly by making gains in their suburban areas.

However, Democrats’ success in the suburbs is not guaranteed nationwide; in Virginia’s 2021 gubernatorial race, Democrat Terry McAuliffe lost by nearly three points in large part because he failed to retain Biden’s margins in the Northern Virginia suburbs.

In Washington, however, suburban voters around Seattle remain reliably liberal and high-turnout. In 2020 Joe Biden won the area surrounding Seattle by nearly 20 points, and Democratic Senator Patty Murray likely won these areas by a similar margin 2 years later. 

Defying Democrats’ National Challenges: Less Polarized Rural Populace

Washington’s rural voters also defy national trends by being less polarized than rural areas in many other states, both ideologically and in partisan preference.

Although Washington’s rural counties decisively favored Trump in 2020, he won only 54% of the rural vote—significantly lower than his 57% share nationwide. In fact, even if votes from Washington’s three largest counties (King, Snohomish, and Pierce) were removed, Biden would still have won the state by around 4,000 votes.10

Unlike in the South or Midwest, where some rural counties gave Trump over 80% of the vote, no rural county in Washington reached such extreme levels. Many of Washington’s rural counties gave Trump margins in the 60s or 70s, reflecting strong support but not anywhere close to the near-unanimous backing seen in states like Texas or Alabama, where a large number of rural counties give Trump upwards of 90% of the vote.

A recent race that illustrates this distinct rural dynamic is Washington’s 2022 election in the 3rd Congressional District, a Republican-leaning, largely rural area where Democrat Marie Glusenkamp Perez ran against Republican Joe Kent.

Kent, an extremist who openly quoted a white supremacist author and received endorsements from figures like Neo-Nazi Nick Fuentes, represented a far-right platform. Although WA-03 had historically leaned conservative, with Trump winning by more than 3 points in 2020, a majority of its voters ultimately chose Glusenkamp Perez over Kent.

In many other rural areas, voters might have supported Kent, or voters might have ignored Kent’s extreme views, choosing a candidate based on party label alone, especially amid concerns about inflation and the economy. However, Washington’s rural voters proved discerning, rejecting Kent’s extreme agenda and supporting a Democrat instead.

If the undiscerning voter had walked into the ballot, intended to vote only based on the lackluster economy and rising inflation, she might cast her ballot for whichever candidate had an R next to their name; in this case, Joe Kent.

However, if they watched even a couple of either candidate’s ads or simply read any news about the state of the race, they’d realize that Joe Kent isn’t just a boring ol’ fiscal conservative: he’s crazy.

This choice reflects a potential characteristic of Washington’s rural electorate—a willingness to cross party lines in the face of extremism.

In Washington, however, a small but significant portion of these voters rejected Kent's far-right agenda and cast their ballots for a Democrat.

Defying Democrats’ National Challenges: Limited Anti-Trump Moderates

And it’s not just about recognizing crazy, either.

Democrats across the nation have recently struggled to retain their tenuous alliances with middle-of-the-road voters — alliances largely borne out of a shared opposition to Trumpism — in the absence of Trump. In Washington, however, these swingy, moderate voters are either fewer in number or more consistently aligned with Democrats.

Even when offered a moderate Republican alternative, Washington’s centrist voters have largely stayed with Democrats.

In 2022, for example, incumbent Democratic Senator Patty Murray faced a stiff challenge from Tiffany Smiley, who was widely perceived as a more conventional, moderate Republican, due to her moderate stance on abortion. Polling had shown the race to be within the margin of error; on November 8th, however, Murray won by nearly 15 points, receiving 57.1% of the vote—a result almost identical to Biden’s 57.9% in 2020. Unlike other states, where moderate suburban voters shifted back to Republicans in 2022, Washington Democrats’ coalition held firm.

This is what differentiates Washington even from other blue states like Virginia, where Biden’s 10-point victory in 2020 was largely due to unprecedented support in historically Republican suburbs near D.C. But in the 2022 midterms, without Trump on the ballot, many of these voters returned to their Republican roots.

For example, in VA-10, a DC-adjacent, suburban district, Biden’s 19-point margin in 2020 shrank to a 6.5-point win for Democratic Rep. Jennifer Wexton two years later. Meanwhile, Washington’s WA-06, a heavily suburban district, showed no such shift, supporting Biden with an 18% share of vote in 2020, then re-electing Rep. Derek Kilmer by 20.1% - even slightly increasing his margin two years later.

In states like Virginia and New York, a significant part of the Democratic coalition (around 5-10%) consists of voters who would probably support a Democrat in a presidential race but would otherwise lean Republican. Washington, however, has little evidence of such voters in significant numbers.

Looking Ahead: GOP Prospects

It's easy for Republican strategists to argue that Republicans could improve their margins in Washington by fielding less extreme candidates —a strategy that has shown promise in states like Arizona or Pennsylvania, where far-right candidates have cost Republicans winnable races.

However, two obstacles make this strategy difficult in Washington.

First: it's not so easy for Republicans to just start nominating less crazy candidates.

First, Washington’s GOP, like many state parties, has been overtaken by a faction focused on culture wars and election denial rather than the traditional conservatism that might appeal to moderates. The state’s current GOP chair, Jim Walsh, is better known for rallying against the state’s COVID restrictions and comparing those who enacted vaccine mandates to fascists in Nazi Germany than for focusing on fiscal conservatism. 11

Even if the party aimed to nominate moderate candidates, they cannot fully control the outcome of primaries.

Ultimately, it's the voters in the primaries who decide which candidates are going to be elevated to the general election.

The vast majority of the Republican base in Washington leans older, whiter, and rural. And while I established that the state’s rurals are less conservative than one might expect, there are still plenty of voters who skew heavily towards the right — and these voters currently dominate the Republican coalition.

They often choose candidates who best reflect their views rather than those with broad electoral appeal. A good example is the 2022 WA-03 race, where Joe Kent, a very extreme Republican, won the jungle primary against the incumbent Republican representative, Jaime Herrera Beutler, who had voted to impeach Donald Trump in 2021. Since her first election in 2010, Beutler had been reelected five times without trouble. In 2022, she had been endorsed by Republican House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, House Minority Whip Steve Scalise, and Republican Conference Chair Elise Stefanik.

In other words, Beutler had the backing of the GOP institution.

But Kent had the support of an even stronger institution: Trump. Trump’s enthusiastic support of Kent singlehandedly transformed his campaign from suicide mission to success, all thanks to Trump’s iron grip on the Republican base. This continued platforming of extremist candidates seems likely to continue: this year, Joe Kent once again advanced to the general election in WA-03.

Unless Washington Republicans find a way to loosen Trump’s stranglehold over the conservative coalition — which begins with them actually wanting to do so — they will keep throwing away electoral opportunities in a state where there already weren’t many to be found.

Here’s the second reason Republicans shouldn’t be holding their breath for a victory in Washington: even when they do nominate more moderate candidates, their electoral performances range from disappointingly mediocre to inadequately strong.

In 2022, for example, moderate Republican Tiffany Smiley lost to Patty Murray by nearly 15 points, a modest improvement over Trump’s 2020 margin in a redder national environment. Dino Rossi, who ran competitive campaigns as a moderate Republican over four elections, and was somewhat successful in consolidating the state’s rural, Republican base and reaching out to more moderate and even Democratic voters, similarly overperformed expectations but was never able to secure a win.

Ultimately, given that even moderate-to-mainstream Republicans who ran strong campaigns were unsuccessful, Republicans’ prospects in Washington appear bleak.

The Republican Dilemma: A Party Out of Step with Washington’s Electorate

Wrapping it up, we can start by talking about political prospects for Republicans in the state.

I'd really sum it up by saying that the current model of the Republican Party, which leans heavily on populist rhetoric, and social conservatism — is extremely ill-suited to Washington State.

Across the nation, Republicans have made a trade-off, sacrificing support from highly-educated, higher-income suburban moderates in exchange for a focus on working-class and rural voters. In heavily blue-collar states such as Wisconsin or Ohio, Republicans have reaped success. But in a state with one of largest secular populations in the nation, a large and growing suburban population, and high concentration of highly-educated voters, this calculus just doesn’t pencil out.

Looking Ahead: Caution to Democrats

Now, while Democrats have been, are, and will likely remain the dominant party in Washington State, it is still imperative that they not rest easy.

They need only look at their neighboring state of Oregon - which shares similar demographics and political culture with Washington, to see that Oregon has actually faced a host of tighter races recently.

This is not because Oregon is a fundamentally more conservative state than Washington, but simply because Democrats in Oregon have made a number of poor political decisions — nominating candidates who are too progressive for moderate voters, and somewhat-poorly managing the state. Issues like rising crime in Portland have eroded Democratic margins, suggesting that political missteps could endanger Democratic dominance in Washington as well.

Washington’s Democrats, however, have generally shown stronger political instincts, balancing progressive policies with moderate appeal. Nevertheless, they should remain vigilant.

In fact, Washington State features a competitive house district in WA-08, whose voters could potentially support a Republican, assuming a poor national environment for Democrats and a strong GOP nominee. The 2024 gubernatorial race in Washington, featuring a matchup between Democratic Attorney General Bob Ferguson and Republican former WA-08 Rep. Bob Reichert, provides an opening for Republicans. Reichert, who won election 8 times in a Democrat-leaning district, has a proven track record at winning. However, he faces multiple obstacles. Ferguson, who has served as AG since 2013, is a well-known politician in the state and by no means a throwaway candidate. Furthermore, Reichert shares the ballot with Donald Trump, whose brand of Republicanism is toxic in Washington. Current polling reflects Reichert’s difficult challenge: in the last three polls, Reichert has trailed Ferguson by margin of 6 to 13 points.

Regardless of whether Reichert wins or loses, his performance may still aid downballot candidates in competitive elections, most notably in WA-03 and WA-08. While Republicans hold only a modest presence in state politics—the Senate stands at 29-20 Democratic and the House at 58-40—a strong year could theoretically bring either chamber within reach.

As is, Republicans aren’t completely shut out of state politics: the current State Senate balance is 29-20 Democratic, and the House 58-40. It wouldn’t be inconceivable for Republicans to win back either or both chambers in a truly extraordinary year.

But as things stand, while the rest of the nation remains bitterly and evenly divided, Washington charts its own, defiant path — towards the bluer end of the spectrum.

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While not a particularly exciting state geographically, Nebraska is certainly a very exciting state electorally. Yes, the Cornhusker State is one of only two states (the other being Maine) that splits its electoral votes: two votes are awarded to the state’s overall popular vote winner, and the remaining three are distributed between the popular vote winners in the state’s three congressional districts. This unique system was created by a 1991 law, and up until the 2008 Presidential election, it didn’t change anything; the Republican presidential candidate, by finishing first in all three congressional districts, won all five of Nebraska’s votes.

But all of that changed in 2008 when Barack Obama won Nebraska’s 2nd congressional district, which includes Omaha. Suddenly, a very Republican state, that had only gone blue in one presidential election since 1940, was awarding an electoral vote to the Democrats, all because of the politics of its largest city. Although Romney flipped the 2nd district back to the Republicans in 2012, and Donald Trump won it too four years later, in 2020, the district once again went to a Democrat, Joe Biden.

This election cycle, Trump’s victory may hinge on winning Nebraska’s 2nd district. In fact, it represents Trump’s only viable road to the White House that doesn’t require the Rust Belt. If the former President flips only Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada on election day, he loses to Kamala Harris, 270-268. But if he can win the 2nd district, then the two candidates tie in the electoral college, and the House’s Republican majority gets to select a winner, which, unsurprisingly, will be Trump.

Statewide, Republican support in Nebraska remains steady. In the 2022 House elections, the GOP won 62.71% of the vote, almost identical to their performances in both 2020 and 2018. And although Nebraska remains solidly red, this is not a good sign for Trump; his support appears to have stagnated in the state, which makes flipping the 2nd district an uphill battle.

Therefore, we predict that Donald Trump will perform very similarly in Nebraska to his 2020 run. And, as a result, we can expect Kamala Harris to hold on to the 2nd district, thereby avoiding an electoral tie.

SOUTH DAKOTA

Although not as Republican as its neighbor to the north, South Dakota is certainly a bright red state, nonetheless. The home of Mount Rushmore voted for Donald Trump by a 26-point margin; Trump won with 61.8% of the vote to Biden’s 35.6%. And while you may not know much about South Dakotan politics, you probably know Governor Kristi Noem (yes, the lady who shot her dog).

Noem was first elected in 2018, in South Dakota’s closest gubernatorial election since 1986. She barely beat the Democrat candidate, former professional bronc rider and Minority Leader of the South Dakota senate, Billie Sutton. Noem finished the race with 51% of the vote, and Sutton finished second with a commendable 47.6% of the vote. Noem’s victory made her the first female governor of South Dakota and extended the longest active hold on a governorship by one party; the GOP has controlled the governor’s office in the state since 1978.

With the presidential election coming up this November, Donald Trump will certainly win South Dakota. So, what chance does he have to increase his victory in the state?

In 2022, South Dakota had a gubernatorial, Senate, and House election. In the governor’s race, Noem performed significantly better than in her first election, receiving 62% of the vote to her Democrat challenger’s 35.2%. In the Senate election, incumbent Republican John Thune cruised to his 4th victory with 69.6% of the vote. Thune, however, did perform slightly worse than in his last election; he received 71.8% of the vote back in 2016. In South Dakota’s at-large House district election, Republican Dusty Johnson was reelected to his 3rd term with 77.4% of the vote. Curiously, Johnson had no Democratic challenger in either his 2022 or 2020 race, instead running against two different libertarian candidates. Nevertheless, Johnson (like Thune) performed worse than his last run, with Johnson’s share of the vote declining by 3.6 points from 2020.

So, although Kristi Noem had a big victory in the 2022 midterms, it was largely due to her facing a weaker Democrat opponent than she did four years prior. In fact, 2022 was an overall worse year for the GOP in South Dakota than 2020 was. With this in mind, we predict that Donald Trump will win South Dakota roughly in line with his 2020 numbers.

NORTH DAKOTA

North Dakota is an often-overlooked Great Plains state. While its sister to the south has Mount Rushmore, the only thing the Roughrider State has is a tapped-out oil boom and a governor who was almost Trump’s running mate. So, what chance does Kamala Harris have in a state that resoundingly voted for Donald Trump in 2020? The answer is probably not a very big one.

To start, Trump won North Dakota by a menacing 33 points four years ago (65% to 32%); this was a two-point improvement over his 2016 run, although his margin of victory was 2.3 points lower. But since 2020, Republicans have shown slight weakness in the state. Again, we must turn to the 2022 midterm election to see how the GOP performed in North Dakota. Two years ago, John Hoeven, who was also the state’s governor from 2000-2010, ran for his third term in the Senate. And while in 2014 Hoeven won an absolutely mind-boggling 78.6% of the vote to his Democratic challenger’s 17% (a freakish margin of 61.6 points), in 2022 Hoeven only won 56.4% of the vote in a three-way race, the Democrat and Independent opponents getting 25% and 18.5% of the vote, respectively. Although the independent candidate likely siphoned a significant amount of votes away from Hoeven, this was still an embarrassing decline in performance for a politician who had been a dominant force in the state for over 20 years.

So does this spell trouble for Donald Trump this November? With the glory days of North Dakota’s oil boom behind it, perhaps the Republican dominance in the state will also go bust. As the oil ceases to flow like it used to, production peaked back in 2019, the state’s phenomenal economic growth over the last two decades will no longer be able to keep pace. So as North Dakotans become weary of voting Republican, Trump may have trouble maintaining his 2020 margin of victory.

All things considered, we predict Trump will win North Dakota by roughly 30 points, slightly lower than four years ago, but nonetheless a landslide.

As President Biden spends his remaining months in office on Rehoboth Beach, this November, residents of Delaware will no longer be voting for one of their own. Will Kamala Harris be able to match the impressive results Joe Biden put up four years ago in the First State? We find it unlikely that the vice president will outdo the extraordinary 58.7% of the vote that Mr. Biden garnered in 2020. Delaware voters just won’t be as eager to turn out for Harris as they would have for President Biden, who has served the residents of his state for over 50 years. This isn’t to say that Harris won’t finish above Trump by double-digit points (she will).

Delaware, a former slave state, has a sizeable Black population, the 8th highest by percent in the nation at 22.5% of its population. Will Harris be able to tap into this pool of voters more effectively than her predecessor? Prior to dropping out, Biden was projected to win the lowest percentage of Black voters for a Democratic candidate in over 60 years, spelling disaster for his reelection chances. While Joe’s ouster and replacement with Kamala Harris, who would be the first Black woman to hold the presidency, will likely bolster the party’s support with Black Americans, it’s unlikely that Harris will even reach Biden’s performance with these voters in 2020; nevertheless, Harris certainly has room for growth with Black voters before Election Day, and her outperformance in a state like Delaware would be reflective of this.

Taking these factors into account, we believe that Harris’ results in Delaware will be in line with Hillary’s 53.4% of the vote to Trump’s 41.9% back in 2016.

MARYLAND

Maryland is the third bluest state in the nation, beaten only slightly for that second spot by Massachusetts (but still a ways behind Vermont). A Republican Presidential candidate has only won Maryland thrice since 1960, in the landslide elections of Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, in 1972, 1984, and 1988, respectively. In 2020, Joe Biden absolutely dominated in the state, receiving more than double Donald Trump’s votes; Biden finished with 65.4% of the vote to Trump’s 32.2%. This was a significantly stronger performance than in 2016, when Hillary Clinton only received 60.3%.

Surely a state as solid blue as Maryland wouldn’t have an extremely popular Republican in office, but it did; from 2015 through 2023, Republican Larry Hogan served as governor. At the same time Democrats were having their best elections in the history of the state, Hogan was becoming one of the most popular governors in the country. In the last year of his term, he had an approval rating of 70%. And since leaving office, Hogan has turned his eyes towards Maryland’s soon-to-be-vacant Senate seat. Incumbent Democrat Senator Ben Cardin is retiring after three terms, leaving his seat up for grabs.

This November, while Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are engaged in a tight race for the presidency, Hogan and his Democrat opponent Angela Alsobrooks are duking it out for this seat. And although Alsobrooks holds a 5-point lead over Hogan in recent polling, you can’t count the former Governor out just yet. Many Marylanders voting for Kamala Harris will split their ballot and vote for Hogan, but it remains to be seen just how many actually will.

However, it doesn’t remain to be seen whether Kamala Harris will have a major victory in Maryland this fall, she will. Yet, it’s not all good news for Harris; in the state’s 2022 House elections, Democrats received 64.71% of the total vote, slightly lower than two years prior, and also a point under Joe Biden’s performance in 2020. This Democrat stagnation in the midterms mixed with a popular Republican down ballot is likely to help Trump make modest gains in the state. Therefore, we predict that Kamala Harris will win Maryland by a slightly smaller margin than Biden did four years ago. And while Trump may do slightly better, Harris will still dominate in this mid-Atlantic state.

NEW YORK

Please excuse the length of this article because we’ve finally gotten to our home state: The Empire State. We certainly have many opinions about New York and its politics, but we will try to keep it as brief and as unbiased as possible. New York, the home of West Point, Niagara Falls, and The Big Apple. Yes, the politics of New York state are obviously dominated by New York City. NYC is by far and away the largest city in the United States, with over 8.2 million residents (LA is second with 3.8 million). If you add Long Island’s Nassau and Suffolk counties (which have 1.4 and 1.53 million people, respectively), and NYC’s neighbors to the north of Rockland and Westchester counties (339,000 and 990,000 people, respectively), the population of downstate New York balloons to a staggering 12.5 million people.

With the entire population of New York coming in at 19.68 million people, the downstaters certainly have a majority of the voting power. In the 2020 election, Joe Biden easily won the state, receiving 60.9% of the vote to Donald Trump’s 37.7%. Breaking down the results by counties, Biden won an eyepopping 86.8%, 83.5%, 77%, and 72.2% of the vote, in New York (Manhattan), Bronx, Kings (Brooklyn), and Queens counties, respectively. Lucky for the King of New York, Donald Trump, to save some of his pride, he did win Richmond County (Staten Island) by 15 points and squeaked through in Suffolk County, Long Island, winning by 232 votes (out of 762,274 total votes cast).

In upstate New York, Trump performed solidly, except in the counties of Erie (Buffalo), Monroe (Rochester), Onondaga (Syracuse), and Albany. An interesting development in the state of New York since 2020 was the resignation of three-term Governor Andrew Cuomo for sexual misconduct, placing Democrat Lieutenant Governor Kathy Hochul in charge. After serving out the rest of Cuomo’s term, Hochul faced an extremely tough challenger, Republican Lee Zeldin. A congressman from New York’s first congressional district (the eastern two-thirds of Suffolk County, Long Island), Zeldin performed stronger in New York’s Gubernatorial Election than any Republican since 2002. Despite not winning the race, he received 46.8% of the vote to Hochul’s 53.2%; for comparison, in 2018 Cuomo won 59.6% of the vote.

This strong performance by Zeldin helped Republican House candidates flip three New York House seats in the midterms (one-third of all seats flipped by the GOP that entire election cycle) and signaled that the Republican party is alive and well in The Empire State. Therefore, we predict that Donald Trump will perform significantly better in New York this November. If the former president can even come close to the Republicans’ 2022 midterm performance, where they won 43.9% of all House votes in the state, then The Donald will have a massive improvement from his 2020 performance.

NEW JERSEY

New Jersey is an often-overlooked state. As a suburb of two iconic American cities: New York and Philadelphia, it is the only state in the nation to have every one of its counties deemed urban by the U.S. Census Bureau. Yes, New Jersey crams a whopping 9.3 million people into 8,722 square miles, making it the 9th largest state by population, but also the 4th smallest by area. This gives the Garden State the title of the most densely populated state in the nation.

The tightly packed residents of this state generally lean to the left; in 2020, 57.3% of Jerseyites voted for Democrat Joe Biden, while only 41.4% voted for the Republican Donald Trump (a 16-point margin). This performance by Trump was the best of any Republican Presidential candidate since John McCain in 2008, who received an almost identical 41.6% of the vote. To find the last time a Republican was even competitive in New Jersey, you have to go back another four years to 2004, where George Bush lost to John Kerry by just 6.7 points.

Today, however, the state remains relatively blue, but probably less so than you think. In the past decade, Republican House candidates have performed surprisingly well in such a Democrat-leaning state as New Jersey. In the 2014 House elections, Republicans received 48.17% of the vote and won 6 out of 12 of the state’s seats (this was a year after 60% of residents voted to reelect Republican Governor Chris Christie). And although the GOP’s support crumbled in 2018, when they won just 38.7% of the vote and lost four of their House seats, they bounced back in 2020 and 2022, winning 41.58% and 44.46% of the vote, respectively.

Despite several polls conducted in late June and early July showing Trump either leading or narrowly trailing Biden in New Jersey, the current President’s replacement, Kamala Harris, is certainly not at risk of losing the state. And even though Trump isn’t competitive in the Garden State, that doesn’t mean that Democrats have won over any of its voters in the last four years (they haven’t). You can expect many suburban voters dissatisfied with the Biden Administration’s performance on issues like immigration and the economy to turn their eyes towards Trump.

For this reason, we predict that although Kamala Harris will win New Jersey this November, it will be by a sizably smaller margin than what Joe Biden won by in 2020.

California, the home of Kamala Harris, is both the nation’s most populated and one of its bluest states. In 2020, over 11 million Californians cast votes for Joe Biden (almost 14% of all votes he received). Democrats have won the Golden State in every presidential election since 1992; and in that time, they’ve consistently grown their support. So will former senator Harris win big in California this November, or will Donald Trump move the state towards the GOP?

In the 2022 midterms, only one of California’s whopping 52 house seats flipped to the GOP, a decrease from the three seats gained in the 2020 house elections. But in 2022, Republicans received 2.5% more of the vote (statewide) than they did two years prior, going from 33.7% to 36.22%. For comparison, in 2020 Donald Trump received 34.3% of the vote, losing the election to Biden by 29 points. Therefore, if Donald Trump is able to replicate the Republican gains during the midterms, there may be potential for him to eat into Harris’ margin of victory.

Another factor to consider are the results of California’s 2022 gubernatorial race. Just 16 years after electing the Terminator to the Governorship, Californians chose to reelect Gavin Newsom. First elected back in 2018, Newsom handily survived a 2021 recall attempt, with 62% of voters seeking to keep him in office. In 2022, he performed worse than the state’s incumbent Democrat senator, Alex Padilla, receiving 59% of the vote compared to Padilla’s 61.1%. Since his reelection, Newsom’s approval rating has fallen below 50%, with a recent Public Policy Institute of California poll placing it at 44% (Joe Biden received a 42% rating in that same poll).

As a result of Governor Newsom’s unpopularity, many California voters may be scared away from supporting Harris this fall. We predict that although Kamala Harris will win California in a landslide, off the back of the GOP’s growing support in the state and the Governor’s shrinking popularity, her margin of victory over Donald Trump will be lower than Joe Biden’s in 2020.

NEW MEXICO

New Mexico is a state unlike any other. The Land of Enchantment was the 47th state to enter the Union, is the 5th largest by area, 36th by population, and has the highest percentage Latino population in the nation. Yes, a whopping 47.7% of New Mexico’s population is Latino, and another 10% is Native American, the 2nd highest behind Alaska. These demographics make New Mexico one of five Majority-minority states (the others being California, Hawaii, Texas, and Maryland) and leave only 36.5% of the population as Non-Hispanic White.

These unique demographics give Hispanics and Native Americans an outsized influence on New Mexican politics, and in recent years these voters have supported the Democratic party. In 2020, Joe Biden carried the state with 54.3% of the vote, the best finish since Barack Obama in 2008, and Donald Trump finished a distant second at 43.5%. Both parties received a greater percentage of the vote in 2020 than in 2016, due to Libertarian Candidate Gary Johnson, the former governor of New Mexico, siphoning an impressive 9.3% of the vote in that election.

However, Biden’s margin of victory, at 10.8 points, is a massive improvement for the Democrats; only 20 years ago, New Mexico was perhaps the closest swing state in the nation. In 2004, Incumbent Republican George Bush narrowly defeated Democrat John Kerry 49.8% to 49.1% in New Mexico, flipping the state red for the first time since 1988. And four years earlier, in the election of 2000, Democrat Al Gore defeated Bush in the state by 366 votes, making the margin of victory in New Mexico that election even smaller than in Florida, where the results were famously disputed.

The glory days for Republicans in New Mexico have long since passed, and the state is no longer regarded as a key battleground state. But this election, as Kamala Harris and Donald Trump are in a dead heat for the White House, the results in The Land of Enchantment may be closer than you think. Trump is performing significantly better with Latino voters this election cycle than in 2016 or 2020. A recent national NBC poll found that 40% of registered Latino voters support Trump, as compared to 54% who support Harris. While the former president still has a ways to go to reach Harris’ numbers with this key demographic, this poll shows he’s come a long way from his meager 19% and 27% Latino support in 2016 and 2020, respectively.

With this in mind, we predict that although Kamala Harris will win the state of New Mexico, it will be by a significantly slimmer margin than four years ago. If Trump can come even close to performing at 40% with Latino voters, who make up almost half of New Mexico’s population, then he can certainly boost his performance to upwards of 45%.

UTAH

Once called Deseret, the land of present-day Utah was first settled by famed Mormon pioneer and University namesake Brigham Young in 1847; this unique history gives the state demographics unlike any other in the nation. For starters, Utah is the only state to have a majority of its residents belong to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; over 60% of Utahns are Mormon, with Idaho coming in a distant second at 26%. Since a majority of the Utah electorate is Mormon, who are generally extremely socially conservative, this makes the state reliably vote for Republicans.

There’s no better example of this than in the Presidential Election of 2012, when Republican Mitt Romney, the first Mormon to be a major party Presidential Candidate, won an astounding 72.8% of the vote. After losing that election, Romney ran and won Utah’s 2018 Senate election; he is retiring once his term ends in the beginning of 2025. Besides Romney, another famous name in Utah politics is former CIA officer Evan McMullin. Best known for his third-party presidential run in 2016, McMullin was able to win 21.5% of the vote in his home state of Utah, an impressive feat, but still finishing third to Trump and Clinton, who received 45.5% and 27.5% of the vote, respectively. In this election, Utah was by far the state with the highest percentage of the vote going to third-party candidates, at 27%.

But in 2020, without any viable third-parties, Trump was able to win over a majority of Utah voters, getting 58.1% of the vote to Biden’s 37.7%. And although both parties improved on their 2016 numbers, Biden’s performance was the strongest by a Democrat in the state since LBJ in 1964. So, will Kamala Harris expand on Biden’s impressive gains in Utah this November? Unfortunately for Democrats, the answer is probably not. Biden’s 2020 performance in the Beehive State is likely an outlier, and the 2022 midterm elections back this up.

In Utah’s four House races, GOP candidates received 63.1% of the vote, while their Democrat opponents only got 32.2%. This was a respectable improvement for the Republicans, who only received 61% of Utahns' votes two years earlier. And although in the 2022 Senate election, incumbent Republican Mike Lee beat our old friend Evan McMullin by just 10.4 points, the closest Senate election in Utah since 1974, this tight race says more about McMullin’s strength with Utah voters than any GOP weakness in the state. Furthermore, Utah has the third lowest black population per capita in the nation, spelling big trouble for Harris. She is highly unlikely to appeal to Utah’s majority white, majority Mormon voter base as well as Biden did back in 2020.

Therefore, we predict that Donald Trump will win Utah by a significantly greater margin than he did four years ago. Trump won’t do close to as well as Romney did in 2012, but expect his numbers to be in-line with John McCain’s 62.6% of the vote way back in 2008.

Indiana, the home of Mike Pence and Dan Quayle, will get its chance this November to elect another single-term vice president to the chief executive. But will Donald Trump’s falling out with Vice President Pence hurt his chances in the Hoosier State, or will he still glide to victory even without the former governor’s support?

In the past two election cycles, Trump has been dominant in Indiana. In 2020, while his support crumbled in most sun and rust belt states, Trump quietly (but nonetheless impressively) pulled in 172,000 more votes in Indiana than four years prior. Percentagewise, he gained 1/5th of a point, from 56.8% to 57%, in a year where he lost ground in all but seven states. With Harris’ association with the unpopularity of the Biden Administration, former president Trump certainly can grow his margin of victory in the state.

Indiana’s 2022 Senate race, where incumbent Republican Todd Young took on Democratic challenger Thomas McDermott, indicates Trump may be able to outperform both his 2016 and 2020 victories in the Midwestern state. Young received 58.7% of the vote, compared to McDermott’s meager 37.9%. This represented a massive gain from Young’s first Senate election back in 2016, where he barely cracked 50% of the vote, showing that Republican support in Indiana remains as strong as ever.

So, will The Donald be able to put up 58% or more of the vote? Not necessarily. It isn’t all rosy for the GOP; the battle over abortion threatens to dash Trump’s chances of any gains in the state. In 2023, Indiana initiated a near-total ban on abortions, which took effect this past August after being injuncted for a year. Trump’s weakness and Harris’ strength on this hot-button issue will likely lead more Hoosier women to vote blue this fall. Democrats already win 43% of Indiana women, beating out the Republicans’ 39%, and with the abortion issue alienating this already smaller Republican voter base, it seems unlikely that men will turn out for Trump enough to net him any gains in the state.

We predict Trump will carry Indiana by a slightly smaller margin than in 2020. Don’t expect a collapse (Trump will win Indiana by a considerable amount), but also don’t expect any sizable gains for the former president in this state.

MINNESOTA

Having voted blue in the last 12 consecutive elections, the longest streak of any state in the nation, Minnesota has always been just shy of tipping to the Republicans. In 1984, when Incumbent Republican Ronald Reagan won 49 states against former Democratic vice president Walter Mondale, he lost Minnesota, Mondale’s home state, by just 3,761 votes. And again, in 2016, Republican Donald Trump barely lost the state to Democrat Hillary Clinton, 46.4% to 44.9%, making Minnesota the blue wall state that got away from Trump that election.

But it’s doubtful that the former President will finally be able to conquer the Land of 10,000 Lakes this November, as their Governor Tim Walz is on the Democrat ticket as Kamala Harris’ running mate. Interestingly, if victorious, he’ll be the third Minnesotan to become a Democrat VP in the last 60 years, joining Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale in this club. Walz was a surprise choice for Harris, beating out more nationally known Democrats like Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro and Arizona Senator and former NASA astronaut Mark Kelly. But his selection did have a clear motive: appeal to working-class Midwestern voters, especially in the crucial swing states of Wisconsin and Michigan; it’s unclear whether this strategy has had success yet.

Walz’s favorability rating in his home state is nothing to write home about. In a recent poll of likely voters by the Minnesota Star Tribune, just 48% of Minnesotans had a favorable opinion of the Governor, while 47% had an unfavorable opinion of him. Although these numbers aren’t great, Walz certainly lives up to the “do no harm” mantra of Vice-Presidential candidates better than Republican VP pick JD Vance, who had a 42% favorable and 48% unfavorable rating in the same poll. So, although Walz is unlikely to harm Harris’ campaign, he is unlikely to move the needle much either.

After Trump’s admirable 2016 performance in Minnesota, his 2020 showing was far less praiseworthy. The Incumbent Republican received just 45.3% of the vote to Democrat Joe Biden’s 52.4%, losing by a 7.1-point margin. Despite this, the GOP performed similarly in Minnesota’s 8 House Elections in 2020 to how they did in 2016, having their share of the total vote decrease by just 0.5 points from 46.73% to 46.18%. And in the 2022 midterms, Republicans came within striking distance of a majority, receiving 48.1% of the vote to the Democrats’ 50.1%.

We believe Trump is unlikely to match the GOP’s 2022 performance; polling has consistently placed him 5 to 8 points behind Harris in Minnesota. And while we don’t think he will lose by greater than 7 points, which is what he lost to Biden by four years ago, we also don’t believe this former President is in contention in the state this election cycle. Therefore, we predict that Kamala Harris will carry Minnesota by a margin of 4 to 5 points.

ILLINOIS

Illinois, the 6th most populous state in the country, is dominated by the politics of its largest city, Chicago; and residents of the Windy City are, unsurprisingly, quite liberal. Joe Biden won Illinois by a 17-point margin back in 2020, almost identical to Hillary Clinton’s margin of victory four years prior. And in a state with 17 house seats, Republicans only control three of them. So, it’s not hard to guess whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will win Illinois this November. But the margin of victory that Harris beats Trump by might be closer than you think.

For one thing, Illinois is not the liberal bastion many believe it to be. If you ignore Chicago, the state’s politics closely resemble its rust belt neighbor Indiana. Looking at Illinois’ 2020 election results by county, you’ll see a sea of red with a spot of blue in its top-right corner, where Chicago and its suburbs are. To improve his numbers in the Land of Lincoln, Donald Trump must overperform in this sea of red. One indicator of Republican strength in Illinois’ rural regions are the 2022 midterm election results. In the state’s house races, GOP candidates received 43.7% of the vote to the Democrats’ 56%, the best Republican performance since 2016.

Additionally, in Illinois’ 2022 senate race, Democrat Tammy Duckworth was reelected with 56.8% of the vote, her Republican opponent Kathy Salvi receiving 41.5%. And while Duckworth performed in line with her first run for senate in 2016, the GOP performed significantly better in the state’s rural areas than six years prior, a good sign for Trump. Therefore, we predict that although Kamala Harris will win Illinois by upwards of 10 points, the unpopularity of the current administration will likely weaken Harris’ appeal with voters outside Chicago, and Harris will perform worse than Biden in 2020 as a result.

And while Harris, who would be the first Black woman president if elected, may perform stronger with Chicago’s urban Black population, Trump’s gains with suburban and rural voters are more than likely to offset this.

OHIO

Perhaps no state encapsulates the changing dynamics of the Midwest – and blue-collar America as a whole – better than Ohio.

Long known for its status as a bellwether state, Ohio had been a critical battleground for nearly the entire 20th century. It remained this way through the 2000’s, when the Buckeye State played a pivotal role in delivering victories for both Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012.

Since then, however, Ohio has undergone a hard shift to the right. Trump’s 2016 and 2020 victories, where he won the state by slightly less than 10%, are commonly cited as major turning points. In reality, though, Ohio Democrats’ fortunes had begun declining years earlier: in 2010, for instance, Republicans won landslide victories on the federal, state, and local levels.

Ohio’s sharp, consistent rightward shift mirrors the changing dynamics in the Midwest as a whole. However, Ohio's political landscape is more nuanced than this single partisan trend might suggest – with an especially sharp divide between its urban, suburban, and rural areas.

The state’s largest urban centers — Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati — are strongholds for the Democratic Party. These cities and their surrounding suburbs are home to more diverse and younger populations, both of whom form the core of the modern Democratic coalition. Especially significant is Ohio’s significant Black population, particularly in Cleveland and other northern industrial cities. These communities remain strongly Democratic, driven by concerns over racial justice, economic inequality, and health care. 

The three cities’ growth patterns have differed wildly. While Cincinnati’s population is relatively stagnant, and Cleveland’s been in decline for the better part of a century, Columbus is one of the fastest-growing cities in the nation. Its growing and diverse population has solidified its role as a Democratic anchor in the state. 

On the surface, it might not seem clear why Ohio is significantly more conservative than other Midwestern and demographically-similar states, such as Wisconsin and Michigan.

While Ohio has cities comparable in size and politics to those in Wisconsin and Michigan, the areas outside of urban Ohio are much, much more conservative compared to their counterparts in the other states.

Ohio suburbs have long been reliable Republican strongholds, but where suburbs across America have shifted to the left during the Trump era, Ohio’s have remained defiantly conservative. This disparity can be traced to a few key demographics: educational attainment, racial diversity, and religiosity. Yes, the suburbs around areas like Cincinnati, which skew highly-educated and higher-income, have demonstrated a noticeable leftward trend. However, from a big-picture perspective, the vast majority of suburban Ohio hasn’t budged significantly.

Adding to an already-gloomy picture for Democrats: rural Ohio, which stretches across the state’s southern and western regions, votes near-universally Republican and is (seemingly) trending further in this direction. Voters in these areas, many of whom are white and work in manufacturing, agriculture, and energy, have resonated with Trump’s populist rhetoric.. The state's white, working-class voters, especially in Appalachia – a once-Democratic, heavily coal-reliant region which has bolted rightward due to the party’s increasing support of clean energy and social progressivism – have become a bedrock of the Republican coalition.

Despite Ohio’s Republican lean, the national debate over issues like reproductive rights and labor protections has significantly impacted state dynamics. The overturning of Roe v. Wade in 2022 has energized large groups of voters, particularly suburban women and young voters, as seen in the landslide rejection of Issue 1 – a measure which would have allowed state Republicans to overturn abortion rights. 

Despite fluctuating social dynamics, Ohio remains a clearly Republican state – and this is unlikely to change in the coming decades, as rural Ohio continues its trek rightward while suburban and urban Ohio remain mostly stagnant. We predict Trump will win Ohio by roughly 10%. This slight Republican overperformance relative to 2020 and 2016 is a function of Kamala Harris’ seeming difficulties in connecting with working class white voters. 

The home of the Adams, Bush, and Kennedy families, Massachusetts holds an important place in our nation’s history. The birthplace of the American Revolution has been a solidly blue state for decades; in fact, if you ignore elections with Ronald Reagan or Dwight Eisenhower, Massachusetts has voted Democrat in every presidential election since 1928. Bay Staters’ commitment to the Democratic Party is shown no better than in 2012, when they overwhelmingly voted for Democrat Barack Obama over their own former governor Republican Mitt Romney (60.7% to 37.5%).

In 2020, Democratic support in Massachusetts increased to a staggering 65.6% of votes for Joe Biden compared to only 32.1% for President Donald Trump. This was the best performance by a Democrat in the state since LBJ in 1964. But it’s not all sunny for Democrats... In 2022, Republicans had their best midterm election performance in the state since 2010, and this fall Elizabeth Warren faces a worthy GOP challenger for her Senate seat in Marine Corps veteran John Deaton.

And with Vice President Kamala Harris being weighed down by the unpopularity of the Biden administration, Former President Trump shouldn’t have a hard time improving his numbers this time around. For these reasons, we predict that although Harris will have a significant victory in Massachusetts this November, Donald Trump will be able to ride Republican momentum in the Bay State to net himself sizable gains from his 2020 run.

CONNECTICUT

Connecticut, the birth state of George W. Bush, today shares the liberal politics of its neighbors to the North, East, and West. But once upon a time, Connecticut was one of the most solid red states in the nation. In fact, in the election of 1932, where Republican Herbert Hoover ran for reelection against FDR, Connecticut was one of only six states to vote for the unpopular incumbent. And up until 1992, Connecticut was a likely Republican state, but since then, they’ve turned blue and never looked back.

In 2020, 59.2% of Connecticutians voted for Joe Biden, while only 39.2% voted for Donald Trump. This was a major improvement for Democrats from the 2016 Presidential election, where Hillary Clinton only got 54.6% of the vote, compared to Donald Trump’s respectable 40.9%. Despite this, the GOP has actually made gains in the last three House elections in Connecticut. In the state’s 2018 House elections, the GOP received 37.78% of the vote; in 2020, they received 38.52%, and in 2022, they received 41.73%.

With these recent improvements for Republicans in Connecticut, will Donald Trump be able to perform better this time around in the Nutmeg State? In Connecticut’s 2022 Senate race, where incumbent Democrat Richard Blumenthal went up against Republican challenger Leora Levy, Blumenthal was reelected with 57.45% of the vote. This performance was significantly worse than during his 2016 run, where he received 63.2% of the vote. The county results from the two elections show that while all eight of Connecticut’s counties went blue in the 2016 Senate race, two counties, Litchfield and Windham, actually flipped red in the 2022 race.

And while in 2020, Donald Trump barely won Litchfield and Windham counties with 51.7% and 51.1% of the votes, respectively, Levy won these counties with 54% and 52.8%, a decent improvement. Unfortunately for Democrats, in his 2022 race, Blumenthal performed worse in every single Connecticut county than Joe Biden did in 2020. Overall, it’s very unlikely that Kamala Harris will be able to live up to Joe Biden’s spectacular performance in the Nutmeg State four years ago. Republicans are winning voters in this state back, especially in the rural regions of Northeastern and Northwestern Connecticut.

As a result of this, we predict that Kamala Harris will win the state by numbers more in line with Hillary Clinton’s back in 2016. Furthermore, we expect Trump to crack the 40% mark and make big gains in Litchfield and Windham counties.

MAINE

The most northern of the lower 48 states, Maine is the largest and youngest member of New England, only gaining statehood in 1821 after seceding from Massachusetts. Politically, Maine has been a relatively blue state for decades. A Republican hasn’t won the popular vote in Vacationland since George Bush in 1988, and only four years later in 1992, Bush embarrassingly finished third in the state behind both Democrat Bill Clinton and Independent Ross Perot, losing to the Texas businessman by just 316 votes.

Despite the GOP’s inability to win the statewide vote in Maine, Donald Trump became the first presidential candidate to capitalize on a 1972 law that divided the state’s four electoral votes between the winner of its two congressional districts as well as the statewide winner. In 2016, Trump earned one electoral vote by winning Maine’s 2nd district with 51.3% of the vote, while narrowly finishing runner-up statewide to Hillary Clinton, 47.8% to 44.9%. This flip of the state’s northern, mostly rural district is truly a testament to Trump’s dominance with this group of voters; only four years prior, Republican Mitt Romney lost this district by 8.56 points to Barack Obama.

In 2020, despite Trump performing significantly worse in the state, winning 44% of the vote to Joe Biden’s 53.1%, the incumbent Republican retained the 2nd district with 52.26% of the vote. While polling is sparse this election cycle in the key district, Trump will likely preserve his victory this November. In the 2022 midterm elections, the GOP performed in line with their 2020 results, receiving 41.9% of statewide House votes to the Democrats’ 58%. In the 2nd District, Democrat Jared Golden was reelected with 53.1% of the vote against Republican Bruce Poliquin, who received 46.9%. Two years prior, in 2020, Golden received 53% of the vote, while his Republican opponent got 46.9% (nearly identical margins).

It’s important to note that many residents of the 2nd district split their votes for Trump at the top and Democrats down-ballot, which is why both the Republican President and Democrat Golden won a majority of votes in the same election. With this in mind, we expect Mainers to split their votes once again, with Golden and Trump both getting slight majorities in the 2nd district, netting the former President an electoral vote. In the battle for Maine’s remaining three electoral votes, Democrat Kamala Harris will easily win the 1st district. We predict she’ll also win the statewide vote by roughly the same margin Joe Biden did in 2020.

VERMONT

Vermont, the liberal bastion where in 2020 Joe Biden got an eye-watering 66.1% of the vote, the home of America’s only socialist senator, is also a state with an extremely popular Republican governor. Yes, it’s often forgotten that while Joe Biden was out getting a higher margin of victory in Vermont than any other state (35 points above Donald Trump), popular Republican Governor Phil Scott was cruising to his second reelection win with 68.5% of the vote (over 40 points above his Democratic challenger).

So how can America’s most liberal state so resoundingly vote a Republican to its highest office? And does this victory give hope for Donald Trump in the Green Mountain State this November? Just to make it clear: Donald Trump will not win Vermont; he’s about as likely to win here as Joe Biden is in West Virginia. Phil Scott’s victories in Vermont are an anomaly, the result of the governor’s fiscally conservative but socially liberal policies. In fact, Governor Scott supported both of Trump’s impeachments and even voted for Joe Biden in 2020, making him a RINO for some on the far-right.

We predict Harris will likely perform slightly worse in Vermont than Biden did four years ago. Although Trump has done nothing since the last election to make himself more popular in the state, since RFK Jr. is on the ballot in Vermont, it’s probable that he’ll siphon a small percentage of votes away from Harris, enough to make winning over more than 66.1% of Vermonters doubtful.

RHODE ISLAND

Rhode Island is certainly Biden country. In 2020, it was one of only three states to have all its counties go blue. Sure, that may be because it only has five of them (none more than 30 miles from its largest city, Providence), but it’s impressive nonetheless. America’s smallest state has voted blue in every election since 1988, and in 2024 it’s poised to stay that way.

Four years ago, Joe Biden won 59.4% of Rhode Island’s vote compared to Donald Trump’s 38.6%. In 2016, Clinton won the state by a narrower margin, getting 55.4%, while Trump performed similarly to 2020 with 39.8%. Trump actually won Rhode Island’s Kent County, right in the center of the state, by 600 votes in 2016; he lost this same county by over 7,000 votes (53% to 45%) in 2020.

This election cycle, Kamala Harris may face problems trying to match President Biden’s performance. In the 2022 midterm election, Democrat Seth Magaziner barely defeated Republican Allan Fung to earn Rhode Island’s 2nd House seat, which is the entirety of Western Rhode Island and half of Providence. Magaziner finished with 50.5% of the vote and Fung came runner-up with a very respectable 46.8%.

If Donald Trump can reach anywhere close to this performance in the 2nd district, which includes the entirety of Kent County (which he won back in 2016), then he can definitely eat into Harris’ margin of victory. Rhode Island isn’t just suburbs; in rural parts of the state, Harris’ appeal isn’t going to be as strong as Biden’s was in 2020, and these voters are likely going to turn out for Donald Trump in greater numbers than they did four years ago.

Therefore, we predict that while Rhode Island will go solid blue this fall, it will not reach the 59.4% threshold set by President Biden the last time around.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

The black sheep of New England, or more aptly red sheep, New Hampshire certainly has a more conservative streak than its neighbors. The Granite State has voted for Republican presidential candidates in 5 of the last 12 elections, although in none since 2004. Moreover, the margin of victory for both parties has been within 10 points in the last eight elections, making New Hampshire a consistently purple (or light blue) state. Most recently, in 2020, Democrat Joe Biden defeated Republican Incumbent Donald Trump in the state with 52.7% of the vote, to Trump’s 45.4%. This was a far cry from Trump’s 2016 run (where he lost the state to Hillary Clinton by just 2,736 votes) and was the worst Republican performance in New Hampshire since John McCain’s all the way back in 2008.

Yet, for a brief moment after Joe Biden’s disastrous June debate, Trump led in polls from the state, begging the question: does the former President have a chance to flip New Hampshire red this fall? Things appeared bright at the start of July for Republicans: Trump was leading Biden by 3.1 points nationally, and states like Virginia, Minnesota, and, of course, New Hampshire were suddenly in play. However, Trump’s lead evaporated as quickly as it appeared when Joe Biden was replaced with Vice President Kamala Harris. Since Harris was tapped, she has reversed Trump’s lead and is now ahead by 6.4 points as per Project 538’s polling average.

But there are more factors than just polls to consider in the White Mountain state this election cycle. As popular Republican Governor Chris Sununu declines to seek a fifth two-year term, GOP candidate Kelly Ayotte, who represented New Hampshire for one term in the Senate from 2011 to 2017, is in a tense race to take his place. Running against Democrat Joyce Craig, the former mayor of the state’s largest city, Manchester, Ayotte has taken a small lead in recent polls, with the RealClearPolitics average placing her up a single point on Craig. So, if the Republican is able to fend off Craig and win the governorship, she may be able to give Donald Trump a boost in his own race against Kamala Harris.

But at the end of the day, Trump’s lead in New Hampshire was likely just a blip on the map. And while we believe the former President will perform better than in 2020, when he lost the state by 7.4 points, we don’t anticipate him coming within five percent of Harris. Therefore, we predict Kamala Harris will win New Hampshire roughly in line with the polling, by 5-6 percentage points.

The double landlocked state home to the Kansas City Chiefs, St. Louis Cardinals, the mighty Mississippi River, and Senator Josh Hawley (plus his fist), Missouri has a storied history as our nation’s Gateway to the West. In recent years, the Show Me State has voted reliably Republican, but throughout the 90s and 2000s it was a hotly contested swing state, there being no better example of this than in 2008, when Republican Presidential Candidate John McCain just barely won the state, beating out Democrat Barack Obama 49.4% to 49.3%.

In the last 16 years, however, Missouri has shifted significantly towards the right. In 2020, Donald Trump won the state with 56.8% of the vote, an identical percentage to his 2016 run and three points higher than Mitt Romney did in 2012. And on a statewide level, Missouri has a Republican Governor and Legislature, as well as two Republican Senators and six Republican House Members. So, does this seemingly solid red state have any chance to fall to Democrat Kamala Harris this November?

Trump’s extremely strong support from rural voters has been his key to success, and in Missouri, this has been no different. A majority of residents voted for Democrat Joe Biden in just three of Missouri’s 114 counties; Trump won everywhere but Jackson County (Kansas City), Boone County (Columbia), and St. Louis County.

And in the 2022 midterms, the GOP showed off their strength with voters outside Missouri’s urban centers. In the 6th congressional district, which represents the rural upper third of the state, Republican House Member Sam Graves cruised to reelection against Democratic challenger Henry Martin with 70.3% of the vote, 3.2 points higher than his 2020 run. In this last election, Republicans even garnered greater support in Missouri’s 1st congressional district (the city of St. Louis and its suburbs), with Republican Andrew Jones finishing a distant second to Democrat Incumbent Cori Bush, but nevertheless receiving 24.3% of the vote, 5.3 points higher than the GOP candidate two years prior.

Even though Republicans may be performing better in this Midwestern state, Trump’s potential victory is complicated by the issue of abortion. After the overturning of Roe v. Wade back in 2022, Missouri was the first state in the country to ban the practice. And although this ban occurred prior to the 2022 midterm elections, which the GOP still made significant improvements in, this November things are different; an abortion referendum is on the ballot in the state of Missouri. This prospective amendment to the state’s constitution protecting the right to an abortion is likely to propel reluctant voters, especially women, to the polls, who will almost certainly vote blue.

And considering a referendum in the similarly right-leaning state of Kentucky failed to outlaw abortion in its constitution, being voted down 52.4% to 47.7%, it’s a definite possibility that voters in Missouri will choose to protect the right to an abortion in their own constitution.

Based on all these factors, we predict that Donald Trump will win Missouri by a slightly greater margin than in 2020. Although this abortion referendum may hurt his chances for big gains in the state, GOP support from rural voters will likely offset this and still boost his numbers in the state.

IOWA

Perhaps the most consistently inconsistent state, Iowa has voted for the Democrat Presidential Candidate in 6 of the last 12 elections and for the Republican in the other 6. Most recently in 2020, Iowans voted for Republican Donald Trump over Democrat Joe Biden, 53.1% to 44.9%. But while Iowa is a moderately Republican-leaning state today, just 12 years ago it was a relatively Democrat-leaning state.

Comparing Iowa’s 2012 Presidential elections results, when the state went blue for Barack Obama, to its neighbors of Wisconsin and Minnesota (two other quintessential Midwestern swing states), we see that all three of them voted for Obama by within a percent, Iowa with 52%, Wisconsin with 52.8%, and Minnesota with 52.7%. But just four years later when Democrat Hillary Clinton ran against Republican Donald Trump, she received just 41.7%, 46.5%, and 46.4% of the vote in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, respectively. And while Clinton did end up winning Minnesota by 1.52 points, she barely lost Wisconsin by just 0.77 points and was absolutely blown out in Iowa by 9.41 points.

Donald Trump’s substantial 2016 victory in Iowa raises the question: Why has the state shifted so far to the right in the last decade? Iowa’s shift towards the Republican party was not actually as abrupt as you may have expected. In fact, in all four of the most recent presidential elections, Republicans increased their share of Iowa’s vote every time, going from 44.4% in 2008 to 53.1% in 2020. But the most significant increase did occur in 2016, when Donald Trump jumped 5 points from Mitt Romney’s performance four years prior.

There is a clear trend in this shift: Iowa’s urban centers became slightly more liberal, while its rural areas became significantly more conservative. And while during this time period states with extremely urban populations, like California and Massachusetts, had a statewide shift towards the left, since Iowa is one of the most rural states in the nation, they unsurprisingly moved in the opposite direction; this is confirmed by a look at Iowa’s county results. Polk County, the most populated in the state and home to the capital Des Moines, went 56.4% for Obama in 2012 and 56.7% for Biden in 2020, a Democrat gain of 0.3 points. On the other hand, Adams County, the least populated in the state, went 51.1% for Romney in 2012 and an astounding 71% for Trump in 2020, a Republican gain of 19.9 points. And while Adams County has less than 1% of Polk County’s population, only 6 of Iowa’s 99 counties went blue in 2020; the remaining 93 red counties more than made up for their smaller populations by sheer strength in numbers.

Now that Iowa is no longer considered a swing state, there is an absence of polling in the state, making it hard to predict whether Democrat Kamala Harris will be able to gain ground for the Democrats this election. However, based on Trump’s consistently growing support with rural Iowans, we predict that the former President will carry the state by a slightly greater margin than he did four years prior.

KANSAS

Located at the center of the contiguous United States, in the heart of the Great Plains, Kansas is probably best known as Dorothy’s home in The Wizard of Oz, but there’s much more to the state than a classic movie. Kansas entered the Union as the 34th state, two months before the outbreak of the Civil War. During its years as a territory, from 1854-1859, the region was rocked by skirmishes between pro- and anti-slavery settlers, a conflict known as Bleeding Kansas. And while Kansas did become a free state, this conflict significantly increased tensions between Northern and Southern states and was a precursor to the Civil War.

Today, Kansans are relatively conservative on average; although they elected a Democrat governor in 2018, they’ve voted for the Republican candidate for President in every election since 1940, discounting LBJ’s landslide 1964 victory. In 2020, Donald Trump carried Kansas with 56.1% of the vote to Joe Biden’s 41.5%, a margin of 14.6 points. And although this substantial margin places the state into the reliably Republican category, it was significantly smaller than back in 2016, when Trump won Kansas by 20.6 points.

So, how can we explain this massive margin decrease in the state? And will Kamala Harris have a shot at closing this gap even further, winning Kansas this November? Joe Biden’s exemplary performance in the Sunflower State came down to a single region: Johnson County. A part of the Kansas City metro, Johnson County is largely suburban, and in recent years, Donald Trump has struggled to attract this group of voters.

Comparing the results of the 2016 and 2020 elections in Johnson, which is the most populated county in the state, we see a significant decline for Trump; he narrowly won the area in 2016 by 2.7 points but lost it to Biden four years later by a sizable margin of 8.3 points. To put it simply, Harris’ path to victory runs right through this county.

While it’s unlikely that Trump can win these suburban areas at the rate he did eight years ago, the 2022 midterm elections do show some signs of hope for Republicans. Although GOP House candidates performed flat, receiving 56.9% of the vote (a quarter point lower than in 2020), in Kansas’ Senate election, Republican incumbent Jerry Moran easily won reelection with 60% of the vote. And in the extremely important Johnson County, he won a respectable 48% of the vote, but still lost to his Democratic challenger Mark Holland by 1.3 points.

So, despite Kansas certainly shifting closer to the center, Moran’s victory shows there’s still some Republican might in the state. We predict that Donald Trump will win Kansas by a greater margin than in 2020. Biden’s amazing performance in the state four years ago is unlikely to be replicated by Kamala Harris this time around. If the former President is able to even come close to matching Senator Moran’s 1.3-point deficit in Johnson County back in 2022, he can expect big gains.

Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Alaska’s political future is full of uncertainties. Many analysts predict that Trump will likely carry Alaska, but the margin remains in question. While Trump’s involvement in the January 6th insurrection and his attempts to deny the 2020 election results have likely decreased his appeal among Alaska’s moderate-leaning electorate, Biden’s popularity in the state remains low, impacted by both policy and perception issues that have distanced him from many Alaskans. Despite Trump’s controversies, Biden’s unpopularity may lead Alaska to vote for Trump by a slightly wider margin in 2024 than in 2020.

The 2024 House Race: Peltola’s Cross-Party Appeal

In Alaska’s at-large House race, Democratic incumbent Mary Peltola presents a different dynamic. Peltola has demonstrated strong cross-party appeal, winning both the August 2022 special election - which many thought she would lose - and the November 2022 general election, defeating Sarah Palin by nearly 10 points. Her performance far outpaced Biden’s results in Alaska in 2020 by almost 20 points, underscoring her popularity among moderate Republicans and independents. With her proven ability to attract voters across the political spectrum, Peltola stands a good chance of retaining her seat even if Biden performs poorly in Alaska, potentially losing by 12 or 13 points. Peltola’s broad appeal and recent victories position her well for the 2024 House race.

Polling Challenges and Democratic Investment in Alaska

Predicting election outcomes in Alaska is uniquely challenging due to the state’s vast, sparsely populated, and hard-to-poll geography. Even in more centralized states like Wisconsin or Michigan, polling can be difficult, but Alaska’s remoteness makes reliable polling data exceptionally rare. Pollsters often issue disclaimers with Alaska polls, cautioning that results may vary widely. This lack of reliable polling data may discourage Democrats from investing heavily in Alaska, as they may prioritize states with clearer polling indicators of competitiveness. However, based on her track record, Peltola remains a strong candidate with a fair chance of holding her seat in 2024.

Alaska’s Political Landscape in the 2026 Midterm Election

Senator Dan Sullivan’s Re-Election Prospects

The 2026 midterm elections could be pivotal for Alaska. Republican Senator Dan Sullivan, who will be up for re-election, has a relatively low national profile but is known in Alaska for his consistent, conservative positions. Unlike more high-profile Republicans like Ted Cruz or Mitch McConnell, Sullivan has maintained a quiet presence nationally, which has worked to his advantage in Alaska. Alaskan voters, who appreciate pragmatic and low-profile representation, have responded positively to his focus on local issues, such as economic development, infrastructure improvements, and strong advocacy for energy initiatives like the expansion of oil and gas pipelines. Sullivan’s policies align well with the state’s values, and his conservative, dependable approach has helped him build a solid base of support.

Sullivan’s 2020 Victory Against Independent Al Gross

In 2020, Senator Dan Sullivan solidified his standing among Alaska voters by winning re-election against independent candidate Al Gross, defeating him by nearly 13 points. While Gross’s campaign as an independent suggested potential crossover appeal, his lack of significant political experience and a detailed policy agenda limited his effectiveness as a challenger. Sullivan’s victory, especially by such a substantial margin, demonstrated his strong base in Alaska and reinforced his reputation as a dependable, low-profile conservative whose focus resonates with Alaskans.

Looking ahead to the 2026 midterms, Sullivan’s electoral strength may again give him an advantage, especially if Biden is serving a second term. Historically, presidents face significant setbacks in their second midterm—a phenomenon known as the “six-year itch.” If Biden is re-elected, the 2026 environment will likely favor Republicans, further bolstering Sullivan’s chances. However, if Trump wins in 2024, the political landscape may shift. Trump’s first midterm in 2018 was highly favorable to Democrats, and a similar Democratic wave could occur in 2026 if Trump is again in office.

Under these conditions, Sullivan’s re-election could become more competitive, especially if Mary Peltola, assuming she wins re-election to the House in 2024, decides to challenge him for the Senate. Peltola, with her demonstrated appeal across party lines and her ability to attract moderate Republicans and independents, could make the race more challenging for Sullivan, particularly if the national environment favors Democrats. However, Sullivan’s established reputation, deep ties to local issues, and solid support among Alaska’s Republican-leaning electorate still likely make him the favorite, even in a Democratic-leaning midterm.

Democratic Overperformance in the 2022 Midterms and Future Implications

Breaking the Trend: Democrats’ Unexpected Success in 2022

The 2022 midterms saw unexpectedly strong performances from Democrats, defying the historical trend of midterm losses for the president’s party. The Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling, which reversed Roe v. Wade, and concerns about GOP extremism, contributed to Democratic successes in many states. Democrats retained Senate seats in challenging races and limited losses in the House. Alaska’s majority pro-choice electorate and its resistance to extreme partisanship suggest that a similar environment could benefit Democrats in the 2026 midterms. However, it remains to be seen whether the dynamics that drove Democratic success in 2022 will persist in future cycles.

Impact of a Potential Trump Presidency on the 2026 Midterms

If Trump wins in 2024, his second midterm could be challenging for Republicans, similar to his first midterm in 2018. In that case, Sullivan’s re-election could become competitive, especially if Mary Peltola - assuming she wins re-election to the House in 2024 - decides to challenge him for the Senate. Given her appeal across party lines, Peltola could make Sullivan’s race closer, particularly if the national environment favors Democrats. However, Sullivan’s strong base in Alaska and the state’s Republican lean still make him the likely favorite, even in a Democratic-leaning year.

A 2028 Senate Opportunity: Peltola’s Potential Path to Statewide Victory

Speculation Around Lisa Murkowski’s Potential Retirement

If Mary Peltola chooses not to challenge Sullivan in 2026, she may look to the 2028 Senate race. Many believe Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a close friend and ally of Peltola despite their different parties, may retire by 2028. Murkowski and Peltola share a mutual respect and bipartisan relationship, and some suggest Murkowski may step aside to create an opportunity for Peltola. Should Murkowski retire, Peltola would have a favorable pathway to the Senate, especially given her appeal to moderates and independents.

Potential Opponents in 2028

While Governor Mike Dunleavy could consider a Senate run in 2028, his age and potential absence from office for several years may weaken his standing. Facing a lesser-known or more extreme Republican, Peltola would likely have an advantage, positioning her well to capture moderate voters and independents. With her bipartisan appeal and established support, Peltola would be a strong contender in a potential 2028 Senate race.

Campaigning in Alaska: Challenges for Democrats

Geographic Isolation and Limited Electoral Value

A major hurdle for Democrats in Alaska is the state’s geographic isolation and limited electoral value. Alaska’s three electoral votes and remote location often lead national campaigns to overlook it in favor of more accessible swing states. For national Democratic candidates, devoting time and resources to Alaska may not seem justifiable, especially when swing states with larger electoral vote counts demand attention. Biden, for example, faces tough odds in 2024, making Alaska a lower priority. This strategic neglect can lead to a cycle of missed opportunities for Democrats, as Republicans continue to solidify their influence in the state.

Alaska’s Democratic Party: A Unique Example of Resilience

Despite the national Democratic Party’s limited focus on Alaska, the state’s Democratic Party remains active and effective. Unlike Democratic organizations in solidly red states like Alabama or Oklahoma, which have largely disengaged, Alaska’s Democratic Party has maintained a robust infrastructure and commitment to running competitive candidates. They have supported viable contenders in most major races, from statewide campaigns to local offices, and have achieved notable successes, including Peltola’s election and, in past cycles, coalition majorities in the state legislature by partnering with moderate Republicans and independents. While national campaigns may be hesitant to commit resources to Alaska, the state’s Democratic Party is a unique example of a minority party that continues to make headway in an otherwise conservative landscape.

Path Forward for Alaska Democrats: Building Local Strength

For Alaska Democrats, focusing on local-level victories will be essential to building a sustainable, long-term strategy.

Anchorage: A New Battleground for Democrats

Anchorage, Alaska’s largest city, represents a promising target for Alaska Democrats. Recently, an independent candidate with Democratic alignment won the mayoral race against a far-right incumbent, marking a significant shift in Anchorage, which has historically leaned Republican. Anchorage has traditionally served as a reliable source of Republican support, so its slow shift toward Democratic or independent-leaning candidates could suggest a broader change in voter sentiment. To capitalize on this trend, Alaska Democrats should prioritize securing city council seats, state legislature positions, and other local offices in Anchorage and surrounding areas.

Investing in Local Infrastructure and Preparing for Statewide Success

Building a strong Democratic presence in local offices can create a foundation for future statewide competitiveness. By maintaining an active local infrastructure and focusing on incremental victories in areas like Anchorage, Democrats can position themselves to compete more effectively in statewide races. While Republicans currently hold a stronger institutional advantage, Alaska’s unique blend of moderate voters and resistance to extreme partisanship offers Democrats an opportunity for gradual progress. With sustained focus on local elections and coalition-building strategies, Democrats can lay the groundwork for a more competitive political environment in Alaska, one that may eventually support Democratic statewide victories.

Long-Term Goals: Turning Alaska Blue

As demographic changes and urbanization influence Alaska’s political landscape, Democrats may see increasing competitiveness in future elections. Alaska Democrats have shown resilience, adaptability, and success in recent local races, making slow but steady progress. With continued investment in local offices, sustained outreach, and a focus on coalition-building, Democrats may increase their chances of achieving statewide success in the long term. While Alaska’s current Republican lean remains an obstacle, the groundwork being laid today may eventually position Alaska as a more competitive, purple state that could even lean blue in the years ahead.

Continue to Part 3:

America’s largest and most sparsely populated state, Alaska, is truly our nation’s last frontier, being over 2,000 miles away from its closest American neighbor, Washington state. This isolation from the rest of the contiguous United States has given Alaska a certain independence. The state has the highest percentage of registered Libertarians in the nation, and in 2016, the party’s Presidential candidate Gary Johnson won an admirable 5.9% of the vote; Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton won 52.9% and 37.7%, respectively. Additionally, in that year’s senate race, Incumbent Republican Lisa Murkowski fended off Libertarian challenger Joe Miller, receiving 44.4% of the vote to Miller’s impressive 29.2%.

But with the dropout of Robert Kennedy Jr. and his endorsement of Donald Trump, there is no longer a notable third-party presidential candidate this election cycle. Although Kennedy remains on the ballot in 33 states, including Alaska, he is unlikely to garner many votes, leaving it to be a two-way race between Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Kamala Harris.

In 2020, Donald Trump defeated Joe Biden in Alaska, receiving 52.8% of the vote to Biden’s 42.8%. This 10-point margin, the closest in the state since 1992, is likely tighter than you expected. Alaska is certainly not as conservative as other sparsely populated mountain-west states like Idaho and Wyoming, and this was shown no better than in the 2022 midterm election.

Being home to only 733,000 residents, Alaska has one at-large house district, and from 1972 to his death in 2022, this district was represented by Republican Don Young. After the 25-term congressman’s death, a special election was held that August to fill his seat. The polarizing former Republican Governor and 2008 vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin ran against Democrat Mary Peltola and fellow Republican Nick Begich. Alaska’s recently passed ranked-choice voting method resulted in Palin, Peltola, and Begich receiving 30.9%, 39.7%, and 27.8% of the first-round vote, respectively, and Peltola narrowly defeating Palin in the second round, 51.5% to 48.5%.

Undeterred, Palin challenged Peltola again that November as the Democrat tried to seek her first full term. Stunningly, Palin finished significantly worse than she did that summer, receiving just 45% of the vote to Peltola’s 55%. Although this embarrassing Republican loss likely won’t affect Trump’s performance in Alaska this November, it does signal that a historically red state is shifting closer toward the center.

An important issue to Alaskan voters is energy, and Trump likely has an edge over Harris in this department. The oil and gas industries are the largest component of the state’s economy, and each year these revenues finance the Alaska Permanent Fund, which pays out $1,600 to every resident. However, this once-booming energy industry has been in decline in recent years. Alaska has fallen from the second to the sixth highest state in oil production and from the third highest in household income in 2010 to the twelfth highest today.

Trump’s recent campaign pledge to restart oil drilling in Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which was halted by the Biden administration in 2023, is likely to resonate with Alaskans who greatly depend upon this industry. We predict that Donald Trump will win Alaska by a slightly greater margin than in 2020. Although Mary Peltola has shown Democratic performance in the state is certainly on the rise, Trump’s strength on energy policy is likely to compensate for this and more.

OREGON

Oregon is seen today as an extremely progressive state, thanks mostly to the politics of its biggest city, Portland. But not long ago, the Beaver State was a consistent swing state; back in 2000, Democrat Al Gore carried the state by just 0.5 points, and even in 2016, Hillary Clinton barely received a majority of Oregonian votes. Although in recent years the state has been shifting to the left politically, Oregon still has a vocal conservative population.

Will Donald Trump be able to rally Oregon Republicans this fall and gain significant ground in the state?

In 2022, the GOP had their strongest performance in Oregon House elections since 2010, with Republican candidates receiving 44.7% of the vote to the Democrats' 53.1%. A key indicator of growing conservative support in the state is Oregon’s 2nd congressional district, which covers the eastern two-thirds of the state. In that district, Republican Cliff Bentz won reelection with an impressive 67.5% of the vote, up from 59.9% two years prior. Donald Trump won this district in 2020 with just 55% of the vote, signaling that it has shifted further to the right since his last presidential run.

Oregon’s 2nd district is also noteworthy as it encompasses the counties currently supporting the Greater Idaho Movement, a conservative effort seeking to have eastern Oregon secede from the state and join Idaho. Since its inception in 2020, the movement has gained considerable traction among residents who feel that the liberal politics of western Oregon overshadow the conservative majority in rural areas. Currently, 13 Oregon counties have approved ballot measures in favor of Greater Idaho, and legislation is pending in both state legislatures. While it remains unlikely that this movement will succeed, it demonstrates that conservatives in Oregon, despite being a minority statewide, are making their voices heard.

Given the strong Republican performance during the 2022 midterms and the rise of the Greater Idaho Movement, we predict that Donald Trump will perform better in Oregon than he did in 2020. While he received 40.4% of the vote to Joe Biden’s 56.5%, we believe he could receive upwards of 43% of the vote this November against Kamala Harris.

WASHINGTON

Washington State may be Democrats’ most optimism-inducing state in the nation. While today, Washington is not as Democratic-leaning as California or New York, it holds the key distinction of trending blue where the other states have remained stagnant or even began shifting right.

Known for its strong liberal leanings, Washington has been a Democratic stronghold in presidential elections for decades. Since 1988, the state has consistently voted for the Democratic candidate, with Joe Biden securing over 58% of the vote in 2020. Biden’s performance represents a significant leftward shift from his preceding 21st-century nominees: Al Gore and John Kerry won the Evergreen State by less than 10 points, while Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton carried the state by low-to-mid double digits.

Washington State’s geographic and political landscape is divided in two halves, along west and east. The west side contains the majority of its population, who mostly reside in densely populated suburbs and urban centers surrounding Seattle. The eastern side of Washington, primarily composed of white, older voters who reside in sparsely-populated rural areas, more closely resembles conservative states such as Idaho and Wyoming.

While Seattle and the surrounding Puget Sound region dominate the state’s population and deliver substantial margins for Democrats, eastern Washington tends to lean Republican, with a focus on issues like agriculture, gun rights, and limited government.

Despite being nearly 80% white, Washington’s electorate is one of the more diverse in the Pacific Northwest. Its growing Hispanic population, combined with significant Asian American and Black communities around the Seattle Metro, have helped solidify Democratic dominance in the state. And although the state’s white voters – many of whom work in industries like farming, forestry, and manufacturing – remain strong supporters of the Republican Party, they still tend to vote less universally Republican than their counterparts in the South or the Mountain West.

National debate over social issues like reproductive and LGBTQ+ rights are unlikely to cause a rightward shift in Washington’s highly-educated, mostly secular electorate. The state’s Democratic coalition, like most others’, is split between a more-moderate suburban faction and a more left-leaning, younger faction residing in urban areas. But these intra-party divisions are much less pronounced, and have caused far less negative consequences for the party as a whole, in Washington than in states like New York, California, and even neighboring Oregon.

At the presidential level, we expect Washington to remain firmly in the Democratic column. While Republicans have nominated a strong candidate for the concurrent gubernatorial race in former WA-08 Rep. Bob Reichert, it is unlikely to compensate for the presence of Trump at the top of the ballot, whose divisive rhetoric and social conservatism have been firmly rejected by Washington’s voters. We predict that Kamala Harris will win Washington by a similar margin to Biden’s: around 20%.