Time and again, as I’ve tried to categorize New Hampshire—by its history, culture, and demographics—and I’ve been unable to nail down its proper place in the American political landscape.

While my deep ties to New Hampshire may explain my particular fascination with its politics, there is something to be said about the curious ideals of the Granite State. This ideology is unabashedly libertarian—possibly to a fault.

Libertarianism in America has lost its way—its party less influential with each passing year, its support splintering off to both sides of our insurmountable two-party system.

Yet as we look forward to the impending political reset of 2028, New Hampshire gives us hope for a brighter political future, combining the best parts of Democrat and Republican platforms—with a pinch of its own outrageous ideas.

Demographics

With this brief history lesson out of the way, it’s time to recognize the citizens of the Granite State. As of July 1st, 2024, New Hampshire has 1.4 million residents, making it the 41st most populous state. Its largest cities, Manchester and Nashua, are in the state’s southern region and are part of the Greater Boston metropolitan area.

The Granite State’s population grew immensely from 1960 to 1990, nearly doubling, and has seen steady growth in the 35 years since then, which is slightly below the national rate but exceeding all other New England states. New Hampshire is expected to reach a peak population of 1.5 million people in 2040.

Like its neighbors Vermont and Maine, New Hampshire’s population is racially homogenous and significantly older than the national average—90% of residents are white. Interestingly, just 40.36% of New Hampshire residents were actually born in the state—36% of them were born in neighboring Massachusetts.

Education and Wealth

New Hampshirites are considerably more educated than the average American—94% and 41% of the population over the age of 25 have received high school and college diplomas, respectively—and wealthier; the median household income is $96,838, the 4th highest of any state. Perhaps because of the last several statistics, New Hampshire also boasts the lowest poverty rate in the nation: 7.42%—almost half the national level.

Religiosity

The Unchurched Belt—a spoof of the Bible Belt—describes areas of the country with low church attendance. New Hampshire, where 66% of adults say they never or seldom attend church or religious services, lands itself in the direct center of one of these regions, sandwiched between Vermont and Maine—the two other states with the highest share of unreligious adults.

While 36% of New Hampshire residents are unaffiliated with a religious group, the remainder are, predictably, overwhelmingly Christian. 26%, 16%, and 13% of residents are Catholic, Evangelical, and Mainline Protestant, respectively, with a mere 5% practicing non-Christian faiths.

The absence of religious fervor among New Hampshirites may help explain their progressive stance on social issues. New Hampshire was the 5th state to legalize same sex marriage, all the way back in 2010—beating out more liberal states like New York, California, and Washington.

Governance

At the time of writing, New Hampshire’s state government has a Republican trifecta—control of the governorship and both chambers of the state legislature, along with the offices of secretary of state and attorney general. The GOP has held control of the governorship since 2017 and the House and Senate since 2021. Historically, the state government has had a Republican tilt; since 1992 there have been 14 years of Republican trifectas, compared to only 4 years for the Democrats.

Governor

Governor Kelly Ayotte was first elected this past November, succeeding the popular 4-term Republican Chris Sununu, of the famed Sununu political dynasty. Ayotte handily defeated Democrat mayor of Manchester Joyce Craig by 9.3 points, significantly outperforming the polls—where she averaged a 2.5-point lead—and Donald Trump, who lost New Hampshire by 2.8 points. Ayotte had previously served one term in the senate, but lost reelection in 2016 to former Democrat governor Maggie Hassan by a mere 0.15 points, just 1,017 votes.

To place a check on the governor’s power, New Hampshire uniquely employs an Executive Council—known colloquially as the Governor’s Council—comprised of five members who each represent a district of about 275,500 residents and are elected for an unlimited number of two-year terms.

With the power to overrule pardons and executive branch nominations issued by the Governor, as well as to approve the state budget and military and judicial appointments, the Council has the final say on most executive branch duties. It is currently split 4-1 in favor of Republicans, thus giving Governor Ayotte a rubber stamp of approval on the bulk of her initiatives.

House of Representatives

New Hampshire has, by far, the most unique House of Representatives in the nation. The state of 1.4 million people has a lower chamber with a whopping 400 representatives—one per 3,448 residents. For comparison, Pennsylvania is runner-up with 203 reps—one per 64,098 residents—and California holds the title of most constituents per rep at 494,755.

This gives the miniature New England state the astonishing distinction of having the third-largest elected legislative body in the English-speaking world, after the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.K. House of Commons. To field such a vast body, representatives are paid just $100 dollars a year—a number in place since 1889—which makes it effectively a volunteer legislature.

In the 2024 election, Republicans increased their control over the lower chamber, which they had held onto in 2022 by a single seat (201 to 199). They flipped 21 districts, expanding their modest majority and continuing GOP control of the house into its third legislative session.

Senate

New Hampshire’s Senate more closely resembles those of other states its size, with 24 members—one per 57,462 residents. In last November’s election, Republicans grew their already sizable control of the state senate—from 14 to 16 seats—giving them a veto-proof supermajority.

One of the two seats the Republicans flipped belonged to Democrat Donna Soucy, the Minority Leader, who represented the 18th District. This was a huge blow to the Democrats—who were hopeful of chipping away at the GOP’s majority—and safely puts the upper chamber in GOP control for the foreseeable future.

Congress

While New Hampshirites prefer a Republican-run state government, they opt for a Democratic Congress. It has been more than a decade since a Republican has won a house race in the Granite state, and more than 14 years since one has won a senate race—Kelly Ayotte all the way back in 2010. While Democrats have a clear edge in House and Senate races in New Hampshire, the state’s two aging Democrat senators could threaten to upheave this.

1st Congressional District

Democrat Chris Pappas has represented New Hampshire’s 1st Congressional District—comprising the southeastern portion of the state, including the coast, Manchester, and its suburbs—since 2019. Pappas, a former state representative and executive councilman, succeeded Democrat Carol Shea-Porter, who declined to run for reelection, and handily beat former South Hampton Police Chief Republican Eddie Edwards in 2018 by 8.6 points. In a show of New Hampshire’s social progressivism, Pappas is the first openly gay man to represent the state in Congress.

Until recently, the 1st District has been one of the most competitive in the nation, changing parties in all but one election from 2006 to 2016. The district bounced from Republican Jeb Bradley to Democrat Carol Shea-Porter in 2006, to Republican Frank Guita in 2010, back to Shea-Porter in 2012, again to Guinta in 2014, and finally back to Shea-Porter in 2016.

While Donald Trump carried the district—47% to 46%—in 2016, Biden easily flipped it blue 4 years later—by 6 points. Trump cut into this margin this past November but still lost the district to Harris by just under 2 points.

2nd Congressional District

New Hampshire’s 2nd Congressional District covers the Connecticut River Valley in the west, extends to Canada in the north, and includes Nashua and the state capital, Concord, in the south. In November, residents elected Democrat Maggie Goodlander—the wife of Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan—to represent the district, replacing retiring six-term Democrat Annie Kuster. Goodlander delivered a 5-point victory against Republican Lily Williams, an impressive feat for a non-incumbent.

Slightly more liberal than its sister to the east, Democrats have won the 2nd district in all but one election since 2006, with the exception being the landmark Republican victory in the 2010 midterms. It was the 2nd that kept New Hampshire blue in 2016—Hillary Clinton carried it 48% to 45%—while the 1st, as you might remember, just barely went for Trump.

Swing State Status

The true modern era of New Hampshire presidential politics, when the Granite State gained its status as reliably purple, began in 1992. Prior to this, New Hampshire was a Republican stronghold from the birth of the party in 1856—excluding the victories of Democrats Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and 1916, FDR in 1936, 1940, and 1944, and LBJ in 1964.

In the election of 1988, Vice President George H.W. Bush carried on where President Reagan left off, defeating Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis in New Hampshire with a commanding 62.5% of the vote. Not a single county in the state went blue, which is especially impressive considering even Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower lost one county in the state during his first election in 1952—Hillsborough, the home of Manchester.

The election of 1992 saw an unprecedented three-way race between President George H.W. Bush, Democratic Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton, and billionaire businessman Ross Perot. Perot’s grassroots campaign, which garnered support across the nation, focused on balancing the budget and protecting American industry, with a sheen of pragmatic populism that appealed to working class voters. In a fiscally conservative, business-friendly state like New Hampshire, this spelled trouble for the incumbent Bush.

That November, Clinton edged out Bush 38.9% to 37.7%, while Perot finished a distant third with a nonetheless respectable 22.6% of the vote. While this could have been a fluke, it was almost certainly Perot’s candidacy that sunk Bush in the state—as it turned out, it was the metaphorical straw that broke the camel’s back.

The Fall

Beginning in the 1980s, Republicans in New Hampshire faced several unfavorable conditions, the harshest being changing demographics. As you may remember from earlier, most New Hampshirites weren’t born in the state; 36% were originally from Massachusetts. During the 1970s and 80s, New Hampshire experienced the most significant population growth in its history, with well over 150,000 of these new residents since 1980 being former Bay Staters. These Massachusetts transplants brought their more liberal politics with them to the Granite State, greatly contributing to the Democratic victories of 1990s.

Another detrimental shift that occurred was in the Republican Party platform, one that placed social issues front and center. The “Moral Majority” movement within the Republican Party, which began in the late 1970s, may have helped Ronald Reagan wrestle evangelical voters in the South away from Jimmy Carter, but in New Hampshire, it won him no supporters.

The low religiosity—and by extension, socially progressive views—of New Hampshire voters did not align with the Republican Party’s increased emphasis on issues like abortion, school prayer, and family values. As the GOP platform of the 1980s and 90s trailed away from placing economic policies front and center, New Hampshire voters increasingly turned elsewhere, notably to Ross Perot and Bill Clinton.

Republican No More

New Hampshire embodies the political shift that has occurred since the 2016 election—a shift that, while favorable to Republicans nationally, doesn’t apply universally, including in the Granite State. While Donald Trump was propelled to his first victory almost entirely by white voters, educated and uneducated, this coalition shrank considerably in his two following races.

Republicans made considerable inroads with minority groups who were previously considered the base of the Democratic Party. This allowed Trump to trounce Kamala Harris in the swing states without his old level of support from white Americans. The former President won 55% of Latino men—a net improvement of 33 points from 2020—and lost Black men to Harris by 56 points, up significantly from a 60-point loss to Biden and 69-point loss to Clinton.

This is all well and good for the GOP in ethnically diverse battleground states like Florida, Nevada, Georgia, and Arizona—and to a lesser extent, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. However, in New Hampshire, with its well-educated, white electorate, this spells trouble.

2016

Trump won white voters with a college degree by 3 points—a significant decline from Mitt Romney’s 14-point margin four years prior. However, this was still enough to put him over the finish line in the Rust Belt. It wasn’t white voters with college degrees that won Trump states Romney had lost; it was the non-college vote that made the difference. Trump won white voters with no college degree by a remarkable 37 points, compared to Romney’s 26-point margin with this group.

Trump lost New Hampshire to Hillary Clinton by 0.37 points—2,736 votes—the narrowest margin of the election besides Michigan. This was a 5.21-point improvement on Mitt Romney’s numbers in 2012 and marked the best performance for a Republican in the state since George Bush in 2000.

2020

This time, amid a global pandemic, Joe Biden won white voters with a college degree by 3 points—a considerable gain for the Democrats. White voters without college degrees held strong for Trump, favoring him by 35 points, slightly below 2016 levels.

Unlike four years prior, election night in New Hampshire was not a nail biter. Biden carried the state by 7.35 points—59,277 votes—the best showing for a Democrat since Barack Obama in 2008.

2024

Last fall, in what was initially his rematch with Joe Biden—and later, Vice President Kamala Harris—Donald Trump was back with a vengeance.

All of Trump’s controversies since the last election: the “Big Lie,” January 6th, being found liable for rape, and a felony hush money conviction, to name just the most memorable—may have galvanized his MAGA base but did little to change the trajectory of New Hampshire’s socially liberal, old-school fiscally conservative electorate.

Of course, just like in every county of every state in the nation, it all came down to one or two big issues: inflation and the border—and in the Granite State it was no different. This amounted to an over-performance compared to 2020, but still a considerable decline from the former President’s 2016 numbers.

Harris won New Hampshire with a slim majority—50.65% of the electorate—while Trump netted 47.87%, a deficit of 2.72 points, or some 22,965 votes. This gave the Granite State the distinction of being the lightest blue state of this election cycle—the closest to falling to Trump.

We constantly were bombarded with updates on polling from the swingy seven: Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, all throughout last fall. But if one other state could have been added to the bunch—rounding it out as the not-so-catchy Erratic Eight—it would’ve been New Hampshire.

Senate 2026

As I hinted at earlier, the disconnect between a GOP-dominated state government, led until recently by the heir to a political dynasty treated like royalty—and a fiercely blue congressional delegation could come to a head, if one figure threatened to make a leap between the two.

This now appears to be becoming true after it was reported in early September that John Sununu, former governor Chris Sununu’s elder brother, and a former Senator himself, is exploring a run to reclaim his old seat—which he lost to Jeanne Shaheen in 2008. Shaheen, who also served as Governor from 1997 to 2003, is quickly approaching 80 and announced that she is not seeking a fourth term.

This leaves Democrats in a precarious position: a popular senator retiring in a state that barely went for Kamala Harris last year—and with an equally, if not more, popular Republican family ready to snatch the seat.

Democratic Representative George Pappas has already announced his candidacy to fill the open seat. However, his relatively short tenure in Congress and—perhaps more consequentially—his lack of statewide name recognition could give Sununu a key edge in the race, if he does decide to run.

Of course, only time will tell whether the GOP will go the distance, defying a decade’s worth of voting trends. Needless to say, this will be a closely watched race in the Midterms—potentially giving Senate Republicans a much-needed buffer against expected losses elsewhere.

But if there was any state where an anomaly like this could happen, it’s the always eccentric, proudly independent Granite State.

Once a contested swing state, Washington has become a Democratic stronghold in both presidential and down-ballot races. Since 2000, Democrats have held the governor’s office, both Senate seats, and a majority of House seats, even as Republicans occasionally won less partisan state offices with moderate candidates. Despite Republicans frequently targeting statewide races, they consistently fall short.

Washington’s consistency contrasts with national trends, where Democrats struggle down-ballot even in blue states. This raises the question: why has Washington grown steadily bluer?

In case you missed it, read Washington, Part 1: A Democrat's Utopia

Part 2 Preview: Exploring Washington’s Unique Blue Trend

Seattle and the “Blue Wall”

The Smiley-Murray race is just one example of a repeated pattern in Washington State: Republican rurals are overcome by a “blue wall”1 located in the western half of the state, preventing Republicans from winning more than 43 percent of the vote in most elections.

The blue wall I'm referring to is King County, which includes the state’s largest city, Seattle, and its heavily urbanized surrounding counties.

Seattle, the state’s largest city, has seen remarkable growth—between 2010 and 2020, it was one of the six fastest-growing metro areas in the country,2adding over 128,000 residents. It’s one of only 14 American cities to grow by more than 100,000 people during that period.3

King County’s suburban areas have also expanded, growing by over 50% compared to the national average of 32%, with an influx of more than 338,000 residents in the last decade,4 , bringing the total population to 2.27 million. Only four other counties in the U.S. saw increases of this magnitude.

Reflecting national trends, King County has also become more diverse over the past decade. The non-Hispanic white share of the population fell by over 10 percentage points, while the Asian population rose by more than 5 points to 19.8%. The Black and Hispanic populations both grew by a little over 1 percentage point.5

Washington’s High Engagement Political Culture

In terms of the state’s political culture, I’d characterize King County voters as high propensity voters - because they go out to vote a ton - turning out at an astonishing 86.% 6in the 2020 election (compared to an already high 76% turnout in Washington state at large7 and 66% turnout nationally). King County voter turnout also significantly surpassed turnout in cities like New York City (63.3% turnout), Los Angeles county8 (57% turnout) and Chicago and Cook County (72.2%), that same year.

They're also reliable voters - and this culture/pattern of high turnout and participation— already seems to be in place looking across several election cycles (not just 2020). King County voter turnout was as high as 81% in both 2016 and 2012. Compared to a more uneven voter turnout in New York City which saw 56.3% voter turnout in 2016, Chicago and Cook County (71.54% turnout in 2016), and Denver County9 which saw 2020 turnout 76.24%, 2016 turnout at 72% and 63.48% turnout in 2012.

Washington’s High-Engagement Political Culture

King County’s political culture stands out for its high voter engagement and its notably secular character, both of which play a role in shaping its Democratic lean. Washington’s voters are also more likely to be politically engaged. They probably do know what the candidates look like; maybe even how they talk, and what exactly they say.

And the numbers reflect this. King County voters are high propensity voters - and demonstrate a pattern of consistent high turnout across election cycles. In the 2020 election, King County saw an extraordinary 86% turnout, surpassing both Washington state’s overall turnout of 76% and the national turnout of 66%. This turnout also outpaced major cities like New York City (63.3%), Los Angeles County (57%), and Chicago's Cook County (72.2%).

This pattern isn’t limited to 2020; King County turnout was similarly strong in previous elections, with 81% turnout in both 2016 and 2012. In contrast, cities like New York City saw lower turnout, with 56.3% in 2016, while Denver County’s turnout varied more dramatically, from 63.5% in 2012 to 76.2% in 2020.

Washington voters are also highly educated. According to the Washington Post’s exit polls, 80 percent of the Evergreen State’s voters had at least a college degree (with the same poll showing that voters without a college degree comprised 59 percent of the total voting population, with no data on further levels of higher education).

Another defining aspect of King County’s political culture is its secularism. Seattle, at the heart of King County, has some of the lowest levels of religious affiliation in the U.S., and this secular tendency is evident in the county’s politics. High turnout and secular values go hand-in-hand here, contributing to a consistent pattern of support for Democratic candidates and progressive policies across election cycles.

All these factors contribute heavily to the state's Democratic lean and help set the state up as what I believe to be a Democratic' 'utopia'. 

Defying National Trends: Seattle’s Steadfast Urban Support for Democrats

Across much of the country, Democrats have struggled with a gradual erosion of support in core urban constituency, where Republicans have made inroads with minority voters, capitalizing on concerns over crime and socialism.

For example, in New York City—a long-standing Democratic stronghold—Joe Biden underperformed Hillary Clinton’s 2016 margins in 2020, despite overperforming her nationally. In 2022, Democratic Governor Kathy Hochul continued this downward trend, winning New York City by less than 70%, a drop from Democrats’ previous 80%+ margins.

Seattle, in contrast, has shown no evidence of this urban backslide. On the contrary, from 2012 to 2020, Democrats increased their share of the vote in Seattle from 83% to 88% of voters, underscoring Seattle's overwhelming and expanding Democratic base of support.

Suburbs That Stay Blue: Washington’s Reliable Democratic Base

Washington’s suburbs are solidly and consistently blue—a stability that contrasts with the national battleground status of suburban areas.

Suburbs have emerged as a key battleground nationally, with many election outcomes across the nation turning on this pivotal voter segment. For example, in 2020, Joe Biden flipped key swing states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania after Democrats had lost all three of these states only 4 years earlier - partly by making gains in their suburban areas.

However, Democrats’ success in the suburbs is not guaranteed nationwide; in Virginia’s 2021 gubernatorial race, Democrat Terry McAuliffe lost by nearly three points in large part because he failed to retain Biden’s margins in the Northern Virginia suburbs.

In Washington, however, suburban voters around Seattle remain reliably liberal and high-turnout. In 2020 Joe Biden won the area surrounding Seattle by nearly 20 points, and Democratic Senator Patty Murray likely won these areas by a similar margin 2 years later. 

Defying Democrats’ National Challenges: Less Polarized Rural Populace

Washington’s rural voters also defy national trends by being less polarized than rural areas in many other states, both ideologically and in partisan preference.

Although Washington’s rural counties decisively favored Trump in 2020, he won only 54% of the rural vote—significantly lower than his 57% share nationwide. In fact, even if votes from Washington’s three largest counties (King, Snohomish, and Pierce) were removed, Biden would still have won the state by around 4,000 votes.10

Unlike in the South or Midwest, where some rural counties gave Trump over 80% of the vote, no rural county in Washington reached such extreme levels. Many of Washington’s rural counties gave Trump margins in the 60s or 70s, reflecting strong support but not anywhere close to the near-unanimous backing seen in states like Texas or Alabama, where a large number of rural counties give Trump upwards of 90% of the vote.

A recent race that illustrates this distinct rural dynamic is Washington’s 2022 election in the 3rd Congressional District, a Republican-leaning, largely rural area where Democrat Marie Glusenkamp Perez ran against Republican Joe Kent.

Kent, an extremist who openly quoted a white supremacist author and received endorsements from figures like Neo-Nazi Nick Fuentes, represented a far-right platform. Although WA-03 had historically leaned conservative, with Trump winning by more than 3 points in 2020, a majority of its voters ultimately chose Glusenkamp Perez over Kent.

In many other rural areas, voters might have supported Kent, or voters might have ignored Kent’s extreme views, choosing a candidate based on party label alone, especially amid concerns about inflation and the economy. However, Washington’s rural voters proved discerning, rejecting Kent’s extreme agenda and supporting a Democrat instead.

If the undiscerning voter had walked into the ballot, intended to vote only based on the lackluster economy and rising inflation, she might cast her ballot for whichever candidate had an R next to their name; in this case, Joe Kent.

However, if they watched even a couple of either candidate’s ads or simply read any news about the state of the race, they’d realize that Joe Kent isn’t just a boring ol’ fiscal conservative: he’s crazy.

This choice reflects a potential characteristic of Washington’s rural electorate—a willingness to cross party lines in the face of extremism.

In Washington, however, a small but significant portion of these voters rejected Kent's far-right agenda and cast their ballots for a Democrat.

Defying Democrats’ National Challenges: Limited Anti-Trump Moderates

And it’s not just about recognizing crazy, either.

Democrats across the nation have recently struggled to retain their tenuous alliances with middle-of-the-road voters — alliances largely borne out of a shared opposition to Trumpism — in the absence of Trump. In Washington, however, these swingy, moderate voters are either fewer in number or more consistently aligned with Democrats.

Even when offered a moderate Republican alternative, Washington’s centrist voters have largely stayed with Democrats.

In 2022, for example, incumbent Democratic Senator Patty Murray faced a stiff challenge from Tiffany Smiley, who was widely perceived as a more conventional, moderate Republican, due to her moderate stance on abortion. Polling had shown the race to be within the margin of error; on November 8th, however, Murray won by nearly 15 points, receiving 57.1% of the vote—a result almost identical to Biden’s 57.9% in 2020. Unlike other states, where moderate suburban voters shifted back to Republicans in 2022, Washington Democrats’ coalition held firm.

This is what differentiates Washington even from other blue states like Virginia, where Biden’s 10-point victory in 2020 was largely due to unprecedented support in historically Republican suburbs near D.C. But in the 2022 midterms, without Trump on the ballot, many of these voters returned to their Republican roots.

For example, in VA-10, a DC-adjacent, suburban district, Biden’s 19-point margin in 2020 shrank to a 6.5-point win for Democratic Rep. Jennifer Wexton two years later. Meanwhile, Washington’s WA-06, a heavily suburban district, showed no such shift, supporting Biden with an 18% share of vote in 2020, then re-electing Rep. Derek Kilmer by 20.1% - even slightly increasing his margin two years later.

In states like Virginia and New York, a significant part of the Democratic coalition (around 5-10%) consists of voters who would probably support a Democrat in a presidential race but would otherwise lean Republican. Washington, however, has little evidence of such voters in significant numbers.

Looking Ahead: GOP Prospects

It's easy for Republican strategists to argue that Republicans could improve their margins in Washington by fielding less extreme candidates —a strategy that has shown promise in states like Arizona or Pennsylvania, where far-right candidates have cost Republicans winnable races.

However, two obstacles make this strategy difficult in Washington.

First: it's not so easy for Republicans to just start nominating less crazy candidates.

First, Washington’s GOP, like many state parties, has been overtaken by a faction focused on culture wars and election denial rather than the traditional conservatism that might appeal to moderates. The state’s current GOP chair, Jim Walsh, is better known for rallying against the state’s COVID restrictions and comparing those who enacted vaccine mandates to fascists in Nazi Germany than for focusing on fiscal conservatism. 11

Even if the party aimed to nominate moderate candidates, they cannot fully control the outcome of primaries.

Ultimately, it's the voters in the primaries who decide which candidates are going to be elevated to the general election.

The vast majority of the Republican base in Washington leans older, whiter, and rural. And while I established that the state’s rurals are less conservative than one might expect, there are still plenty of voters who skew heavily towards the right — and these voters currently dominate the Republican coalition.

They often choose candidates who best reflect their views rather than those with broad electoral appeal. A good example is the 2022 WA-03 race, where Joe Kent, a very extreme Republican, won the jungle primary against the incumbent Republican representative, Jaime Herrera Beutler, who had voted to impeach Donald Trump in 2021. Since her first election in 2010, Beutler had been reelected five times without trouble. In 2022, she had been endorsed by Republican House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, House Minority Whip Steve Scalise, and Republican Conference Chair Elise Stefanik.

In other words, Beutler had the backing of the GOP institution.

But Kent had the support of an even stronger institution: Trump. Trump’s enthusiastic support of Kent singlehandedly transformed his campaign from suicide mission to success, all thanks to Trump’s iron grip on the Republican base. This continued platforming of extremist candidates seems likely to continue: this year, Joe Kent once again advanced to the general election in WA-03.

Unless Washington Republicans find a way to loosen Trump’s stranglehold over the conservative coalition — which begins with them actually wanting to do so — they will keep throwing away electoral opportunities in a state where there already weren’t many to be found.

Here’s the second reason Republicans shouldn’t be holding their breath for a victory in Washington: even when they do nominate more moderate candidates, their electoral performances range from disappointingly mediocre to inadequately strong.

In 2022, for example, moderate Republican Tiffany Smiley lost to Patty Murray by nearly 15 points, a modest improvement over Trump’s 2020 margin in a redder national environment. Dino Rossi, who ran competitive campaigns as a moderate Republican over four elections, and was somewhat successful in consolidating the state’s rural, Republican base and reaching out to more moderate and even Democratic voters, similarly overperformed expectations but was never able to secure a win.

Ultimately, given that even moderate-to-mainstream Republicans who ran strong campaigns were unsuccessful, Republicans’ prospects in Washington appear bleak.

The Republican Dilemma: A Party Out of Step with Washington’s Electorate

Wrapping it up, we can start by talking about political prospects for Republicans in the state.

I'd really sum it up by saying that the current model of the Republican Party, which leans heavily on populist rhetoric, and social conservatism — is extremely ill-suited to Washington State.

Across the nation, Republicans have made a trade-off, sacrificing support from highly-educated, higher-income suburban moderates in exchange for a focus on working-class and rural voters. In heavily blue-collar states such as Wisconsin or Ohio, Republicans have reaped success. But in a state with one of largest secular populations in the nation, a large and growing suburban population, and high concentration of highly-educated voters, this calculus just doesn’t pencil out.

Looking Ahead: Caution to Democrats

Now, while Democrats have been, are, and will likely remain the dominant party in Washington State, it is still imperative that they not rest easy.

They need only look at their neighboring state of Oregon - which shares similar demographics and political culture with Washington, to see that Oregon has actually faced a host of tighter races recently.

This is not because Oregon is a fundamentally more conservative state than Washington, but simply because Democrats in Oregon have made a number of poor political decisions — nominating candidates who are too progressive for moderate voters, and somewhat-poorly managing the state. Issues like rising crime in Portland have eroded Democratic margins, suggesting that political missteps could endanger Democratic dominance in Washington as well.

Washington’s Democrats, however, have generally shown stronger political instincts, balancing progressive policies with moderate appeal. Nevertheless, they should remain vigilant.

In fact, Washington State features a competitive house district in WA-08, whose voters could potentially support a Republican, assuming a poor national environment for Democrats and a strong GOP nominee. The 2024 gubernatorial race in Washington, featuring a matchup between Democratic Attorney General Bob Ferguson and Republican former WA-08 Rep. Bob Reichert, provides an opening for Republicans. Reichert, who won election 8 times in a Democrat-leaning district, has a proven track record at winning. However, he faces multiple obstacles. Ferguson, who has served as AG since 2013, is a well-known politician in the state and by no means a throwaway candidate. Furthermore, Reichert shares the ballot with Donald Trump, whose brand of Republicanism is toxic in Washington. Current polling reflects Reichert’s difficult challenge: in the last three polls, Reichert has trailed Ferguson by margin of 6 to 13 points.

Regardless of whether Reichert wins or loses, his performance may still aid downballot candidates in competitive elections, most notably in WA-03 and WA-08. While Republicans hold only a modest presence in state politics—the Senate stands at 29-20 Democratic and the House at 58-40—a strong year could theoretically bring either chamber within reach.

As is, Republicans aren’t completely shut out of state politics: the current State Senate balance is 29-20 Democratic, and the House 58-40. It wouldn’t be inconceivable for Republicans to win back either or both chambers in a truly extraordinary year.

But as things stand, while the rest of the nation remains bitterly and evenly divided, Washington charts its own, defiant path — towards the bluer end of the spectrum.

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Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Alaska’s political future is full of uncertainties. Many analysts predict that Trump will likely carry Alaska, but the margin remains in question. While Trump’s involvement in the January 6th insurrection and his attempts to deny the 2020 election results have likely decreased his appeal among Alaska’s moderate-leaning electorate, Biden’s popularity in the state remains low, impacted by both policy and perception issues that have distanced him from many Alaskans. Despite Trump’s controversies, Biden’s unpopularity may lead Alaska to vote for Trump by a slightly wider margin in 2024 than in 2020.

The 2024 House Race: Peltola’s Cross-Party Appeal

In Alaska’s at-large House race, Democratic incumbent Mary Peltola presents a different dynamic. Peltola has demonstrated strong cross-party appeal, winning both the August 2022 special election - which many thought she would lose - and the November 2022 general election, defeating Sarah Palin by nearly 10 points. Her performance far outpaced Biden’s results in Alaska in 2020 by almost 20 points, underscoring her popularity among moderate Republicans and independents. With her proven ability to attract voters across the political spectrum, Peltola stands a good chance of retaining her seat even if Biden performs poorly in Alaska, potentially losing by 12 or 13 points. Peltola’s broad appeal and recent victories position her well for the 2024 House race.

Polling Challenges and Democratic Investment in Alaska

Predicting election outcomes in Alaska is uniquely challenging due to the state’s vast, sparsely populated, and hard-to-poll geography. Even in more centralized states like Wisconsin or Michigan, polling can be difficult, but Alaska’s remoteness makes reliable polling data exceptionally rare. Pollsters often issue disclaimers with Alaska polls, cautioning that results may vary widely. This lack of reliable polling data may discourage Democrats from investing heavily in Alaska, as they may prioritize states with clearer polling indicators of competitiveness. However, based on her track record, Peltola remains a strong candidate with a fair chance of holding her seat in 2024.

Alaska’s Political Landscape in the 2026 Midterm Election

Senator Dan Sullivan’s Re-Election Prospects

The 2026 midterm elections could be pivotal for Alaska. Republican Senator Dan Sullivan, who will be up for re-election, has a relatively low national profile but is known in Alaska for his consistent, conservative positions. Unlike more high-profile Republicans like Ted Cruz or Mitch McConnell, Sullivan has maintained a quiet presence nationally, which has worked to his advantage in Alaska. Alaskan voters, who appreciate pragmatic and low-profile representation, have responded positively to his focus on local issues, such as economic development, infrastructure improvements, and strong advocacy for energy initiatives like the expansion of oil and gas pipelines. Sullivan’s policies align well with the state’s values, and his conservative, dependable approach has helped him build a solid base of support.

Sullivan’s 2020 Victory Against Independent Al Gross

In 2020, Senator Dan Sullivan solidified his standing among Alaska voters by winning re-election against independent candidate Al Gross, defeating him by nearly 13 points. While Gross’s campaign as an independent suggested potential crossover appeal, his lack of significant political experience and a detailed policy agenda limited his effectiveness as a challenger. Sullivan’s victory, especially by such a substantial margin, demonstrated his strong base in Alaska and reinforced his reputation as a dependable, low-profile conservative whose focus resonates with Alaskans.

Looking ahead to the 2026 midterms, Sullivan’s electoral strength may again give him an advantage, especially if Biden is serving a second term. Historically, presidents face significant setbacks in their second midterm—a phenomenon known as the “six-year itch.” If Biden is re-elected, the 2026 environment will likely favor Republicans, further bolstering Sullivan’s chances. However, if Trump wins in 2024, the political landscape may shift. Trump’s first midterm in 2018 was highly favorable to Democrats, and a similar Democratic wave could occur in 2026 if Trump is again in office.

Under these conditions, Sullivan’s re-election could become more competitive, especially if Mary Peltola, assuming she wins re-election to the House in 2024, decides to challenge him for the Senate. Peltola, with her demonstrated appeal across party lines and her ability to attract moderate Republicans and independents, could make the race more challenging for Sullivan, particularly if the national environment favors Democrats. However, Sullivan’s established reputation, deep ties to local issues, and solid support among Alaska’s Republican-leaning electorate still likely make him the favorite, even in a Democratic-leaning midterm.

Democratic Overperformance in the 2022 Midterms and Future Implications

Breaking the Trend: Democrats’ Unexpected Success in 2022

The 2022 midterms saw unexpectedly strong performances from Democrats, defying the historical trend of midterm losses for the president’s party. The Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling, which reversed Roe v. Wade, and concerns about GOP extremism, contributed to Democratic successes in many states. Democrats retained Senate seats in challenging races and limited losses in the House. Alaska’s majority pro-choice electorate and its resistance to extreme partisanship suggest that a similar environment could benefit Democrats in the 2026 midterms. However, it remains to be seen whether the dynamics that drove Democratic success in 2022 will persist in future cycles.

Impact of a Potential Trump Presidency on the 2026 Midterms

If Trump wins in 2024, his second midterm could be challenging for Republicans, similar to his first midterm in 2018. In that case, Sullivan’s re-election could become competitive, especially if Mary Peltola - assuming she wins re-election to the House in 2024 - decides to challenge him for the Senate. Given her appeal across party lines, Peltola could make Sullivan’s race closer, particularly if the national environment favors Democrats. However, Sullivan’s strong base in Alaska and the state’s Republican lean still make him the likely favorite, even in a Democratic-leaning year.

A 2028 Senate Opportunity: Peltola’s Potential Path to Statewide Victory

Speculation Around Lisa Murkowski’s Potential Retirement

If Mary Peltola chooses not to challenge Sullivan in 2026, she may look to the 2028 Senate race. Many believe Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, a close friend and ally of Peltola despite their different parties, may retire by 2028. Murkowski and Peltola share a mutual respect and bipartisan relationship, and some suggest Murkowski may step aside to create an opportunity for Peltola. Should Murkowski retire, Peltola would have a favorable pathway to the Senate, especially given her appeal to moderates and independents.

Potential Opponents in 2028

While Governor Mike Dunleavy could consider a Senate run in 2028, his age and potential absence from office for several years may weaken his standing. Facing a lesser-known or more extreme Republican, Peltola would likely have an advantage, positioning her well to capture moderate voters and independents. With her bipartisan appeal and established support, Peltola would be a strong contender in a potential 2028 Senate race.

Campaigning in Alaska: Challenges for Democrats

Geographic Isolation and Limited Electoral Value

A major hurdle for Democrats in Alaska is the state’s geographic isolation and limited electoral value. Alaska’s three electoral votes and remote location often lead national campaigns to overlook it in favor of more accessible swing states. For national Democratic candidates, devoting time and resources to Alaska may not seem justifiable, especially when swing states with larger electoral vote counts demand attention. Biden, for example, faces tough odds in 2024, making Alaska a lower priority. This strategic neglect can lead to a cycle of missed opportunities for Democrats, as Republicans continue to solidify their influence in the state.

Alaska’s Democratic Party: A Unique Example of Resilience

Despite the national Democratic Party’s limited focus on Alaska, the state’s Democratic Party remains active and effective. Unlike Democratic organizations in solidly red states like Alabama or Oklahoma, which have largely disengaged, Alaska’s Democratic Party has maintained a robust infrastructure and commitment to running competitive candidates. They have supported viable contenders in most major races, from statewide campaigns to local offices, and have achieved notable successes, including Peltola’s election and, in past cycles, coalition majorities in the state legislature by partnering with moderate Republicans and independents. While national campaigns may be hesitant to commit resources to Alaska, the state’s Democratic Party is a unique example of a minority party that continues to make headway in an otherwise conservative landscape.

Path Forward for Alaska Democrats: Building Local Strength

For Alaska Democrats, focusing on local-level victories will be essential to building a sustainable, long-term strategy.

Anchorage: A New Battleground for Democrats

Anchorage, Alaska’s largest city, represents a promising target for Alaska Democrats. Recently, an independent candidate with Democratic alignment won the mayoral race against a far-right incumbent, marking a significant shift in Anchorage, which has historically leaned Republican. Anchorage has traditionally served as a reliable source of Republican support, so its slow shift toward Democratic or independent-leaning candidates could suggest a broader change in voter sentiment. To capitalize on this trend, Alaska Democrats should prioritize securing city council seats, state legislature positions, and other local offices in Anchorage and surrounding areas.

Investing in Local Infrastructure and Preparing for Statewide Success

Building a strong Democratic presence in local offices can create a foundation for future statewide competitiveness. By maintaining an active local infrastructure and focusing on incremental victories in areas like Anchorage, Democrats can position themselves to compete more effectively in statewide races. While Republicans currently hold a stronger institutional advantage, Alaska’s unique blend of moderate voters and resistance to extreme partisanship offers Democrats an opportunity for gradual progress. With sustained focus on local elections and coalition-building strategies, Democrats can lay the groundwork for a more competitive political environment in Alaska, one that may eventually support Democratic statewide victories.

Long-Term Goals: Turning Alaska Blue

As demographic changes and urbanization influence Alaska’s political landscape, Democrats may see increasing competitiveness in future elections. Alaska Democrats have shown resilience, adaptability, and success in recent local races, making slow but steady progress. With continued investment in local offices, sustained outreach, and a focus on coalition-building, Democrats may increase their chances of achieving statewide success in the long term. While Alaska’s current Republican lean remains an obstacle, the groundwork being laid today may eventually position Alaska as a more competitive, purple state that could even lean blue in the years ahead.

Continue to Part 3:

The Limits of Crossover Appeal in Today’s Indiana

Indiana’s downward spiral for Democrats only worsened after 2012. By 2016, Hillary Clinton lost the state by nearly 19 points, essentially returning Indiana to its pre-2008 position as a state widely regarded as unwinnable for Democrats.

However, there is a key difference between the Democratic landscape in Indiana now and in the early 2000s. This shift is largely part of a broader national trend: the increasing polarization of American politics where voters are increasingly aligned with a single party.

Ten to twenty years ago, it was common to see Democratic House members representing districts that had voted for Republican presidential candidates by large margins.

In the 2000s, ticket-splitting was common, with nearly 50 House members representing districts that voted for a presidential candidate of the opposite party.

By 2024, fewer than 20 members hold such seats, reflecting the shrinking space for Democrats in Indiana’s political landscape.

In Indiana, this polarization means that while Democrats previously had a significant presence despite their losses in presidential elections, it is now nearly impossible for them to win a significant portion of the state, with the state consistently voting for Republicans on the presidential level by upwards of 15 points in the last 8 years or so.

Evan Bayh: A Case Study in Indiana’s Political Shift

Back in the 2000s and early 2010s, Democrats still held down-ballot offices, including conservative House districts and even the governorship and a Senate seat. A prominent example is Evan Bayh, a Democrat who was highly popular during his tenure as governor and senator. However, Bayh’s political decline really mirrors the state's transition ideologically and politically as whole.

After leaving office in 2010, he attempted a Senate comeback in 2016, the same year Clinton lost the state by a large margin. Early polls gave Bayh a formidable lead over Republican Todd Young, a relatively unknown representative. However, as the election neared, Young overtook Bayh as revelations emerged about Bayh’s role as a corporate lobbyist and his extended out of office tenure had surfaced. In the end, Bayh lost by nearly 10 points, despite polling ahead earlier, illustrating that a strong candidate on paper is not enough to shift Indiana’s political leanings in favor of Democrats.

Indiana’s strong Republican orientation now means that Democrats can no longer afford to forfeit presidential races while relying on crossover support in Senate, House, or gubernatorial contests, as they did in the early 2000s. For example, the contrast between the 2012 and 2020 gubernatorial elections highlights this change.

John Gregg’s Near Wins and the Erosion of Democratic Competitiveness

Indiana’s gubernatorial races provide a unique lens on its political dynamics. In 2012, Democratic candidate John Gregg, a former Speaker of the Indiana House, came surprisingly close to defeating Mike Pence. He won 46.6% of the state's vote to Pence's 49.5%, representing around a three-point margin of defeat, an impressive performance, which is even more outstanding considering that the election was held concurrently with the presidential election in the Hoosier State. Gregg ran again in 2016 but lost by a larger six-point margin to Eric Holcomb.

Despite mounting a fierce challenge, Gregg still faced an uphill battle as Indiana continued trending Republican. Gregg was ultimately defeated by a wider margin in his second run, securing only 45.4% of the vote compared to Eric Holcomb’s 51.4%, resulting in a roughly 6-point loss. This outcome was still impressive, considering that Gregg was competing in a deeply Republican state where Hillary Clinton had lost by a landslide. However, despite his strong performance, Gregg remained far from victory.

Indiana’s 2020 Gubernatorial Race: A Further Shift to the Right

It's important to keep in mind that gubernatorial elections can deviate from and continue to be very flexible compared to the state's partisan lean.

For example, Democrats currently govern in Kansas and Kentucky, both states that backed Donald Trump by over 15 points in 2020. Conversely, Republicans hold the governorships in Vermont and, until 2023, Massachusetts—two of the most Democratic states in the country. These four elections highlight that it’s not uncommon for gubernatorial races to diverge from presidential outcomes, and it’s not implausible to imagine John Gregg outperforming Democratic presidential candidates in Indiana, given his popularity and long history as a state politician.

Despite Gregg’s familiarity and appeal, he was unable to secure victory in either 2012 or 2016. Notably, by 2020, Indiana’s gubernatorial results shifted even further right than its presidential results. Democrats, who had previously contested gubernatorial races vigorously, effectively forfeited in 2020.

William Myers, a former New York City Health Commissioner, ran against incumbent Republican Eric Holcomb but lost by over 24 points—a far greater margin than Joe Biden’s 16-point loss in the presidential race that same year. While Myers slightly improved on Clinton’s 2016 share, the result was still a far cry from Obama’s 2008 win or even his 10-point loss in 2012, underscoring Democrats' deepening struggles in Indiana.

Indiana’s Quiet Political Landscape Since 2020

Since 2020, Indiana has remained politically quiet—a situation that is reassuring for Republicans but disheartening for Democrats. In states dominated by the opposition, it falls to the minority party to vigorously contest each election and invest in outreach and get-out-the-vote efforts. Without this commitment, an already "safe" state becomes even safer for the dominant party, a trend seen nationwide.

This pattern held true in Indiana during the 2022 midterms, when Republican Senate incumbent Todd Young, a fairly center-right and relatively uncontroversial candidate, bested his Democratic opponent by north of 20 points in a race effectively ignored by both national and state Democrats. Similarly, Democrats lost the total House vote in Indiana by slightly over 20 points, with Republicans on seven congressional districts and seven congressional incumbents remaining largely unchallenged.

Indiana's First District: A Bright Spot for Democrats

The only real bright spot for Democrats in the state would be Indiana's First District, centered around the city of Gary in the northwestern part of the state. Gary, remains a rare Democratic stronghold, a Rust Belt city similar to Detroit, grew significantly during the rise of industrialization and has since experienced gradual population decline. Democratic incumbent Frank Mrvan, who hailed from a political dynasty in the state, faced a strong challenge from Republican newcomer Jennifer Green. Despite alot of buzz from forecasts predicting a potential upset, Mrvan won reelection by 5.6 points, offering Democrats a glimpse of hope in a generally red state.

Despite Mrvan's victory being contained to a single district and not the state as a whole, it does suggest a glimmer of hope for Democrats in the future because Mrvan’s success stemmed not only from his performance in Gary but also from strong support in suburban areas surrounding the city, which are part of the broader Chicago metropolitan area. These suburbs, predominantly white yet more educated than much of Indiana’s rural areas, leaned Democratic due to rising concerns about Republican extremism after Donald Trump’s 2020 loss and the subsequent January 6th Capitol insurrection. Additionally, the 2022 Dobbs decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade, galvanized many suburban voters, particularly women, who were alarmed by Indiana’s decision to ban abortion entirely in August 2023.

This trend reflects a larger shift we’ve seen nationwide, especially in Midwestern states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, where growing suburban populations have increasingly supported Democrats. If Indiana Democrats can continue to build on this momentum, particularly in suburban and urban areas, they may eventually expand their influence in the state.

Indianapolis: The Democratic Core

Beyond Gary, Indianapolis is the most critical urban center for Indiana Democrats. As the state capital and largest city, Indianapolis proper has a population of around 900,000, similar in size to Jacksonville, Florida, making it one of the top 20 most populous U.S. cities. Its metropolitan area, with over 2.1 million residents, ranks as the 34th largest nationwide.

Indianapolis is the heart of Indiana’s Democratic coalition, characterized by its racial and ethnic diversity, with substantial Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations. Without Indianapolis, Democrats would likely be shut out of Indiana almost entirely, making the state resemble conservative strongholds in the Mountain West, like North and South Dakota or Wyoming. Indianapolis, however, remains the center of the Democratic coalition in Indiana. It is a highly diverse city, with substantial Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations. Furthermore, its suburbs have trended leftward in recent elections, a pattern seen in other Midwestern states, including Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Indianapolis’s economy, driven by tourism (especially its renowned racing scene) and a robust financial sector, attracts residents whose interests often align with Democratic priorities.

This foundation gives Democrats room to grow, with the potential to increase voter turnout in urban and suburban areas. Although a statewide win may remain challenging, sustained get-out-the-vote efforts in Indianapolis and other urban centers could yield progress. Barack Obama’s 2008 success in Indiana, as the first Black presidential nominee, demonstrated the importance of urban support, with cities like Indianapolis and Gary contributing significantly to his narrow victory. Democrats’ future efforts might benefit from similar strategies, focusing on maximizing their urban coalitions as a stepping stone for broader gains across the state.

Urban Growth Alone Won't Turn Indiana Blue

It would be a mistake for Democrats to assume they could win Indiana solely by boosting urban margins. Marion County, home to Indianapolis and its suburbs, has indeed shifted significantly left over the past 20 years. In 2000, George W. Bush narrowly won Marion County over Al Gore, but by 2020, Joe Biden carried it by 29.1 points—a massive, nearly 30-point leftward shift.

An even more revealing comparison is between the 2020 and 2008 results in Marion County. While Barack Obama performed far better than Joe Biden statewide, in Marion County, the story is different: Obama won the county by around 28.3 points in 2008, but Biden slightly outperformed him in 2020 with a 29-point margin. This difference of less than one point may seem small, especially considering the urban and suburban growth over the past decade, but it indicates that Democrats still had room to expand their support even in a county that Obama had dominated.

This local growth is noteworthy, especially as Indiana shifted nearly 20 points to the right overall between 2008 and 2020. Marion County’s slight leftward movement during this period points to a favorable trend for Democrats, suggesting potential opportunities in suburban areas beyond Indianapolis. To make Indiana more competitive in the future, Democrats will need to fully leverage this suburban shift toward liberalism. This requires strong get-out-the-vote efforts in both urban centers and suburban regions, and even in rural areas, despite their conservative lean, if Democrats hope to make gains in the state.

Strategic Approach to Indiana’s Electoral Landscape

Democrats must approach electoral politics strategically, especially in states like Indiana. In 2022, many Democratic candidates in suburban districts outperformed expectations by positioning themselves as the “normal” candidates amidst a wave of perceived Republican extremism. Rather than adopting conservative policies or attacking prominent Democrats, these candidates made themselves universally approachable and likable, particularly to swing and moderate voters in suburban areas.

Elissa Slotkin is an example of this strategy in action. She successfully defended a district that had voted for Trump by more than five points by emphasizing her relatability and portraying herself as the reasonable choice. This rhetorical positioning allowed her to gain support across the aisle without alienating her core Democratic base.

Traditionally, Democrats in competitive or conservative areas have faced a choice: pivot left to energize their base or shift heavily to the center or right to attract swing voters. However, the success of candidates like Slotkin in 2022 suggests it may be possible to find a middle ground—a strategy that could be game-changing in Indiana. This dual approach could be particularly valuable in Indiana, where Democrats need to consolidate support in urban strongholds like Indianapolis and Gary, while also expanding their reach in suburban and even some rural areas.

To succeed, Democrats must prioritize not only the most charismatic and capable candidates but those who genuinely fit the state’s unique political landscape. Often, success lies in the candidate’s persona rather than their ethnicity, background, or specific policy profile. This does come with limitations, of course. For example, nominating highly progressive figures like AOC or Ilhan Omar in a conservative state like Indiana might not be ideal. However, a progressive yet pragmatic candidate could balance the need to mobilize the Democratic base while making a persuasive case to more conservative-leaning voters.

Ultimately, Democrats’ success in Indiana lies more in the personal appeal and effectiveness of their candidates than in predetermined factors like race or ideological purity.

But Alaska isn't just defined by its location.

Politically, what's interesting about the Last Frontier is that while it fits the standard current prevailing archetype of a small, rural Trump-loving state, it's actually much more idiosyncratic.

The Political Status Quo

In the 2020 election, Alaska supported Trump by a 10-point margin — a number that might seem sizable but is relatively modest compared to many other states, especially compared to its similarly-sized counterparts in the Mountain West.

Take the Dakotas, for instance. Both states have around the same number of residents — between 500,000 and 100,000 — and similar population demographics: largely white, but with a significant Native American tribal presence. However, compared to Alaska, the Dakotas are far more conservative: in 2020, South Dakota and North Dakota supported Trump by 35.1% and 33.4% margins, respectively. In other words, Alaska voted nearly 25 points to the left of the Dakotas. To put this into perspective, New York voted 25 points to the left of North Carolina in the election.

Interestingly, Alaska has only voted for a Democrat once since joining the Union in 1960: the 1964 election, when Alaskans backed Lyndon B. Johnson in his landslide national victory in every state outside of the Deep South. Since then, however, Alaska has consistently voted Republican in presidential elections, though it has occasionally shown signs of Democratic traction over the past few decades — and this trend has only accelerated in the 21st century.

Breaking Down the Results, Geographically

Looking at an electoral map of Alaska from the 2020 election, you’ll see an interesting pattern: most of the state’s boroughs (equivalent to counties in most other states) appear blue. This contrasts sharply with states like Wisconsin, where small, densely populated urban blue pockets were sufficient to win Biden the state amid large red rural areas. In fact, this trend is reflected across nearly every other state in the nation: in 2020, Donald Trump won 2497 counties to Biden’s 477.

In Alaska, by contrast, the Democratic base of support is spread across rural areas, giving the state an unusual rural Democratic presence.

However, this comes with a tradeoff: just like Republican support among rural Wisconsinites failed to overcome bastions of Democratic voters in Milwaukee, Madison, and the latter’s suburbs, the coalition of Democrats across rural Alaska — namely native Alaskan tribes — has proven insufficient in overcoming Republican margins in urban and suburban areas, as well as non-native rural areas.

Alaska’s Journey from Solid Red to Magenta

Before the 21st century, and through the early 2000's, Alaska was undoubtedly a solidly Republican state. Between 1972 and 2004, the state supported Republicans by 20 to 30%, on average. During this time, no Democrat managed to win more than 40% of the state’s voters.

During these four decades, Alaska actually was politically indistinguishable from the Mountain West states.

By 2008, all hope seemed lost for Alaskan Democrats. Despite carrying 365 electoral votes, winning the national popular vote by 7.2%, and tightening the margins in Mountain West states like Montana (R+2.4) and South Dakota (R+8.4), Barack Obama lost Alaska by an enormous 21.5%.1

Yet, since that election, Republicans’ grip on Alaskan politics has loosened just a bit. In 2012, Republicans won a noticeably smaller 18% victory in Alaska — despite the nationwide popular vote shifting nearly 4 points to the right. In 2016, Trump’s performance slipped further compared to Romney’s and McCain’s, winning by 14.7%. His relatively-poor showing was likely caused by weakness among moderate white voters — a significant force in areas like Anchorage and its surrounding suburbs — and his opponent Hillary Clinton’s strong enthusiasm and support from Native voters.

By 2020, Democrats hit a high watermark in Alaska, as Joe Biden continued the state’s leftward trend by building on Hillary Clinton’s gains. Biden lost the state by 10% and won 44.77% of Alaskans — a level of support Democrats had not attained since 1964, when they last won the state.

Alaska’s Demographic DNA

One reason — arguably the main one — that Alaska is not as predictably Republican as other rural states lies in its demographic makeup. Native Alaskans represent 15.7% of the state’s electorate. In line with most Native American tribes across the United States — take the Navajo Nation in Arizona and the Pueblo Tribe in New Mexico, for instance — Native Alaskans lean strongly Democratic. The Inupiat People of the North Slope Borough, the Yup’ik People of the Bethel Census Area, and the Haida Peoples of Southeast Alaska all supported Biden by decisive margins in 2020

While their 15% portion of the total population — equivalent to roughly 1/7th — might seem small, they aren’t the only non-white groups in Alaska. 6.7% of Alaskans identify as Asian, 3.7% as Black, 1.7% as Pacific Islander, 5.3% as at-least partially Hispanic, 8.2% as multiracial, and 1.7% as an other non-white race. Added up, these groups comprise over 40% of the Alaskan population, one of the largest minority populations of any state (as a percent of the total populace). While there are still many white, rural Republican voters in Alaska, they make up a smaller proportion of the electorate compared to other rural areas in the U.S.

Alaska also has one of the younger populations in the nation, with a large proportion of youth voters who tend to reside in urban areas like Anchorage, the state’s largest city and home to the aptly-named University of Alaska, Anchorage; Fairbanks, where U-Alaska Fairbanks is located; and Juneau, the state capitol.

Young voters between the ages of 18 and 29 tend to support Democrats by wide margins in national elections, and there’s no reason to doubt that Alaskan youngsters follow this trend. Assuming up-and-coming generations of voters continue this leftward ideological shift, the future bodes well for Democrats.

However, let’s not forget about a crucial summary data: geography. Looking at the 2020 New York Times exit polls, Alaska’s geographic ideological composition is — to no one’s surprise — extremely unique. Normally, Democrats rely heavily on urban support to counterbalance large swaths of conservative rural voters, but in Alaska, they won these areas narrowly by 51%-47%. Considering the historically-Republican leanings of Anchorage — Joe Biden’s 2020 victory in the city was a first for Democrats since 1964 — these numbers shouldn’t come off as a surprise.

Nationally, suburban voters have undergone a notable leftward shift during the Trump Era, but in Alaska, this trend seems all but nonexistant: in 2020, Trump won these voters by 25%.

Finally, onto the rural areas. The New York Times’ exit polls break down rurals into two categories: rural and small-town. In Alaska, this has yielded interesting results: while Trump won rural voters 61%-37%, he actually lost small-town voters 46%-50%. This discrepancy was rarely seen among most other states, and it’s unclear why the difference is so pronounced in Alaska.

Perhaps students in college towns classified their residences small-town? Maybe Native Alaskans used this term to describe themselves and the areas in which they reside?

Whatever the case, Alaska’s rural (both ‘rural’ and ‘small-town’) population, which accounts for nearly half of its entire vote, is not monolithic — which as an important component to Democrats’ ability to stay afloat and even build support in the Last Frontier.

Federal Subsidies and Government Support

Another interesting aspect of Alaska’s politics is its reliance on federal subsidies. Due to its extremely remote location, harsh climate, and sparse population (it’s the least-densely populated state in the nation!), Alaska receives heavy federal investment in the form of public services grants for its limited road network and vast forested areas, federal programs such as Medicaid and the Indian Health Service, and energy-friendly policies and subsidies supporting Alaska’s heavily oil- and natural resource-dependent economy. Oil-drilling policy is one the prime legislative items on Alaskans’ agenda, with the state’s split congressional delegation uniformly supporting these policies. As proof: Democratic Rep. Mary Peltola co-sponsored the Alaska’s Right to Produce Act of 2023, which reversed the Biden administration's restrictions on oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska.

While Alaskans generally support smaller government, they do recognize the benefits of federal support in their everyday lives, opening the door to greater receptivity to Democratic policies that emphasize government involvement.

But while Alaska’s need-based relationship with federal funds puts it at odds with traditional Republican ideals of limited government, Trump’s populist approach — along with Democrats’ embrace of renewable, climate-friendly energy production — has blurred the lines around this ideological tension in recent years. That being said, voters tend to favor Democrats when it comes to healthcare policy. Republican leaders — including Trump himself, with his failed American Health Care Act — have sought to cut down or outright repeal Medicaid and Medicare in favor of private healthcare.

All in all, it’s difficult to say whether the federal issue significantly benefits Democrats any more than it does Republicans, given that both parties support various facets of federal support for the state. However, it certainly differentiates Alaska from the more explicitly anti-big-government, liberation-leaning states of the Mountain West.

Alaska’s Ideological Secularism and Political Modernism

In addition, Alaska is a relatively secular state compared to other rural states, such as those in the South and the Mountain West, where religious conservatism often drives social policy. Alaskans, by contrast, are more likely to be nonreligious, which translates into greater social liberalism on issues such as abortion. A majority of Alaskans are pro-choice, whereas in other rural states, Republican voters are more uniformly anti-choice. This secularism may make Alaskans friendlier to many Democratic agendas in the state.

Trump-Era Extremism and Alaska’s Response

The Trump era has underscored Alaska’s relative ideological modernism. Across the U.S., Trump-backed candidates have often succeeded in Republican primaries, only to face challenges in general elections due to their extreme policies. This trend is visible in Alaska as well, where voters have shown resistance to extreme Republican candidates.

An obvious example would be in August 2022, when former Governor Sarah Palin, who had been as conservative as Trump both in rhetoric and policy, lost the House election against Democrat Mary Peltola. This was an astonishing victory for Democrats, not only because the state hadn't been expected to go Democratic, but because Alaska only has one House seat, making this essentially a statewide victory. Peltola’s win signaled Alaskans’ preference for moderation over extreme partisanship.

In another telling example, in another example, Senator Lisa Murkowski, a moderate Republican who angered much of the GOP base by voting to impeach Trump in 2021 and for generally being pro-choice, won re-election despite facing Trump-endorsed challenger Kelly Tshibaka. Polls showed Tshibaka as a strong contender, yet she lost by over five points. This outcome underscores Alaska’s resistance to extreme partisanship, with voters favoring Murkowski’s moderate approach over Tshibaka’s far-right alignment.

Down-Ballot Trends in Alaska: 2014 and 2018

Alaska’s electoral history beyond presidential races further highlights its complex political identity. While still the minority party in the state, Democrats have actually won some victories: Not only was there the recent House election in 2022 where Peltola won, but in 2014, during a Republican-leaning election year, independent Bill Walker won the governorship with Democratic support. Walker did support a fair amount of Republican policy positions, like being pro-gun, but he accepted Democrats’ backing - and his win demonstrates Alaska’s openness to candidates who don’t fully align with traditional party lines.

In that same year of 2014, which, by the way, was a very Republican-leaning year, the general ballot was around Republican plus one or plus two. Compared to two years prior in 2012, when Obama won the general election by nearly four points, Democratic incumbent Mark Begich in the Senate, who had been elected in 2008 against Republican incumbent Ted Stevens (who was a seven-term senator indicted for a felony in a corruption scandal), was running for re-election.

Just looking at the state's baseline in 2014, you would assume that Mark Begich was a sitting duck, but he faced a respectable Republican challenger in Dan Sullivan, who had been a fairly long-time veteran politician in the state. Begich only lost the general election by around 1.5 percentage points, representing a huge over-performance compared to Obama.

Multiple factors can be attributed to Begich's good performance. Outside of Alaska itself, you could say that Alaska was more isolated from the national environment. Alaskans had voted for Bill Walker in the same year, and seeing how it's geographically located very remote from the rest of the country, it could have also experienced that same remoteness in its political environment that year. Also of note is that Mark Begich comes from arguably the most prominent political family in the state, most of whom were Democrats who had served as mayors of Anchorage or in the state legislature. His name definitely helped him in a state where there are so few politicians simply because there are so few people to begin with.

Going forward to 2018, it was generally a slightly less positive year for Democrats in the state. Bill Walker ran for re-election but lost by a wide margin, partly because independents face unique challenges in maintaining support even when they are incumbents. In the same election, former Senator Mark Begich ran for governor but lost by over seven points — even in a very Democrat-leaning year, where Democrats had won the total House vote by nearly 10 points. Of course, you could say that Bill Walker's candidacy had interfered with Begich's percentage, but still, the fact that he couldn't even come close to winning against the Republican underscored the challenges Democrats still face in the state.

The Introduction of Ranked-Choice Voting in Alaska

Another factor impacting Alaska voting dynamics is that, as of 2021, via referendum, voters in the state chose to make their state voting system ranked-choice, the only state besides Maine to do so.

In ranked-choice voting, all candidates are on the ballot, and there's just one round of voting. Voters rank multiple candidates by preference. When votes are counted, the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes is eliminated, and this continues until one candidate wins with a majority.

This system has tended to benefit Democrats and moderate Republicans in Alaska. For instance, in the 2022 election, Mary Peltola won despite initially trailing two Republican opponents. Because more voters ranked Peltola as their second choice ahead of Palin, she ultimately prevailed over her. Ranked-choice voting helped Lisa Murkowski as well, whose second-choice votes from minor candidates boosted her over Kelly Tshibaka.

While ranked-choice voting has created an advantage for moderate candidates, it also highlights a challenge for Democrats, as Alaskans tend to prefer moderate Republicans over more extreme candidates - regardless of party affiliation. Alaska’s congressional delegation, including Senators Lisa Murkowski and Dan Sullivan, reflects this preference for moderate conservatism. Murkowski and Sullivan are among the more moderate, mainline conservatives in the Senate Republican caucus. Neither of them voted to object to the results in Arizona or Georgia in 2020, and Murkowski actually voted to impeach Trump. Both have shown a relatively cooperative stance with the Biden administration on select issues, in contrast to more hardline Republicans elsewhere,

At the state level, Governor Mike Dunleavy, while conservative, is arguably less so than governors in states like South Dakota or Mississippi. His moderation has helped solidify his popularity among Alaskans.

The state GOP's commitment to moderatism and maintaining a disciplined approach to policy has really gone a long way in firming up the state for Republicans, even as the partisan gap narrows. This is reflected in the state’s legislative leaders, who are all moderate conservatives who tend to keep a low profile nationally and instead devote more energy to state issues. They have a very strong and cohesive institution compared to Republican parties in states like Michigan, which have completely devolved into clown shows.

In summary, Alaska’s political dynamics reflect a distinctive blend of conservatism and openness to moderation, shaped by its demographics, reliance on federal support, secularism, and recent adoption of ranked-choice voting. These factors make Alaska a unique political environment, one where both Republicans and Democrats face opportunities and challenges that are unlikely to fade in the coming years.

To continue this deep-dive, read Alaska, Part 2: Beyond Red and Blue.

From Barack Obama’s 15 point victory in 2012, Washington has only leaned further left, culminating in Joe Biden’s decisive 19-point victory in 2020— at a time when traditionally blue states like California and New York shifted rightward - in the opposite direction.

This raises two key questions:

First, has Washington always shown such a strong Democratic lean?

Second, what specific dynamics are driving Washington’s continued shift to the left, especially as other blue states move in the opposite direction?

Washington’s Political Backstory

For much of its history, Washington was not solidly Democratic at all. In fact, from its admission to the Union until the 1992 presidential election, Washington was a hotly contested swing state —and arguably even leaned Republican. From 1952 to 1984, only two out of nine Democratic presidential candidates won in Washington, with Ronald Reagan carrying the state decisively at 55.8% in 1984.

But a turning point came in 1988, when Democrat Michael Dukakis, despite losing nationally by 7.8%, carried Washington by a narrow 1.6%. This meant the Evergreen State voted nearly 10 points to the left of the nation that year.

That election marked Washington’s shift from swing state to a reliably Democrat one. Since then, Washington has consistently voted Democratic at the presidential level - has never voted Republican on the presidential level - and this trend shows no signs of reversing

Moments of Republican Resurgence

Still, Democrats have faced setbacks in the state over the years. In 1994, during the “Republican Revolution” in Bill Clinton’s first midterm, Republicans flipped a whopping six House seats in Washington, shifting the balance from an 8-1 Democratic majority to a 7-2 Republican one, even ousting incumbent Speaker Tom Foley. Republicans also won the Senate race that year by an 11.5% margin. And in 2004, Democrat Christine Gregoire won the governor's race by a razor-thin margin of 129 votes—the closest in U.S. history.

Still, there have been times since when Democrats faltered in the state. For example, in the 1994 elections (Bill Clinton's first midterm, colloquially known as the Republican Revolution), Republicans flipped a whopping 6 House seats in Washington – shifting the balance from 8-1 Dems to 7-2 Reps and even taking out incumbent Speaker Tom Foley – while simultaneously winning the Senate election by 11.5%.

And in 2004, Democrat Christine Gregoire won the governor’s race by a razor-thin margin of 129 votes — the closest in United States' history.

The Rise of a Deep Blue State: 2000 to 2020

But despite hiccups like these, Washington has grown only bluer over time.

Elections from 2000 to 2020 showcase this shift clearly: In 2000, Al Gore won Washington by 5.6%. In 2004, John Kerry increased that margin to 7.2%, even as the nation as whole leaned more Republican, and voted 3 points more Republican. In 2008, Barack Obama won the state by a commanding 17% amidst his national landslide, and in 2016, Hillary Clinton improved on Obama’s 2012 margin by nearly 2%, despite underperforming him in most other states. By 2020, Joe Biden attained a new high in the state, winning Washington by 19.2%. In 20 years, Washington shifted from voting 5 points to the left of the nation to a remarkable 15.

Down-ballot Trends

Beyond the presidential level, Washington has shown remarkable consistency for Democrats in down-ballot races since the 1994 midterms.

Since 2000, Democrats have continuously held the governorship and both Senate seats for the past 24 years, despite facing competitive elections along the way. Democrats have also maintained a majority of Washington's House seats.

Republican Challenges and the “Dino Rossi Effect”

Although Republicans have occasionally won state-level positions like Secretary of State, Attorney General, and State Treasurer, these offices have generally been less partisan than congressional seats. Notably, Republicans holding these positions—such as Attorney General Rob McKenna and Secretary of State Kim Wyman—tended towards the moderate faction of the party. Wyman’s 2021 resignation to join the Biden administration highlights the brand of moderate Republicanism capable of winning in Washington. In fact, Wyman resigned her position in 2021 to serve as a member of the Biden administration, speaking volumes about the brand of Republicanism capable of winning in Washington: not a very conservative one.

Despite fielding strong candidates, Republicans have struggled to to break within 4 to 5 points of victory in Washington over the past two decades. Dino Rossi, for instance, exemplifies these challenges. He ran multiple strong, close campaigns for governor, Senate, and the House but was unable to secure a victory, even in favorable political climates. In his 2004 gubernatorial race, he narrowly lost by 129 votes, and his 2008 rematch ended with a 6.5-point loss in a deeply Democratic year, while John McCain lost by 17 points in the state.

National vs. Washington Democratic Trends: A Contrast in Down-Ballot Success

Washington’s steady Democratic down-ballot success stands in stark contrast to Democrats’ struggles elsewhere across the nation to match top-of-the-ticket results down-ballot. These struggles have manifested in Senate, House and countless state legislative races across the country.

Nationally, Democrats often face a "ballot drop-off," underperforming in Senate, House, and state legislative races despite strong presidential showings. For instance, in 2020, Democratic Senate candidates in Biden-won states like Maine and Michigan, for example, seriously underperformed the presidential topline. .

In Maine, Biden won by 10 points, and Republican Senator Susan Collins won re-election by a whopping 9 points. In House races, Democrats lost nine districts that Biden had won. This pattern extended into 2022, with Democrat Senate and gubernatorial candidates underperforming in traditionally blue states like New York and California, losing seats that Biden had carried comfortably in 2020 and arguably costing them the House majority.

Washington, however, has bucked this trend. In 2020, as Biden won the state by 19 points, Democratic House candidates won their collective races by over 20 points—a small but significant over-performance that contrasted with the nationwide 1.7% underperformance of Biden’s margin in House races.

So why has Washington remained so reliably Democratic, where other states—from battlegrounds like Michigan to Democratic strongholds like California—have faltered?

Why Republicans Seem to Have a Shot in Washington

On the face of it, Republicans might seem to have a lot going for them in the Evergreen state.

Geographically, Washington sits in the Pacific Northwest, bordered by Idaho and Oregon.

Idaho is one of the most reliably Republican states in the nation, largely due to its high proportion of rural residents, and Oregon —while solidly blue overall—remains largely rural outside of its urban centers, particularly in the eastern half.while being very blue overall, remains a very rural state outside of its urban center, especially in its eastern half. Like its neighbors, Washington boasts vast rural areas, where voters are typically quite conservative.

Demographically, Washington might also appear favorable for Republicans. According to the 2020 Census, approximately 70% of Washington’s population is non-Hispanic white, compared to 61% nationally. This puts Washington demographically in the ballpark of states like Ohio (61.6% non-Hispanic white), Alabama (63%), and Oklahoma (61.6%). Yet, in 2020, Washington voted for Biden by a commanding 19 points, while Trump won Ohio by 8, Alabama by 26, and Oklahoma by 33.

Given these characteristics, one might assume Republicans have a strong shot at closing the gap in Washington. Indeed, Republicans often operate under this belief, frequently investing heavily in at least one statewide race per cycle, thinking they have a real chance. However, despite these efforts, Republicans have consistently fallen short, often by significant margins.

Combined, these factors could suggest to many that Republicans have a strong shot at improving their margins in the state. Indeed, Republicans have very consistently acted in this belief, frequently investing heavily in at least one statewide race per cycle, thinking they have a real chance. But they ultimately don't win, and recently, have been unable to come very close.

A recent example is the 2022 Senate race, where Republican candidate Tiffany Smiley, a former nurse and seemingly ideal moderate, went up against five-term Democratic Senator Patty Murray in a difficult national environment for Democrats given the unpopularity of President Biden. Republicans poured over $20 million into the race, and polls showed Smiley running neck and neck with Murray. However, on election night, the race was called soon after polls closed, with Murray winning by a whopping 14 points.

So, what gives?

Continue reading Washington, Part 2: A Democrat’s Utopia

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In recent years, as parts of the Deep South have shown signs of political transformation, some have wondered if Mississippi—a state with a large Black population and deep-rooted Democratic history—might be on the verge of a similar shift. While Georgia, for example, has seen a leftward trend due to rapid population growth and diversification, Mississippi remains a Republican stronghold, showing little movement in the past two decades.

To understand why Mississippi has resisted these changes, we examine the unique dynamics of the state’s population, voting patterns, and deeply rooted social structures. In this section, we’ll explore the significant obstacles Democrats face in Mississippi and whether a path forward exists in a state where traditional partisan tactics seem to fall flat.

Continued from Mississippi, Part 1: The Southern Question

Mississippi’s Political Stagnation and Future Democratic Challenges

Mississippi’s Stagnant Political Shift: Why It’s Not Another Georgia

Beginning in the late 2000s and throughout the 2010s, Georgia’s political landscape started shifting toward the Democrats. Fueled by rapid population growth centered in Atlanta and its suburbs, Georgia went from a state that voted Republican by more than 15 points in 2000 and 2004 to a state where, in 2008, Obama lost by only 5.2%.

Growth and diversification in the Atlanta suburbs, along with declining Republican support among well-educated suburban whites, continued to erode Georgia’s red tilt through the 2010s. In 2016, Trump won the state — but only by a lackluster 5.1% — and in 2020, Georgia flipped entirely, with Democrats not only taking the presidential vote but also winning both Senate seats in the runoffs.

Mississippi, however, has not followed suit. In 2000, Mississippi supported George W. Bush by a margin of 16.9%. In the following years, Obama lost Mississippi by 13.2% in 2008 and 11.5% in 2012—the closest Democrats have come to winning the state in recent presidential elections. The state shifted only marginally toward Democrats in the 2010s, and by 2020, Biden lost Mississippi by 16.5%, barely improving on Hillary Clinton’s 2016 performance. Overall, while Georgia shifted 11.9 points to the left from 2000 to 2020, Mississippi barely moved, edging just 0.4 points toward Democrats.

The big picture: between 2000 and 2020, Georgia shifted 11.9 points to the left, while Mississippi shifted only 0.4 points towards Democrats. The question is, why?

Population Dynamics: A Lack of Urbanization and Diversity

The divergence between Mississippi and Georgia’s trajectories is largely explained by population dynamics.

Over the past 50 years, Georgia’s population growth has been driven by Atlanta’s expansion as a hub of industry, finance, and affordable housing, nearly doubling the state’s population from 5.4 million in 1980 to 10.9 million today. Atlanta’s surrounding suburban counties saw a major influx of highly educated, higher-income voters, contributing to Georgia’s leftward shift. By 2020, the Atlanta metropolitan area’s population reached six million, nearly quadruple its 1980 population of 1.6 million residents.

Mississippi, on the other hand, saw its population grow by only about 25% over the same period, from 2.5 million to 2.9 million residents, with almost no growth attributable to suburban or urban areas..1.Jackson, the state’s largest city — actually shrank by 26.2% since 19802, and its surrounding suburbs have remained stagnant. Mississippi’s population is also aging; by 2030, over 25% of the state will be 60 or older. Without the urban growth or younger, diverse populations seen in Georgia, Mississippi lacks the drivers for a major political shift.

Suburban voters, a group that has trended leftward in other states, simply don’t comprise a significant portion of Mississippi’s electorate. In 2020, only 23% of Mississippi voters came from suburban areas, compared to 62% in Georgia, 49% in South Carolina, and 56% in Alabama. This leaves Mississippi’s electorate dominated by rural, Evangelical white voters and a similarly religious but predominantly Democratic Black population.

And across the board, Mississippi is losing population as a whole. In fact, it was one of two states in the last 10 years to lose population, along with Michigan.

So, without significant urban centers or suburbs, without any substantial population growth driving diversity or an influx of moderate voters, and with the current population only growing older, Mississippi lacks the leftward drivers that could indicate a Democratic resurgence in the state. Given these circumstances, the question we’re left with: is there any path forward for Democrats?

The Democratic Challenge: Balancing White Conservatives and Black Voter Turnout

Mississippi’s recent down-ballot elections underscore Democrats’ biggest challenge: courting conservative white voters while energizing the state’s Black voter turnout.

Only 15 years ago, Mississippi Democrats were able to win down-ballot elections by taking conservative positions and riding off residual support from white voters.

Ronnie Musgrove, the last Democrat to win the state’s governorship in 1999, fits this archetype. In his 1999 gubernatorial victory, he won large swaths of rural, conservative counties in the northeast corner of the state by adopting conservative stances similar to his Republican opponent, Michael Parker — and instituted bans on same-sex adoption and measures like requiring “In God We Trust” in public schools.

Another example is Gene Taylor, one of the most conservative Democrats in House history, who represented MS-04 for over 20 years and was successfully reelected 10 times. Taylor’s conservative, Yellow-Dog appeal won over over the staunchly Republican southeastern Mississippi voters, who hadn’t supported Democrats in presidential races for decades. In 2008, even as John McCain won 66% of the vote in MS-04, Taylor was re-elected with over three-quarters of the vote - demonstrating his cross-partisan appeal.

By 2010, however, this strategy had fallen apart. Musgrove lost his re-election in 2003, and even Taylor was swept under partisan tides, and was unseated by a narrow 5.3% margin by Steven Palazzo in 2010.

Ultimately, even the most successful Democrats in Mississippi chose to switch to the Republican Party to avoid fading into total political irrelevance. Conservative Democrats like Taylor, realizing there was no political future in the present party, switched their party affiliation to Republican. Among these party-switchers is current Republican Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith, who began her career in state politics as a Democrat before joining the Republican Party in 2010.

A pure Democrat-in-name-only could no longer win in Mississippi; but what about a conservative Democrat who encoded some core progressive policies in their platform?

Similarly, Jim Hood’s 2019 gubernatorial campaign attempted to bridge Mississippi’s divides. A conservative Democrat who served as state attorney general for 16 years, Hood appealed to both white and Black voters by incorporating progressive policies, such as Medicaid expansion, tuition-free higher education, and universal preschool. alongside conservative stances on issues like gun rights. Hood garnered impressive support among white voters, particularly in Republican districts, but ultimately, he struggled to turn out Black voters in the numbers necessary for victory. In heavily Black MS-02, Hood outperformed Clinton by six points but was unable to overcome the entrenched partisan alignment across the rest of the state.

Hood captured impressive support amongst white voters (overperforming Hillary Clinton in the heavily white and heavily Republican districts of MS-01, MS-03, and MS-04 by 14%, 15%, and 13%, respectively). Hood even showed strength among the state’s Black voters (overperforming Clinton in the heavily Black district of MS-02 by 6%). But for all of his campaign’s strength, without stronger support among Mississippi’s Black voters (which he was unable to turnout in the aggregate, at rates even close to presidential elections like in 2016 or 2020), Hood was unable to secure victory.

On the flip side, former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in the Clinton administration Mike Espy found unprecedented support with Black voters but was unable to win substantial white support. Espy ran a strong, energetic Senate campaign, highlighting his fiscal conservatism (supporting the Trump tax cuts and positioning himself as pro-business) and his opposition towards gun control and abortion, all while steadfastly advocating for a progressive agenda including medicaid expansion. He aimed to supercharge Black turnout — a recurring challenge in midterm elections — and he did so, winning MS-02 by a whopping 36% compared to Hillary Clinton’s 29% victory in the district two years earlier. While Espy’s 6.3% loss was the best showing for a Democratic Senate candidate in Mississippi in the 21st century (astonishing, considering no other Democratic nominee came within 10 points of victory), he still proved unable to gain the crucial white support necessary for outright victory.

Granted, 2018 was an extremely pro-Democratic year, with Democrats winning the national House popular vote by nearly 10%. Espy’s Republican opponent Cindy Hyde-Smith was incredibly weak, having been engulfed in several controversies which included expressing support for a public hanging and being pictured at the home of Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederacy.

But while Hood and Espy reveal possible important opportunities for Democrats in the state and showcase possible coalitions for a competitive race, neither was able to consolidate crucial support across both demographics.

Brandon Presley’s Campaign: A New Model for Mississippi Democrats?

In the 2023 gubernatorial election, conservative Democrat Brandon Presley came within 3.2% of victory, building on lessons from Hood’s campaign but taking a distinctly populist approach. Beneath the already-impressive topline, Presley won 96% of Black voters in the state,(overperforming Joe Biden despite running in an off-year election under an unpopular Democratic president). Presley did this while also successfully consolidating support among white voters, overperforming Joe Biden by 10%, flipping 5 majority-white counties from 2020, and swinging many heavily-Republican counties in the northeastern region (where he originates) towards the left.

So how did Presley — who lacked Hood’s 16-year pedigree and Espy’s appeal to Black voters — manage to outperform both candidates?

Unlike Hood or Mike Espy, who ran campaigns centered around specific policy issues, Presley reframed the race as a battle between insiders and outsiders. While like Hood, Presley often stressed his conservative bona fides, positioning himself to the right of the national party on issues like abortion and gun control, made the race less about partisan labels and more about corruption vs. integrity and the powerful vs. the powerless. As Presley summed up his campaign: “It’s not even Democrat versus Republican. It’s those of us on the outside versus those of them on the inside.”

Presley, a self-styled populist, emphasized his modest roots — recounting his struggles in his upbringing, living without electricity and running water, from his very first campaign ad. Presley highlighted his efforts to improve rural infrastructure as Public Service Commissioner — expanding internet and broadband access, fiercely regulating power companies, and opposing rate hikes.

Presley cast incumbent Gov. Tate Reeves as emblematic of a corrupt political elite, focusing on a recent welfare scandal and advocating for policies like Medicaid expansion and grocery tax cuts. By centering his campaign on anti-corruption and working-class values, Presley connected with a broader base, winning 96% of Black voters and outperforming Biden by 10% among white voters, flipping five majority-white counties.

Presley’s relative success suggests that an anti-corruption, populist message could provide Mississippi Democrats with a path forward. Like Hood, Presley balanced conservative stances with progressive policies, but by emphasizing populist values over strict partisanship, he demonstrated how Democrats could broaden their appeal.

Mississippi’s Structural Barriers to Democratic Gains

Despite Presley’s impressive performance, Mississippi’s structural barriers to Democratic gains remain significant.

Presley’s success was aided by the vulnerabilities of his opponent, Tate Reeves, who faced a series of corruption scandals, backlash for reneging on a promise to repeal an unpopular grocery tax, and widespread criticism over the Jackson water crisis—an issue exacerbated by his opposition to funding critical water system repairs. With these controversies, Reeves practically handed Presley a clear angle to frame his campaign around “change,” positioning himself as a reformist alternative to the established political elite

However, there are a couple of important caveats. The first is that this was a gubernatorial election, where state-level issues and candidate-specific weaknesses often play a larger role than in federal races. Much of Presley’s campaign focused on Reeves’s gubernatorial record, a factor that would be difficult to leverage in a Senate, House, or Presidential race where the stakes are higher and partisan lines are more deeply entrenched. In these federal races, an anti-establishment, populist message may not resonate as strongly or may get drowned out by broader national dynamics.

The second caveat is that Reeves was an exceptionally weak candidate. His record and the specific controversies surrounding his administration allowed Presley to center his campaign on integrity and anti-corruption rather than simply Democrat versus Republican. This strategy proved effective in a state election, but it would be challenging to replicate in a federal race, where partisan divisions are more rigid and the focus is less on individual candidates’ state records.

Ultimately, while Presley’s approach shows potential for Democrats in Mississippi, replicating this success in other contexts may prove difficult. Additionally, Mississippi’s stagnant population growth and predominantly rural, aging electorate continue to limit the likelihood of a significant leftward shift, reinforcing the broader structural barriers facing Democrats in the state.

The Road Ahead: Can Democrats Build a Winning Coalition?

Which brings us back to the bigger question: can Democrats become competitive in Mississippi?

The path forward is far from certain.

Mississippi’s current demographics heavily favor Republicans, and with the state’s population in decline, these dynamics aren’t likely to improve for Democrats.

Hood and Espy’s campaigns highlight the seemingly impossible “can’t have your cake and eat it” challenge Democrats face: appealing to the state’s predominantly Republican voters (who comprise 60% of the electorate) risks alienating their core coalition. Candidates like Hood flaunted conservative positions on gun rights, criminal justice, and abortion in an effort to broaden their appeal. However, while many Black Mississippians lean conservative on issues like abortion due to religious beliefs, this does not make them uniformly conservative; they tend to support left-leaning policies on issues like climate change and criminal justice, in line with Democrats across the rest of the nation. This creates challenges in crafting a message that resonates across Mississippi’s diverse partisan spectrum.

Still, Democrats may have ways forward in the state.

Presley, Hood, and Espy each demonstrated viable approaches for future statewide campaigns. Even Gene Taylor—likely the last Democrat to win MS-04 in recent history—offers useful insights for Democrats. While conservative, his success stemmed more from his populist stances, which could resonate in a predominantly blue-collar state like Mississippi, where many residents rely on government programs like Medicare and Social Security. In Congress, Taylor successfully cultivated a populist record, consistently voting against Bush-era tax cuts, free-trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT, and supporting campaign finance reforms — positions that set him apart from the political mainstream.Although heavily gerrymandered, the state house and state senate still offer potential openings for Democrats.

Longstanding issues of corruption and poor Republican governance governance in Mississippi present further opportunities. Former Governor Phil Bryant’s involvement in a recent welfare scandal underscores a recurring pattern of Republican mismanagement. By spotlighting these issues, Democrats can potentially make races less about partisanship and more about integrity, effectiveness, and change. While this strategy may have more limited impact in federal races, where national partisanship is deeply ingrained, it could still make a difference in state-level contests.

At the federal level, however, the prospects are far more limited. Outside of MS-02, which Democrats already hold, none of Mississippi’s congressional districts are closely contested enough to justify significant Democratic investment. The state’s Senate seats are held by capable — if not generationally talented — Republican incumbents; in 2020, Cindy Hyde-Smith, outspent 10-to-1 by Mike Espy, still won by a 10-point margin. Mississippi’s runoff system also complicates Senate bids for Democrats. Even if a Democrat wins a plurality, they would face a later runoff election, where lower turnout has historically favored Republicans.

None of the state’s house seats besides MS-02, which Democrats already represent, are closely divided enough to be worth a substantial amount of funding or effort.

Both of the state’s senate seats are held by capable — if not generationally talented — Republicans. In 2020, Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith was outspent 10-1 by Mike Espy and still won by 10%. Mississippi’s run-off system makes outright winning a senate seat even more difficult: even if a Democrat managed to win a plurality of the vote, they would be forced to win another, later election with substantially lower voter turnout.

For now, Republicans have little reason for concern in Mississippi—— with the possible exception of the 2027 gubernatorial race. Perhaps by adopting Presley’s populist, anti-corruption playbook, Democrats can begin to make Mississippi a competitive state.

At baseline, Oklahoma is one of the top five most Republican states in the nation, and has been for much of the 21st century. It voted overwhelmingly for Trump by over two-thirds of the vote in the last election, and many view the state as one of the reddest in the nation. 

But what's interesting about Oklahoma is that looking at its demographics, it's kind of a mix between the American South and Great Plains states. 

It shares characteristics of the South in much of its Southeastern corner of the state, where a lot of its residents are rural white voters who are religiously devout, and extremely socially conservative. 

And, in much of its Western half of the state, it shares a lot of characteristics with the Great Plains states, also overwhelmingly rural, but dominated by a more libertarian breed of voter, many of whom are relatively less socially conservative, but still tend to back Republicans driven by their dislike of Democrats' urban-based policies, and due to ancestral ties with the party. 

Oklahoma Recent Political History / Conservative Dominance

Oklahoma hasn’t voted Democrat in a presidential election since 1964, so for ~60 years. Other Southern states like Alabama and Mississippi that are also Republican strongholds still voted for Democratic presidents into the 1970’s and voted for Democratic senators and governors into the 2000’s.

Oklahoma's shift towards the GOP in the late 20th century was much quicker and also more universal than many other states in the South. Republicans have held both Oklahoma Senate seats for the past 30 years and no Democrat represents any of the state’s five U.S. House districts. By 2023, the number of Oklahomans registered to vote as Democrats dropped to a little more than 650,000 (out of ~2.2 million total registered voters in the state1) - half the number from just 20 years prior. 

In contrast, in states like Arkansas or Georgia, Democrats held Senate seats and governors’ offices well into the 21st century, and Democratic state parties were able to sustain themselves and retain some degree of political relevance throughout the late 20th century and even into the early 21st.

But by the 1990s, Democrats in Oklahoma were pretty much completely wiped out as a political force.

Oklahoma Demographic Context

And a lot of these disparities can be explained by the fact that Oklahoma is demographically very different than many Southern states - and actually shares a lot of DNA with the rest of the Great Plains.

Rural and White Oklahoma

Oklahoma’s rural areas are massive. The entire western half of the state, from the Panhandle towards the areas just west of Oklahoma City, is comprised of many very sparsely populated rural counties that add up to a substantial portion of the electorate - around 37% as of 2022.

And since the 2000 election, Democrats have not won a single county in the state of Oklahoma, even in very sparsely populated rural counties.

Now, if you just look at modern election results in other rural, Southern states like Mississippi, Alabama, or Louisiana, what you'll see is that, while their county-level maps are covered in a sea of red, there are spots of dark blue. These spots of blue are often counties that have significant populations of Black voters, who tend to vote for Democrats by extremely large margins. Look at Mississippi, for example, and you'll see that many of the counties along the western edge of the state, along the Mississippi Delta, are heavily blue, sometimes supporting Democrats by upwards of 80 points.

But this same Black presence simply does not exist in Oklahoma. On a state-wide basis, Oklahoma’s Black population stood at ~7% in 20222. In rural Oklahoma, only ~3.5% of the state’s rural population is Black — a significantly smaller proportion than in other Southern states like Alabama, where 21% of the rural population is Black, Mississippi (39%), or Georgia (25.8%), and South Carolina (36.4%). There is simply no rural enclave with a significant proportion of Black voters that exists in Oklahoma to any extent, which really puts Democrats in an challenging position in the state, even more so than they are in states like Mississippi.

And this overwhelming white-ness is a great starting point for looking at how Oklahoma differs from other Southern states, and its’ shared characteristics with the Mountain West.

In Oklahoma, white, non-Hispanic Americans made up around 78% of the electorate in 2020, similar to states like Indiana (76.74% white), Iowa (84.27% white), Kansas ( Ohio (77.85% white). Nebraska (76.15% white) in 2022.

In contrast, the proportion of white, non-Hispanic Americans in other Southern states is much lower overall, like Mississippi (56.96% white), Alabama (63.62% white), or Louisiana (56% white).

White & Evangelical Oklahoma

Taking a closer look at the complexion of Oklahoma’s white electorate, religion adds a further twist:

Oklahoma ranks among the highest evangelical Christian populations in the nation. In 2022, over 44% of adult Oklahomans identify as evangelical according to Pew Research, compared to 14% of Americans who identify as evangelical nationally3.

While there is some diversity in this group — nationally, evangelicals tend to be overwhelmingly white with only 6% of Black Christians identifying as evangelical. And in Oklahoma, only 3% of Black Christians identify as evangelical as of 20144.

Overall, Oklahoma’s evangelical share is much more closely aligned to Southern states like Kentucky (49% evangelical), Tennessee (52%) and Alabama (49%) than it is in Mountain West or Great Plains states like Kansas (31%), Montana (28%) and Nebraska (25%).

This somewhat unique combination of white-dominance, rural, and significant evangelical presence is what gives Oklahoma it’s unique character.

And this mix - it’s reflected in electoral outcomes in the state.

Electoral Outcomes

Let’s look closer at Oklahoma’s white vote.

In 2020, you'll notice that Oklahomans indeed voted very conservatively, much more so than the national average. Oklahomans voted in 2020 for Trump by around a 43-point margin, 71 to 28 - a substantially wider margin than the nationwide average, where white voters split 57 to 43.

But this delta is noticeably narrower than in many other Southern states like Mississippi or Alabama, where in 2020 many of the white voters in the states gave Trump as much as 82% of its total vote.

Now, the difference between 70 and 80% points may seem small, but it is very significant.

What we are seeing in Oklahoma electoral outcomes is in part how a mix of these two types of white voters is coming into play. Oklahoma's white population, being a mix of this rural Great Plains, Mountain West population whose voters are very ideologically conservative - but not quite as extreme as evangelicals, and Southern evangelical white ultra-conservative population, mostly located in the eastern half of the state, helps showcase how Oklahoma does vote like a mix of the two regions of the United States.

Oklahoma’s Native American Voter Base

Oklahoma’s Native American population also shapes the unique political character of the state. Oklahoma’s Native American voters represent nearly 10% percent of population - among the highest in the entire nation.

But while Native American across the nation tend to vote Democratic, in Oklahoma, they’re overwhelmingly Republican.

Nationally, around 68% of American Indian and Alaska Native voters supported the Democratic nominee Joe Biden - with some precincts delivering over 97% of their votes to Biden in 20205.

In contrast, Native Americans in Oklahoma are among the most conservative voters in the state. Just to illustrate how idiosyncratic Native voters in Oklahoma are compared to Native American voters nationally, in 2020 Donald Trump won the two counties encompassing the Cherokee Nation (one of the largest Native tribes in Oklahoma), by massive margins. Trump won Adair County, one of the two, by an extremely large 60 percentage points, capturing nearly 80% of the county's total vote. In Cherokee County (which shares the name with the tribe), he won 63% of its total vote, defeating Joe Biden by around 29 percentage points. In addition, Trump won the counties encompassed by the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Muscogee, Seminole, Osage, and Pawnee reservations by overwhelming margins.

On the surface, the sizable Native American population in Oklahoma might seem to present an opportunity for future Democratic gains in the state. But the truth is: it’s more complicated than that.

Many Native Americans in Oklahoma have been Republican for generations. Republicans have made concerted and long-term efforts to develop strong Native American ties through highly collaborative cultural, economic and social integration policies. And the success of these initiatives is reflected in the strong solidified support of the state's Native American communities of the GOP.

Oklahoma Outlook

This all raises the question of whether there's a future for Democrats in Oklahoma.

While any prediction is speculative at best, there could be a glimmer of hope of Democrats at least improving their position in the state. This would not only involve courting Native American voters, but really squeezing any margin they can out of their base in cities like Tulsa and Oklahoma City and squeezing any margin they can out of the state’s relatively small proportion of Hispanic and Black voters which comprise ~10% of the voter base in the state.

Urban and Suburban Oklahoma

Oklahoma doesn’t have very many urban metropolises. It has Tulsa and Oklahoma City, but those cities are among the most conservative cities in the nation, often supporting Republican candidates for municipal, state and even federal seats. Oklahoma City voted in Republican David Holt for mayor in 2022 and in 2020, Donald Trump won Oklahoma County, where Oklahoma City resides, albeit by just 1.1 percentage points.

Moreover, most of Oklahoma's suburbs are overwhelmingly Republican. Looking at the 2020 county data, knowing Oklahoma County has a population of around 800,000 and encompasses all of Oklahoma City, which has a population of 680,000, you can reasonably infer that Joe Biden won Oklahoma City proper by a small, maybe single-digit margin, while losing the surrounding suburbs to Donald Trump, resulting in a Trump victory in the county as a whole.

But these municipalities may be the crux to Democrats’ future in the state.

As of 2023, 41% of all Democrats lived in either Oklahoma or Tulsa counties, home to the state’s two largest cities, compared to 2000, when only 25% (or one out of every four) of registered Democrats lived in either of these counties according to voter registration data6.

And while Oklahoma as a whole is one of the slowest growing states in the nation, with a 1% growth overall — Oklahoma City saw a 17.4% increase in population from 2010 to 20207, and it was one of only 14 cities that gained more than 100,000 residents in that time period.8 Since 2010, the Oklahoma City and Tulsa metros accounted for nearly 70% of net population gains for the entire state. Without those two metros, the rest of the state experienced a net population loss of 43,0009 and many counties concentrated in the Western rural portion of the state lost population in the same time period.

So how is this urban growth playing out down-ballot in the state?

Democrat Kendra Horn's surprise 2018 victory in Oklahoma's 5th District, was emblematic of a potential leftward shift in Oklahoma City and its long-time conservative suburbs driven by this population growth and influx of Democrat-leaning moderate voters.

Horn’s victory was one of the most stunning upsets of the cycle; the 5th district is the only district in Oklahoma that’s remotely competitive. Horn ultimately lost her seat in 2020 like a lot of freshman Democrats in a very polarized election year, and it would be hard for any Democrat to over-perform the presidential nominee by more than 3 or 4 points, let alone having to do so by 7 or 8 points. And in 2022 — when the Democrats didn’t seriously compete for the district after its lines had shifted substantially — it voted for Trump by a much larger margin. But if the city continues its trajectory, then the 5th district could be competitive again. But that’s likely a years- or decades-long process.

Erosion in Native American Voter Support

It's also possible that continued Republican controversy could damage goodwill with significant constituents like Native American voters in Oklahoma.

We actually saw this sort of occur in 2022 when Governor Kevin Stitt turned in a significant underperformance of 18% points, compared to Donald Trump’s 2020 margin. Stitt defeated his Democratic opponent by less than 15 points in a state that Republicans usually win by over 30 points.

In that race, Stitt ran against a former Republican head of the department of public education in the state who switched to the Democratic party, Joy Hofmeister. What was so interesting is that Hofmeister over-performed by a pretty significant margin, in a year that was substantially more Republican than in 2020 or in 2018.

As backstory to this race: in the months and years leading up to his reelection, Kevin Stitt sparked a lot of high-profile feuds with numerous Native American tribes throughout the state… tribes that often play extremely influential roles in state politics. Many states came out forcefully against a second term for Kevin Stitt (who, by the way, is a Cherokee citizen himself) after he spent nearly all of his first four years in office publicly antagonizing many of the largest tribes in the state. These efforts included attempting to renegotiate the state's gambling compact with the tribes, which has always been an integral source of economic revenue for these tribes.

In addition, Stitt’s administration attempted to overturn a favorable U.S. Supreme Court ruling for tribal sovereignty and also terminated various hunting and fishing compacts that had been previously written between the state and the tribes.

Stitt has also been bogged down by other damaging scandals, the most notable being the improper spending of coronavirus relief funds intended for education, which really further damaged his reputation, not only among Native American tribes but also among more moderate voters who typically supported Republicans on issues surrounding education.

Education Policy

In another surprise outcome, Democratic nominee, Jena Nelson, a middle school teacher running for the state's Superintendent of Public Instruction, was the best-performing Democrat in Oklahoma that year, surpassing Joy Hoffmeister’s strong performing. Nelson came within 13 points of beating the Republican nominee Ryan Walters. The race highlighted Nelson’s controversial positions on education amidst the national debate on critical race theory, culture wars, book banning helped show that even in a deeply entrenched conservative state like Oklahoma, political missteps can erode significant support10.

Continued Challenges for Democrats

So, I've presented some sources for potential optimism for Democrats in Oklahoma and mentioned that despite poor past circumstances with important demographics like suburban voters or Native American voters, there is some evidence showing that the party may actually be able to pick up support with these key demographics, owing primarily to Republicans' shift to the extreme right, which has damaged their relationship with a lot of these more mainline voters.

But if this leads you to think that Democrats have any shot of winning the state in the foreseeable future, unfortunately, I have to sort of pour water on those hopes.

Because underlying all of this action and movement in the state is an absolutely overwhelming and universally Republican base that is responsible for covering the state in a sea of red and is also responsible for making the state among the most Republican in the nation.

Given current political dynamics, there is simply too much of a rural demographic for Democrats to have any chance of winning the state in the foreseeable future, especially given that Democrats have really deprioritized winning back rural voters, which actually used to comprise a very significant chunk of their coalition, even as recently as the late 1900s when Bill Clinton won a substantial amount of rural America, including in the state of Oklahoma.

But in the 21st century we’ve seen Democrats support among rural voters fall precipitously across the nation. And nowadays, rural voters consistently back Republicans by overwhelming margins.

In 2020, rural voters, who comprised 37% of Oklahoma's total voting population, backed Donald Trump by a 78 to 21 margin, or a margin of 57 percentage points, which is absolutely insane.

Small-town voters, who made up 20% of the population in Oklahoma in 2020, also supported Trump by an overwhelming margin, with 73% of small-town voters backing Trump compared to a measly 25% for Joe Biden - again an eye-popping 48% margin of victory.

This was also reflected in how the white vote was split between the two candidates. Many Oklahoman white voters, who made up 78% of the voting population in 2020, backed Trump by a 43-point margin, 71 to 28, which was substantially higher than his performance among whites nationally as a whole, when he won the demographic by 57 to 43%.

Democrats have a very large problem with white voters, which, while maybe less consequential as a whole due to America's diversification, is really a dealbreaker in the state of Oklahoma. While Oklahoma is growing and diversifying, given the pace and complexion of this growth, it will likely remain a very white dominant state for a very long time, in the mold of many Mountain West states we’ve discussed.

So, Oklahoma combines that extreme whiteness of the Mountain West with the extreme conservatism of a lot of Evangelical Christian white voters in states like Mississippi and Louisiana, who regularly back Republicans by 80, even 90 points. And because this Evangelical-identifying population comprises such a substantial amount of Oklahoma's white population, Democrats arguably face even greater challenges in Oklahoma than it does in states like Montana or other Great Plains states that don't have this strong Evangelical white population.

Oklahoma, unfortunately, really combines the most unfavorable aspects of the Mountain West and the Deep South for Democrats, which make it sort of a worst-of-both-worlds situation for the party.

Close Out: Looking Ahead

I just gave a lot of Democratic supporters a pretty unfortunate wake-up call, but you know, this is just because it is unlikely they'll win this is a hole for the foreseeable future.

But this does not mean that they cannot find opportunities in Oklahoma because remember, the presidency is by far not the only prize on the board. There are, of course, Senate seats, House seats, state legislative seats, and governorships, which are all extremely important not just for the state but with important implications for the entire nation.

So, looking at it from this lens, I'd say that Democrats have a few great opportunities.

For one, if Democrats begin contesting more state legislative districts, they will be able to slowly build up their party's presence in both state legislative houses, which right now are arguably at their lowest point.

In the state house, Democrats only control 20 seats to Republicans' 81, and in the state senate, Democrats hold eight seats to Republicans' 40.

This is a far cry from only a couple of decades ago when Democrats actually held majorities in one or both chambers, which just goes to show how times have quickly changed within the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

In 2022, only 58 Democrats filed to run for legislative seats in either house compared to Republicans' 182, which means that Democrats left an extraordinary amount of seats uncontested.

In fact, in 2022, 70% of Oklahoma state legislative elections were left uncontested. This sort of inactivity from the state Democratic party is very suboptimal for progress or improvement and, as elementary as it may sound, it is still a very significant point in a very significant area for improvement for the state Democratic party.

Now, on the federal level, Democrats have, of course, an opportunity in Oklahoma's 5th congressional district. Earlier, I mentioned how Democrat Kendra Horn won in a stunning, arguably the most surprising result of 2018, a year filled with stunners. Unfortunately for Democrats, Horn was unable to hold on to the district for long; two years later, in 2020, while Trump carried the district by 5.6 percentage points, Horn lost reelection to Republican challenger Stephanie Bice by 4.2 percentage points.

During the 2021 redistricting cycle, Oklahoma's 5th District was gerrymandered to become a heavily Republican district, so much that Stephanie Bice won reelection by 22%. Perhaps in the future, Democrats can once again contest the fifth district, even though its current form is clearly Republican due to Oklahoma City and its surrounding suburbs' shift to the left, which looks to continue in future years.

Perhaps Democrats can once again win the fifth district and establish a political foothold in the state.

Looking to 2024, it is virtually guaranteed that Trump will win Oklahoma, and he will do so by an astounding margin. Trump will likely improve on his 2020 margin in the state where he won by 33 percentage points because rural voters are likely to turn out in spades for Trump, just as they were in 2020 and 2016.

The key difference is that Joe Biden has also arguably weakened himself as a candidate, especially among the key suburban demographic, which will really decide whether Donald Trump manages to improve or decline in his performance this year. Oklahoma City's suburbs and Tulsa's suburbs, which were already not the most liberal places despite their leftward shifts, may reject Biden this time around, as we saw in suburban areas in Northern Virginia and in Long Island in the state of New York.

Mississippi & The Southern Question

In 2020, Georgia — a state in the Deep South — flipped to Democrats for the first time in 28 years. 

The last Democrat who won it was Bill Clinton in 1992. 

Now, Joe Biden’s 2020 victory in Georgia represented what many coined a transformation of the South, a region dominated by Republicans since the beginning on the 21st century.

Following this, one of the central questions that forecasters and all of us watching the election had in mind was, “If Georgia can turn blue, can the rest of the South do the same?” 

And in many ways, the answer to that question is, not really. 

No state better illustrates the complexities Democrats face in the South than Mississippi.

Mississippi: Opportunity or Non-Starter?

On the face of it, Mississippi would seem to represent a huge opportunity for Democrats, if only for one simple reason: just like Georgia, Mississippi has an extremely high proportion of Black residents.

In Georgia, Black Americans comprise around 33% of the total population; in Mississippi, this number is closer to 37%. 

Now, that’s just a huge proportion of the population, especially compared to the national average, where Black Americans make up around 13% of the population.

This is crucial, as Black voters overwhelmingly align with the Democratic Party. Nationally, around 84% of Black voters support Democrats.1 And in Mississippi, Black voters cast an impressive 93% of their ballots for Joe Biden in 2020.

Given this level of support and Mississippi’s demographics, one might assume Democrats could have an even greater opportunity here than in Georgia.

But Mississippi is far more complicated for Democrats than one might assume.

Mississippi's White Vote

Democrats’ primary challenge in the Magnolia State lies with the state’s white voters.

Outside of its Black residents, Mississippi is overwhelmingly white, with little Hispanic, Asian, or Native American presence compared to states like Georgia or North Carolina.

In fact, Mississippi’s white voters are among the most consistently Republican in the country, even more so than those in other heavily Republican Southern states like Georgia, North Carolina, or South Carolina. According to 2020 exit polls, white voters in Mississippi supported Republicans at a higher rate than in any other state in the nation.

To put this in perspective: nationwide, white voters leaned Republican in 2020 by a margin of 57% to 43%. In New York, roughly half of white, non-Hispanic voters chose Democrats, while in states like Wyoming and the Dakotas, around two-thirds supported Republicans.

In Mississippi, however, the proportion of white voters backing Republicans that year was upwards of 82%.

And this racial voting pattern goes back decades. It traces back to 1964, the year that marked the Deep South’s transition from a Democratic stronghold to a Republican bastion.2 That year, Mississippi voters supported Republican nominee Barry Goldwater, who opposed the Civil Rights Act, with 87% of the vote. At the time, with only 10% of Black Mississippians registered to vote, the electorate was nearly all white.

Remarkably, that 87% Republican alignment from 1964 mirrors how white Mississippians vote today. Since the mid-20th century, Mississippi’s white voters have remained deeply aligned with the Republican Party, showing little shift toward Democrats. But why?

Mississippi: Influence of Evangelicals

A key factor in understanding Mississippi’s conservative white vote is the state’s strong Evangelical presence. In 2020, Evangelical Protestants made up 54% of Mississippi’s total vote, the highest percentage in the nation. Among them, white evangelicals voted Republican by a margin of 89% to 11%, translating to about 40% of the state’s overall electorate voting overwhelmingly Republican.

The Turnout Challenge: Mobilizing Mississippi’s Black Voters

Adding to Democratic challenges in Mississippi is the difficulty of consistently turning out Black voters. Barack Obama’s campaigns in 2008 and 2012 were exceptions, as he generated unprecedented Black voter turnoutIn 2012, Black Mississippians made up 36% of the electorate, nearly matching their 37% share of the voting-age population3. And, in most of the majority-Black counties comprising the Mississippi Delta on the western border of the state, Obama won upwards of 70% of the total vote — reflecting his unprecedented strength among Black voters.

However, Obama’s high turnout levels have not been replicated before or since. In 2020—a year of historic turnout nationwide—Black Mississippians accounted for only 29% of the voting population, falling short of their 37% share of the state’s population.

Another complicating factor is the deeply religious nature of Mississippi’s Black population, with 67% identifying as Historically Black Protestants.4 Nationally, about 42% of this group opposes abortion, suggesting that a significant portion of Mississippi’s Black community may lean pro-life. While nationally, reproductive rights in the wake of the Dobbs ruling has driven up Democrat turnout, the same cannot be said for Mississippi. In the 2022 midterms, for example, turnout remained relatively low, and in MS-02, an overwhelmingly Black congressional district, popular incumbent Bennie Thompson still underperformed Biden’s margin by 10 points.

Historical Context: The Deep South’s Conservative Roots

Looking beyond partisan labels, the Deep South—even before its shift to solidly Republican in 1964—has historically been the most conservative region in the United States. The political dynamics here are inseparable from the South’s troubled past, rooted in slavery and a legacy of racial violence and segregation.5

Until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Mississippi and much of the South largely favored Democrats. However, the Democratic Party of that era was fundamentally different from today, with most Southern Democrats supporting and upholding segregation. Meanwhile, the Republican Party—the party of Lincoln and Reconstruction—was more progressive on civil rights issues.6 

But the 1964 election marked a major turning point. When President Lyndon B. Johnson championed civil rights and the Democratic Party cemented its identity as a liberal coalition, the Deep South swiftly abandoned its Democratic ties and pivoted rapidly — and overwhelmingly — towards the Republicans.

Georgia and Mississippi: Pre and Post 1964 Trajectories

Returning to the comparison of Georgia and Mississippi: before 1964, both states were reliably Democratic. In the pivotal 1964 election, both states supported Barry Goldwater, who opposed the Civil Rights Act.

Throughout the 20th century, Democrats in both states saw a decline, and save a couple of outliers (in 1972 when Jimmy Carter won Georgia by 33.8% and Mississippi by 1.9%, and in 1992, when Bill Clinton won Georgia by 0.6%, but George W. Bush won Mississippi by 8.9%), Republican presidential nominees would see victory in most future contests in both states.

By the turn of the century, both states’ Democratic parties had become shadows of their former selves — and by 2004, Republicans controlled both states’ governor’s offices and Senate seats for the first time since Reconstruction.

However, from the 2000s onward, the political paths of Georgia and Mississippi began to diverge.

Continue to Mississippi, Part 2:

Considered one of the quintessential "Fly Over States, " Kansas is located in the Great Plains region of America, and is predominantly rural, overwhelmingly white, and, as expected, largely Republican and conservative.

However, Kansas stands out from many of its Mountain West and Great Plains neighbors, like the Dakotas, Wyoming, and Nebraska, in several key ways. Its demographics are slightly more favorable to Democrats, make Kansas marginally less conservative than these states and seems to be shifting leftward at a very slow but sure pace.

Demographic Dynamics and Urban Influence

While Kansas remains overwhelmingly white and rural, it does have significant urban centers, the most prominent being Kansas City, Topeka, and Wichita. These cities, along with their surrounding suburbs, are home to more diverse populations and lean more Democratic than the state as a whole.

Similar to trends in Arizona, Georgia, and parts of the Midwest, suburban voters in Kansas — particularly white suburban voters — have been shifting left, a trend spurred by former President Trump's fiery rhetoric and extreme social conservatism.

This trend is evident when examining recent voting patterns. In the 2020 election, Kansas supported Trump by a 15-point margin, a smaller gap than previous Republican wins. For comparison, George W. Bush carried Kansas by 21 points in 2000 and 26 in 2004 - both of which are far greater than just a simple 15-point margin. In 2008, when Barack Obama won the nation in a landslide, he lost the state by around 15%, and in 2016, Democrat Hillary Clinton lost the state by nearly 21 percentage points as well.

But Biden's 2020 loss by only 15 points signals a subtle but encouraging sign for Democrats.

Diverging Paths: Kansas vs. Missouri

The political shift in Kansas becomes particularly interesting when compared to its neighboring state of Missouri, which seems to be evolving in the opposite direction, moving firmly from a swing state to Republican stronghold in recent decades.

To better understand Kansas’s current political context, let’s look at its recent voting patterns. Kansas supported Trump by a margin of 15 percentage points in 2020, which might seem like a decisive Republican win. However, compared to Kansas’s historical margins for Republican candidates, this 15-point gap suggests a trend that is softening.

For example, Kansas supported George W. Bush by 21 points in 2000 and by 26 points in 2004. Even in 2008, when Barack Obama won the presidency in a national landslide, he lost Kansas by roughly 15 points. In 2016, Hillary Clinton lost Kansas by nearly 21 points. In this context, Biden’s 2020 loss by 15 points signals a subtle yet significant shift toward a less staunchly Republican landscape in Kansas.

Missouri, in contrast, has shifted steadily to the right. Kansas and Missouri share the Kansas City metropolitan area, yet their political paths have diverged. Missouri, once an electoral bellwether that closely mapped to national outcomes, has transitioned into a solidly Republican state.

In 2000, Missouri voted for George W. Bush by a relatively narrow margin and repeated this in 2004. By 2008, John McCain carried Missouri by just 3,000 votes. However, in subsequent elections, Missouri veered more decisively Republican: Mitt Romney won comfortably in 2012, Trump won by nearly 20 points in 2016, and then by 16 points in 2020 — helping demonstrate Missouri’s steady transformation from a competitive swing state to a reliably conservative stronghold.

While Missouri has entrenched itself in the Republican camp, Kansas appears to be slowly moderating. Historically, Kansas was one of the most Republican states, often supporting GOP candidates by margins well over 20 points. In 2020, however, Trump’s 15-point win is notable for being comparatively narrower. If Democrats could shift just 5% of the Kansas electorate, they could feasibly reach a 50% share of the vote, a more attainable task than one might assume at first glance.

The challenge for Democrats in Kansas remains substantial, but some subtle demographic shifts and the state’s recent electoral trends suggest that a path to greater competitiveness is not entirely out of reach

Suburban Shifts and Congressional Implications

One major factor in Democrats’ favor is the growth of the state’s largest metropolitan areas, which tend to vote for Democrats by significant margins. Metro areas like Kansas City are large and growing - with increasingly diverse populations, substantial Black and Hispanic communities. This demographic shift has helped created a solid Democratic base within the state’s largest cities.

But the other part of the equation is the growth of Kansas’s suburbs, home to many white voters who tend to be more moderate and less culturally conservative than Kansas’s rural electorate. These suburban voters have shown a greater openness to supporting Democrats, diverging from the state’s traditional rural conservatism.

This trend was evident in Kansas’s Third Congressional District, where Sharice Davids, a Democrat, won her House seat in 2018. Her victory was driven by strong urban support and notable gains in suburban areas that have become increasingly receptive to Democrats in federal elections.

Davids initially won her district by a 3-4% margin, but her support only grew in subsequent elections. In 2020, she was re-elected by a 10-point margin, surpassing her 2018 performance. Davids' win was primarily fueled by, number one, very overwhelming urban support, and also by large overperformances among a suburban populace that had increasingly become more willing to support Democrats in federal elections

This pattern continued in 2022, a year that saw a stronger Republican national environment than in previous cycles. Despite Republican gains elsewhere and a 4.5-point rightward shift on the generic House ballot, Davids increased her margin of victory to over 12 points - an overwhelming margin. Her success came even as Republicans attempted to make her district more competitive through gerrymandering, underscoring the staying power of her coalition.

The leftward shift in Kansas’s Third District owes much to Kansas City and its suburbs, where changing demographics and recent events have impacted voter sentiment. Specifically, the 2022 Dobbs decision, which overturned federal abortion protections, galvanized suburban support for Democrats, especially among white women. Abortion rights enjoy widespread support across the United States, even among a significant portion of Republican voters, and Kansas is no exception. The backlash in suburban Kansas following Dobbs likely fueled increased Democratic support, a trend that shows signs of continuing in the coming years.

Kansas Recent Political Context

As I mentioned, Kansas has been a reliably Republican state for decades, consistently supporting Republican presidential candidates by margins north of 20 points in the 21st century. Even before this, Kansas’s loyalty to the GOP was evident. The last time Kansas voted for a Democratic presidential candidate was in 1964, when it supported Lyndon B. Johnson.

On the Senate level, Kansas has an even longer streak: it hasn’t elected a Democrat to the Senate since the 1930s, a nearly 100-year Republican stronghold unmatched by any other state. While there are plenty of states in the country that are currently much more conservative than Kansas, but this record helps show how it has been among the most Republican states in the nation.

Signs of a Democratic Resurgence

Despite its Republican history, recent events hint at traces of a Democratic resurgence in the state.

A key example is the election of Laura Kelly, a Democrat, as governor in 2018. Kelly’s victory was seen as an upset, an against all odds win, fueled largely by backlash against the policies of her Republican predecessor, Sam Brownback.

Brownback’s "Kansas experiment" of slashing major taxes to promote small-government ideals had severe financial consequences for the state. Cuts in essential services, especially in education and the arts, angered many voters, particularly those in suburban areas.

As a result, when Kelly ran against the far-right Republican candidate Chris Kobach, she was really running against the legacy of Sam Brownback. Kelly successfully positioned herself as a departure from Brownback’s legacy, narrowly winning by two points.

Challenges in Kelly’s 2022 Re-election

Kelly’s re-election bid in 2022 posed new challenges. Unlike 2018, she faced state Attorney General Derrick Schmidt, a less polarizing Republican opponent with a low profile. The 2022 election year was also generally favorable to Republicans nationwide, with rural voters strongly mobilized and some members of the Democratic base showing lower enthusiasm due to dissatisfaction with the Biden administration.

Moreover, Kelly no longer had Brownback’s candidacy and unpopular policies as a clear target. Four years had passed since his tenure, and some of the outrage had faded. Yet, to many people’s surprise, Kelly managed to win re-election by a slim two-point margin, in one of the most notable Democratic victories of 2022.

Factors Behind Kelly’s Victory

Several factors contributed to Kelly’s success and are worth exploring.

Although Schmidt was a more conventional candidate than Kobach, he still had weaknesses. He ran a rather sleepy or inactive campaign that focused heavily on divisive social issues, such as transgender rights, and culture war issues, which did not resonate with many mainstream voters. Rather than simply running against Joe Biden and focusing on economic issues like inflation, which could arguably have appealed to a broader audience, Schmidt’s focus on culture war topics likely limited his appeal to fringe factions of the Republican base.

A second factor shaping the political landscape in Kansas at that time was the national environment, which was noticeably more Republican-leaning in 2022 than in 2018. Kansas, like much of the country, saw a surge in Republican support that year. However, this trend was counterbalanced by the Dobbs ruling, which energized Democrats and pro-choice voters nationwide. In Kansas’s suburban areas, particularly among women, the ruling sparked significant opposition to the Republican stance on abortion, which helped balance out some of the pro-Republican sentiment generated by economic discontent.

Finally, while it was assumed that Kelly couldn’t rely on anti-Brownback sentiment as she had in 2018, the shadow of his policies still loomed. Many voters, particularly in suburban and urban areas, remembered the devastating impact of policies implemented under Brownback’s tenure, and Kelly’s campaign effectively leveraged this memory to paint her Republican opponent as a risk for the state’s future stability.

Implications for Future Democratic Success

Kelly’s victories paint a potentially hopeful picture for Democrats in the state and suggest a possible roadmap for Democrats aiming to compete in Kansas. A closer look at her campaigns could provide valuable insights into how Democrats might overcome the state’s Republican lean. Key strategies include capitalizing on urban and suburban discontent with Republican policies, emphasizing issues like abortion rights that resonate with moderates, and maintaining a clear contrast with past GOP administrations viewed as harmful to the state’s well-being.

While Kansas remains a challenging state for Democrats, recent elections indicate that with the right circumstances and strategy, Democratic candidates can make races competitive enough to attract national attention and funding.

Obstacles to Democratic Progress

While this may paint a rosy picture for Democrats’ prospects in Kansas, looking at both the successes and challenges faced by Democrats in recent elections might dampen the hope of a quick resurgence in the state. While some races offer hope for a Democratic resurgence, others reveal the obstacles that remain.

In the 2020 Senate election, Democratic hopes were high for state senator Barbara Bollier, a former Republican who had switched to the Democratic Party in the Trump era. Bollier ran a fierce, well-funded campaign, bolstered by substantial cash and favorable polling, which showed her within the margin of error against Republican Congressman Roger Marshall.

It’s easy to see why analysts crafted this narrative around a Bollier win: many speculated that Bollier's appeal to suburban voters, many of whom had turned against Republicans in the Trump era, could give her an edge. However, despite overperforming Joe Biden’s statewide margin by a couple of points, Bollier ultimately lost by a 12-point margin. Marshall’s comfortable victory highlighted the ongoing Republican dominance in Kansas Senate races and dashed hopes that Kansas was becoming a true battleground state.

Similarly, in that same election, Republican incumbent Jerry Moran won decisively, capturing nearly 60% of the vote against a low-profile Democratic opponent who lacked the funding and visibility to mount a strong challenge.

Together, these races demonstrate that the path for Democrats in Kansas is more challenging than it may initially appear. Bollier’s moderate positions and appeal to suburban voters were not enough to overcome Kansas’s entrenched Republican support, and suggests that additional favorable circumstances—such as an unpopular opponent or a national environment that galvanized Democratic turnout—may be necessary for Democrats to succeed in statewide races.

Governor Laura Kelly, for example, benefitted from these types of favorable circumstances in her initial 2018 election, running during a Democratic midterm in the Trump era. Unlike Bollier, Kelly was not tied to a national Democratic presidential candidate, allowing her to cast a more independent stance. This points to the idea that Democrats may have better chances in midterm elections, which tend to be more insulated from presidential influence. If Kansas’s partisan composition remains fairly stable, future midterms might offer Democrats the best opportunity to compete seriously for statewide office.

Looking ahead to 2024, a highly polarized election is anticipated, making a Democratic win in Kansas challenging. However, if the political environment in 2026 mirrors that of previous midterms, Democrats could potentially make gains, especially if candidates like Sharice Davids or even Laura Kelly decide to run.

In Kansas, while the pathway to Democratic success is challenging, it is not entirely closed, especially in favorable midterm election cycles - more so than than other deeply conservative Mountain West states, like Missouri, the Dakotas or Wyoming, where there was really no clear path for Democrats whatsoever.

Montana is located in the Mountain West - the region including Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska.

What all these states have in common is that they are very rural, very white and very Republican.

The reason the Mountain West, and in part the Great Plains, is often considered among the most Republican areas of the nation (even more so than the South) is just how long and consistently they've been voting Republican - basically since the mid-20th century. 

These states have voted for the Republican presidential candidate in every election since 1964. And this wasn't just a late 20th-century occurrence as it's been in the South; it's been that way for a while.

How Montana Stacks Up

Just like its Mountain West neighbors, Montana is extremely rural, and it's very Republican.

Montanans has voted for the Republican nominee in all but two presidential elections since 1952. Since 1900, Wyoming has voted Democratic 22.6% of the time and Republican 77.4% of the time.

But for some reason, Montana isn't quite as Republican as it's neighboring Mountain West states. 

If you look at Montana's voting history, it actually voted Democratic in 1992 for Bill Clinton albeit by only a small margin of ~2%. Partly, this happened because Ross Perot, the third-party candidate, got a large percentage of the vote, cutting into George H.W. Bush's share. 

But at the same time, Clinton didn't win Wyoming that year, he didn't win the Dakotas, although he did come close in those states. 

More recently in 2008, Barack Obama, in his close to a landslide victory, won nationwide by 7 points in terms of the popular vote and won 365 electoral votes. Obama lost Montana, but only by ~2%, whereas he lost most of the rest of the Mountain West by upwards of ~10% or 20% the same year. 

Likewise, if you look at the officeholders in Montana right now, a slight blue tint shines through.

It currently has a Democratic senator Jon Tester, who I’ll discuss further. Before 2020, it had a two-term Democratic governor, Steve Bullock, and before that, another Democratic governor, Brian Schweitzer. 

Obviously, down-ballot races or state-level races differ substantially in terms of the margin and how they're decided. But all this suggests that there may be something that separates Montana, albeit slightly, from its neighboring states. And that leads to the question, among others, of whether it could ever potentially be a Democratic state. 

Drivers for Montana's Blue Tinge

So what's going on in Montana?

First, Montana has Billings, the state’s largest city with a population of 117,000, and several smaller cities, like Missoula (pop. 77,000), Bozeman (pop. 56,000) and Helena, the state capital with a population of ~32,000, which help keep Democrats above 40% in terms of the popular vote most of the time in Montana. 

Second, Montana also has a large number of Indian reservations and a substantial Native American population. And significantly - Native Americans voters in Montana, much like Native Americans in Arizona or other areas of the South - are staunchly Democrat.

Nationally, Native Americans vote Democrat 56% to Republican 40% as of 20221 but their voting pattern varies significantly state to state, based on tribal affiliations. For example, if you look at Native Americans in Oklahoma, they're one of the most Republican groups in the nation. They comprise close to 10% of the state’s population, which helps maintain Oklahoma’s staunch Republican status. Another example is North Carolina's Robeson County, where Native Americans voters there are also very conservative, and that county is holistically rightwards, which is a serious problem for Democrats in that state. 

Third, an issue that shows Montanan's ideological modernism is its fairly moderate position on abortion. Abortion is legal in Montana and overall, it is the most pro-choice state in the Mountain West, an outlier considering that states in the rest of the region are stridently anti-abortion.

Exit polls in the 2020 elections show some of the intriguing voter dynamics at play in the state: male voters gave Donald Trump 63% of their votes, while female voters gave Trump a much smaller 52% of their votes — suggesting that Montana’s female voter population is far more liberal than its male voter population.

This divide along gender lines is rarely seen to this extent in any other state. This also helps explain why a "born alive" referendum in 2022, a pro-life measure supported by many Republicans and anti-abortion groups in Montana, and opposed by many on the opposite side of the spectrum, actually failed by 6 points in 2020—a year, of course, taking place after the Dobbs ruling.

Ultimately, these factors are mainly what keep Democrats polling in the state.

Mountain West & The White Vote

Notwithstanding the above, what will likely keep Montana and many other states in the Mountain West in the Republican column for the foreseeable future lies in their staggeringly high proportion of white voters.

2020 presidential election exit polls show that white voters constituted 88% of Montana's total voting population. Nationally, white voters made up a much lower amount - about 2/3 of the total voting population that year.

Notably, unlike other states in the Mountain West, white voters in Montana actually voted very similarly to the national average. About 58% of Montanans voting for Donald Trump compared to 39% for Joe Biden, yielding a 19-point victory for Trump overall. White voters nationally voted for Trump by a 17-point margin.

So, it’s not that white voters in Montana are especially ideologically conservative. It’s just that the proportion of white voters in the state is simply too large for Democrats to gain traction with this demographic.

In contrast, white voters in Wyoming, Idaho and other states in the Mountain West, tend to be more conservative than the national average. Nationally, white people vote for Republicans ~57% of the time. But, in the Mountain West, they probably vote for Republican upwards of 65%. 

(And if that seems high, just for comparison, white voters in Mississippi and other areas in the Deep South, usually vote Republican upwards of >90% -- which is an astonishing amount. It's crazy.)

Bottom line: The overall proportion of white voters in the Mountain West, in Montana, and Wyoming, in Idaho, the Dakotas, is just incredible. In many of these states, they are upwards of 95% white. And that's one of the reasons why it's hard to see for Democrats to have a real shot at winning Montana on the presidential level, although they could win a statewide election in this coming year.

2024 Outlook

Now, it's really impossible to talk about Montana and its politics without mentioning Jon Tester, who has arguably been the dominant political figure in the state for much of the 21st century. Tester has served in the Senate since 2006 when he defeated long-time incumbent Republican Senator Conrad Burns in the Democratic national environment of the state senate in Helena, where he was one of the most important politicians in the state in his own right, even back then.

Tester and his electoral success really provides a plausible path forward for Democrats in the state. Not only did Tester win the Senate election in 2006, but he has successfully defended his seat in the two elections since then, despite Montana backing Republicans in presidential elections during the same period of time by upwards of 10 or even 15 percentage points.

In 2012, Tester won re-election while Obama lost the state by 13 percentage points, which is an especially impressive feat considering that politics as a whole had become much more polarized, with fewer voters splitting their tickets or voting one party for president while voting another party for Senate by that time. Tester was able to really counteract this phenomenon by managing to over-perform Obama by around 15 percentage points.

In another phenomenal performance, two years after Donald Trump won the state by over 21 percentage points, Tester was actually able to retain his seat by around 3.5 percentage points in 2018.

Now Tester had the aid of friendly national environments in all three of his successful elections, but that shouldn’t discount his considerable personal talent. Even as Tester was winning these elections, many other statewide candidates or House candidates were losing election by a very large margin.

Tester’s tremendous appeal to Montana voters is highly personal and rooted in his identity as an authentic Montanan. Before entering politics, Tester was a farmer. In fact, even now, Tester continues to work his own farm in Montana while spending considerable time in D.C. Over his 18 years in public office, Tester has proven to be very in touch with the needs of his state's voters and an effective advocate for his constituents.

Compared to the Democratic party at large, Tester takes a number of more conservative political positions whether on the economy or on gun rights, for example, or immigration. These likely help Tester’s appeal to conservative Montana white voters who simply might not consider voting for a Democrat who is against the Second Amendment, or someone more aligned with the national party on issues like the environment, where a lot of Democrats' climate change counteractive proposals would likely be perceived as damaging to Montana's economy and personally to many of its residents.

Tester has really carved out a very positive profile among the state's voters, so much so that he may even win another re-election this coming November - even while Joe Biden is likely to lose the state by upwards of 15 percentage points to Donald Trump.

Unique Blueprint for the State

While Tester really provides a great blueprint for Democrats, replicating his success may require a great deal more than just adopting similar positions.

In Indiana, Democratic Senate incumbent Joe Donnelly, a former lawyer and small businessman, ran for re-election. Like Tester, Donnelly positioned himself as a moderate, and took similar conservative positions to Tester around taxes and gun control and was endorsed by the National Rifle Association in his 2008 and 2010 elections. Ultimately, Donnelly failed to win re-election, and was defeated by six points in a state that voted for Trump by around 20 percentage points in 2016.

Despite taking similar positions to Tester, Donnelly was unable to win the same level of crossover support largely because he was unable to establish the same level of personal appeal and authenticity. It would be interesting to see how other Democrats can, if they can muster the same support on a personal level, and if this will help other Democrats besides Tester win races in the state. That's really the name of the game for Democrats in the future, I would say.

Where Does Montana Go From Here?

Now, I mentioned that the only way I could see that happening is if the state experiences a pretty significant demographic change, if it diversifies, which can happen as the state grows, based on the complexion of people who are coming into the state, whether they’re minorities, retirees, older, or otherwise.

And the truth is, Montana is growing. It's growing just like the rest of the Mountain West.

Idaho is gaining population. It's going to probably gain a congressional district in 2030.

Montana gained an additional congressional district following the 2020 census going from having one representative to two. 

In 2022 a number of state legislative districts were decided by relatively close margins. In the Montana state House, twelve districts (23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 41, 48, 50, 51, 64, 77, and 92) were won by Republicans by 15% points or less. In the state Senate, Republicans won five districts (11, 12, 13, 30, and 39) by 15% points or less.

In future election cycles where the national environment may be more favorable, Democrats may be able to gain a significant number of seats in the state legislature which would bolster their presence in state government and policymaking.

Looking Ahead

Looking at the future of the state and its political trajectory, there are trends on record for both the Democrats and Republicans in the state.

As mentioned Montana's fast-growing population, among the fastest in the nation, may benefit both parties, since much of this population growth is concentrated in suburban areas and cities.

Growth will no doubt boost Democrats, especially in state legislative races concentrated in these areas. However, many of Montana's urban areas are actually more conservative than many might expect, including its largest city of Billings.

So, urban growth in the city proper and its surrounding suburbs may actually not provide Democrats with as much advantage as one might think.

However, Billings and its surrounding suburbs have actually shifted to the left during the 21st century, and it's likely to continue this trend in the coming years and decades.

This can potentially make Montana much more narrow in future elections.

Additionally, the Native American vote, while strongly Democratic, can potentially be expanded upon, both in terms of margin and turnout. If Democrats can win an even higher percentage of these voters and also turn out even more of these voters in presidential and midterm elections, they could really expand their coalition so that they can truly compete in statewide elections.

One notable opportunity for Democrats would be Montana's first district, which encompasses the western, more liberal half of the state, anchored by the city of Missoula, which is much more liberal than its eastern counterpart of Billings.

Democrats seriously contested the seat in 2022, with Monica Tranel, a former Olympic athlete, losing only by 3 percentage points to Republican former representative Ryan Zinke in a district that Trump won by over 7 percentage points in 2020.

In a blue year like 2022, a well-funded Democratic nominee could potentially flip the district for the Democrats, considering it is also moving towards the left on the presidential level. Tranel is once again running for the seat this year, in 2022, and her campaign is receiving funding from the state and national Democratic party.

So, it is indeed possible that Democrats could actually secure the district this November, but I do think this is unlikely considering that her campaign is tied to that of Joe Biden, whose popularity has slipped heavily in Montana, a state in which his popularity was already poor before he even entered office.

Close-Out

In terms of its future political trajectory, Montana is likely to become more competitive in future elections, but whether this process takes years or decades is dependent upon Democrats' consistent efforts in elections across the board, on every level of the ballot, not simply the presidential race or a Senate election featuring Jon Tester. Whether Tester loses reelection this year or retires in 2030, Tester will not serve forever, and after his exit, Democrats will be left with no substantial influence in the state unless they can build a stronger presence.

And as you might expect, it shares political characteristics of both regions. 

Much of the state is rural and of the desert, similar to Utah, and those areas are overwhelmingly Republican. However, Colorado is also home to numerous metros and their surrounding suburbs, many of which have seen a surge in diversity, especially among voters of color, predominantly Hispanics, who vote overwhelmingly Democratic. This shift has significantly contributed to the state’s overall Democratic lean.

In terms of size, Colorado is a moderately big state. It has eight congressional districts, representing 10 electoral votes.

Political Context

For much of the late 20th century and early 21st century, Colorado was a Republican-leaning swing state. Its political heritage was shaped by its smaller, rural character, similar to neighboring states like Utah, Nebraska, and Wyoming, which remain predominantly rural and staunchly Republican. George Bush carried the state in both 2000 and 2004, until Barack Obama flipped the state for Democrats in 2008.

But Colorado’s geography—featuring the more accessible Denver metro area—set it apart, allowing it to grow in ways that its rural neighbors could not. Over the past 50 years, favorable conditions and urban development transformed Colorado into a populous and politically diverse state, with Denver emerging as a key economic and social hub.

And since that time, Colorado has continued to shift leftward, even as the nation remains deeply divided between the two major parties.

Today, Colorado is almost unrecognizable as a traditional Mountain West state. Where it once resembled its rural neighbors, Colorado’s outsized growth set it apart from its rural neighbors, transforming it into a populous, politically diverse state.

Population Dynamics and Growth

A major factor in Colorado’s Democratic shift has been its massive population growth, particularly in urban and suburban areas. Like much of the American Southwest and Mountain West, Colorado is among the fastest-growing states in the nation. Between 2010 and 2020, Colorado’s population grew nearly twice as fast as the national average—15% compared to the nation's 7.4%. However, this growth was uneven, with urban centers booming while rural counties, especially in the southeastern part of the state, saw population declines.

This surge in urban and suburban areas, particularly in metro Denver, has not only increased the state’s population but also reshaped its political identity. Colorado’s metro areas attract young professionals, diverse communities, and tech and renewable energy industries, many of which lean Democratic. Hispanic communities, the largest minority group in the state, make up nearly 22% of the population as of 2021, and many within this group tend to favor Democratic candidates. This Democratic alignment reflects both the community’s ideological liberalism and possible reaction to Republican stances on immigration and rhetoric that can alienate communities of color.

Population Dynamics: Suburban Voters

Another key factor in Colorado’s Democratic shift has been the changing attitudes of suburban white voters. Across the nation, fiscally conservative, middle-class white voters in suburban areas—who traditionally leaned Republican, especially in the Bush and early Obama years—were repelled by Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric and intense social conservatism. During the Trump era, many of these voters flocked toward the Democratic Party in massive numbers.

This shift is especially clear between 2016 and 2020. In 2016, Hillary Clinton won the state by a small four points but in 2020, Joe Biden won the state by an overwhelming 13 points. 

However, an interesting trend emerged after Trump’s presidency.

Across the nation, many suburban areas that had bolted leftward during Trump’s time in office ended up reverting to their Republican roots in 2022. Biden’s unpopularity, inflation, and the absence of Trump on the ballot contributed to this shift, as concerns over Trump’s anti-democratic and xenophobic rhetoric became less immediate. In states like Virginia and New York, suburban voters returned to the Republican fold, and one might expect Colorado’s suburban voters to have followed suit.

But in fact the opposite happened. 

Democratic Governor Jared Polis won a second term by nearly 20 points. And Democratic Senator Michael Bennet won re-election to a second term with a 13 point lead, even though both Democrats had their seats contested by fairly moderate Republicans who would have assumed to actually over-perform substantially.

Notably, both faced relatively moderate Republican opponents. Polis ran against Hade Ganal who was not see as a strong Trumpist. And Bennet faced Joe O’Dea, a local businessman widely regarded as one of the best challengers Republicans had fielded that year. Despite 2022 being a more Republican-leaning year than 2020, both Republicans lost by significant margins.

So the question remains: why did Colorado shift even more leftward in 2022 than it had in 2020?

Population Dynamics: Suburban Voter Modernism

And the answer to this is more complicated.

But if you had to summarize it in one sentence it would be that: Colorado’s suburban voters aren’t just anti-Trump, they’re actually pro-Democratic. 

Many Colorado voters seem to align with key Democratic positions: they are strongly pro-choice, economically liberal, and seem supportive of greater government intervention in the economy—stances Republicans traditionally oppose. Additionally, Colorado’s suburban voters are more socially liberal, less likely to be evangelical Christians or intensely religious, and generally opposed to extreme measures like book bans or framing critical race theory as proof of national decline.

In short, Colorado’s suburban voters rank among the most progressive in the nation, which may help explain why they didn’t shift rightward in 2022. Despite factors like inflation and cultural divisions damaging Democratic performance in other states, these voters stayed with Democrats, reflecting their ideological leanings.

Looking Ahead: Colorado’s Political Future

As Colorado continues its rapid growth and demographic shifts, the state’s political landscape is set to evolve even further. The trends driving Colorado’s leftward movement—urban and suburban expansion, increasing diversity, and a liberal-leaning white population—show no signs of reversing, suggesting Colorado’s transformation into a Democratic stronghold may be here to stay.

Key Dominant Democratic Figures

The influence of prominent Democratic figures like Senators John Hickenlooper and Michael Bennet help exemplify Colorado’s current political alignment. Hickenlooper, the junior Senator who served as Governor for 8 years before then, and served as Mayor of Denver before. He’s served in all the prominent offices in the state and he’s extremely well known remains widely respected and deeply embedded in Colorado’s political scene. His track record of consistent wins, including his decisive victory over Republican incumbent Cory Gardner in 2020 by 9 points.

Likewise, Bennet, whose tenure as a senator followed his role as head of Colorado’s Department of Education, has repeatedly proven himself a resilient figure in state politics. Both men symbolize the strength of the Democratic establishment in Colorado and the state’s growing resistance to Republican contenders.

Key Republican Figures in State

While Republicans have struggled to maintain influence at the statewide level, certain figures highlight the ongoing Republican presence in the state. Representative Lauren Boebert, for instance, is Colorado’s most prominent Republican on the national stage, though her narrow win in the traditionally Republican 3rd District suggests limited appeal beyond her base.

In terms of prominent Republicans in the state of Colorado in the last 10 years they're really haven't been too many. The most prominent would probably have been former Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a Democrat-turned-Republican who served in the 1990s and early 2000s, who had shifted substantially rightward ideologically during his Senate career, to the point where he is now firm supporter of Donald Trump and has endorsed him in 2024 election.

Shifts in Congressional Districts

Looking forward, the recent creation of the 8th congressional district reflects Colorado’s rising population and potential for more representation. While Democrat Yadira Caraveo won the seat in 2022, the district’s unique demographic makeup—largely suburban with a significant white population—makes it more competitive than other areas of the state. This district could serve as a testing ground for Republicans if they nominate candidates capable of appealing to a mix of suburban white voters, Hispanic communities, and the rural Republican base. A strong GOP contender could theoretically gain traction here, though the district’s competitiveness doesn’t necessarily signify a broader shift rightward for Colorado.

Close Out:

With figures like Hickenlooper and Bennet leading the charge, Colorado’s Democratic establishment appears solidly in place, and future leaders will likely follow in their footsteps, as evidenced by the growing number of local Democrats with strong name recognition and policy influence.

Meanwhile, the lack of prominent Republicans signals a party struggling to connect with a changing electorate. The state’s population growth, demographic diversification, and concentration of voters in urban and suburban centers signal that Colorado’s political shift is not merely a reaction to recent trends but a long-term evolution.

Overall, Colorado’s political future appears increasingly blue, shaped by powerful ongoing demographic trends and strong leadership of the Democratic establishment. As the state grows and solidifies its position as a Democratic stronghold in the Mountain West, we’re likely to see it gain increasing influence in national politics.

Last time, we took a look at the baseline factors shaping Indiana’s Republican politics, contrasting them with other Midwestern states to determine the root causes of its conservatism. Today, we’ll take a deeper dive into its electoral history — including its climactic 2008 showdown between Barack Obama and John McCain.

The Political Shift in Indiana: From Competitive to Solidly Republican

Make no mistake: Indiana has long been a red state. In fact, it has consistently been the preeminent Republican stronghold of the Midwest, if there ever was one.

But as we’ve established last time, Indiana’s Republican lean has only solidified over the last election cycles.

Between the years 1964 (Democrats’ most recent victory apart from 2008) and 2000, Indiana regularly supported Republicans by around 20 points. Even Bill Clinton failed to narrow the margins within 5 points in either of his otherwise-monumental victories in 1992 and 1996.

While Indiana’s partisan lean has remained relatively similar between the late-20th century and our current day, the inner dynamics of the state have shifted dramtically.

The little support that Democrats like Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis could muster came mostly from white, working-class counties located in the extreme southern portion of the state. This reflected a general trend, where the 1980’s Democratic Party was far more successful (and reliant) on capturing white blue-collar voters compared to now.

On the flipside, however, Democrats struggled immensely in the suburbs and had not yet attained the strong support (and turnout) that they receive from urban minority voters today. Take Marion County, which contains Indianapolis and its surrounding suburbs, for example. In 2020, Joe Biden captured an impressive 65% of the county’s vote — nearly matching Obama’s 2008 performance in the county, which was (and remains) a high watermark for Democrats). Biden’s performance was buoyed by strong margins among Black and Hispanic residents of Indianapolis and record support in its highly-educated, affluent, and ideologically-moderate suburbs. Look backwards to the late 20th century, however: Marion County backed Republican candidates in every election between 1964 and 2000, underscoring a general trend where Republicans dominated most of suburban America.

The turn of the century didn’t change much about Indiana politics.

In 2000, George W. Bush won Indiana by 15.6 points against Al Gore - an overwhelming margin of victory, considering that Al Gore had fared better nationally compared to past Democrats like Dukakis and Mondale, and one that did not bode well for Democrats in future state elections. And in 2004, G.W. Bush increased his margin to over 20 points against John Kerry - nearly reaching 60% of the total vote in the state.

But despite this history of clear Republican dominance, in 2008, Democrat Barack Obama achieved an against-all-odds surprise victory in Indiana, winning by just over 1 percentage point.

Obama’s Unusual Success in Indiana

Obama’s win in Indiana in 2008 was the result of a “perfect storm” of circumstances. Obama campaigned vigorously and invested heavily in Indiana, while his Republican opponent, John McCain, reflecting overconfidence in the state, largely neglected it, assuming it was safely Republican. Additionally, dissatisfaction with George W. Bush’s presidency due to aggressive foreign policy, particularly the Iraq War, and other extended military engagements in the Middle East. As these conflicts continued, public approval of Bush’s foreign policy declined significantly, despite initially strong bipartisan support.

And adding on to this, in the last year or so of Bush's term, Bush’s unpopularity peaked with the 2008 financial crisis, which devastated the economy and hit working- and middle-class Americans particularly hard. In Bush’s final year, his approval ratings plummeted, with some polls showing only around 10% of Americans viewing him favorably, while over 80% disapproved - pretty much as close to unanimous as you can get in a nation as closely divided as the U.S..

Obama’s 2008 victory was notable for his performance in traditionally Republican rural areas across the nation. Unlike many Democratic victories that rely heavily on urban and minority voters, Obama expanded his support well into rural areas across states like Iowa and Wisconsin. Obama won Michigan by a substantial 17-point margin in 2008 and also carried Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, both by over 15 points. His success in Pennsylvania was particularly notable not only for the margin but for the breadth of his coalition. At the county level, maps from 2008 show these traditionally competitive or Republican-leaning areas colored predominantly blue—an unusual sight for a Democratic candidate, as Democratic support is often concentrated in urban regions that occupy smaller geographic areas.

In Indiana, Obama’s remarkable performance in rural areas was just as pronounced. Comparing Indiana’s 2004 and 2008 election results at the county level reveals a striking shift. In 2004, George W. Bush won roughly 90% of Indiana's counties, with many by margins exceeding 70 points over John Kerry. However, in 2008, John McCain managed to win only about 10 rural counties by more than 10 points. Most other counties showed margins within a 10-point range. Although Obama didn’t secure a majority of Indiana’s counties or even a substantial portion of its rural areas, his ability to significantly reduce Republican dominance in these traditionally red counties speaks volumes about his appeal. This narrowing of margins, even in areas that had consistently backed Republicans, ultimately enabled Obama to win Indiana by a narrow 1.03-point margin, or approximately 29,000 votes.

Indiana’s Shift Rightward from 2008 to 2012

Unfortunately for Democrats, following Obama’s 2008 victory, Indiana quickly returned to the Republican column, taking a hard shift to the right.

Between 2008 and 2012, Indiana saw a dramatic political shift from supporting Democrat Barack Obama to voting for Republican Mitt Romney by over 10 percentage points, marking an 11-point swing to the right.

Indiana’s right shift wasn’t much of an anomaly, as it closely mirrored the rightward shift in Midwestern states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. The period between 2008 and 2012 encapsulated a gigantic shift in electoral politics. Over Barack Obama's first four years in office, his perception and reputation had soured among much of the country, particularly rural voters. His top priorities, like the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), the Wall Street bailouts, and the Dodd-Frank Act, which regulated financial practices after the crash, sparked backlash among working-class voters.

By 2012, Indiana’s political map turned overwhelmingly red. Looking at a county-level map of Indiana from this time period vividly displays this shift: the state was blanketed in dark red, with Obama losing nearly all rural counties by margins of 70 to 80 points—a stark contrast to the narrow Republican wins in many of these areas in 2008.

Beyond voter dissatisfaction, demographic changes in Indiana also contributed to the decline in Democratic support. While the U.S. overall became larger and increasingly diverse, Indiana remained relatively stagnant. As it became whiter, older, and more rural, Indiana became even more favorable to Republicans — and these shifting dynamics would only accelerate with the arrival of Donald Trump.

characteristics that aligned with GOP priorities.

Continue reading Indiana, Part 3: A Midwestern Dilemma

Indiana sits in the heart of the American Midwest, and the Midwest sits at the heart of the United States — geographically, culturally, and figuratively.

The Midwest has long been a focal point in American politics: the region has been among the most hotly contested regions in the United States for the better part of a century and looks to stay this way.

Many of these states have been among the biggest prizes on the electoral board for well over a century. Races, from state legislatures to U.S. House elections, have historically seen intense competition from both parties.

States including Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have been among the most politically competitive, evenly-divided states in the nation. They’ve been consistently contested by both major parties in recent decades, and consistently decided by margins of less than a single point in multiple 21st-century elections.

Ohio, although less competitive in recent years, was a leading presidential bellwether for nearly a century, with its election results closely reflecting national trends.

However, not all Midwestern states follow this competitive pattern.

Illinois, dominated by Chicago, has held a firm Democratic lean since the 1980s. And conversely, Indiana has proven reliably Republican. In fact, in the better part of the 21st century, it's safe to say that Indiana is the most partisan state in the Midwest. In other words, Indiana goes to one party more consistently and by greater margins than any of its fellow Midwestern compatriots.

Do Demographics Tell the Whole Story?

In order to better understand Indiana’s political composition, we’ll explore its baseline demographics, as they can (and often do) help provide a strong indication of a state’s political orientation, especially when compared to national trends.

Indiana’s population demographics differ from the national average in several notable ways that help provide a strong indication of its political orientation.

High Representation of White, Non-Hispanic Voters

One of the defining aspects of Indiana’s demographics is its predominantly white population. 75.5% of Indiana’s population identifies as non-Hispanic white, over 15% higher than the national average of approximately 58%.

This composition positions Indiana more conservatively than the United States at large, which is nearly evenly politically divided. For more than half of a century, it’s been common political wisdom that white voters consistently leaned Republican: the last presidential election where Democrats won white voters was in 1964, when Lyndon B. Johnson swept the entire nation outside of the Deep South.

Now flash forward to the present: in 2020 presidential election, white voters nationwide favored Donald Trump over Joe Biden by a 15-point margin.

Lower Representation of Minority Groups

Indiana’s smaller-than-average Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations further shape its political character. Black Americans make up about 9% of Indiana’s population (compared to 13% nationally), while Hispanic residents constitute around 8% (compared to 20% nationally). These figures help further highlight Indiana’s demographic differences from national averages, as minority groups in the U.S. generally tend to favor the Democratic Party. The relatively low percentages of these demographics in Indiana partially explain its Republican tilt, as the state lacks a large population of groups that typically support Democratic candidates.

The remaining 5% of Indiana’s population consists of multiracial individuals, Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and other groups. Indiana’s age and gender demographics, however, closely mirror national averages, with the population slightly more female than male and a median age around 37.4 years.

Differences in Educational Attainment

Notably, Indiana’s educational demographics significantly differ from the national average, which is an important factor in understanding the state’s political alignment. Only about 33% of Indiana’s population has graduated high school, and fewer than a third hold any type of college degree, with even smaller percentages attaining bachelor’s or graduate degrees - and reflects higher educational attainment trends in political coalitions: Democrats have increasingly built support among college-educated, higher-income individuals, while Republicans have strengthened their base among working-class voters with lower levels of formal education.

Education level has become a major predictor of political affiliation. Individuals with higher education levels are generally more likely to support Democratic priorities, particularly on social issues like abortion rights and LGBTQ rights. In contrast, those with less higher educational attainment—often older and living in rural areas—have shown a higher likelihood of prioritizing conservative values that align with Republican policy positions. With over 70% of Indiana’s population without a college degree, this demographic trend can help further explain, in part, Indiana’s unique political dynamics.

Indiana’s Sharp Contrasts to the Rest of the Midwest

A useful, polar-opposites comparison to Indiana is Illinois, a state with a similar degree of partisanship (Joe Biden won Illinois by slightly under 17% while Trump won Indiana by slightly over 16%) and demographics that actually favor the Democratic Party. Illinois is highly educated and extremely diverse, largely due to the influence of Chicago, which, along with its surrounding suburbs, comprises nearly 80% of the state’s population.

Of course, Indiana is not without its own urban areas. In addition to containing a large chunk of Chicago’s surrounding suburbs (colloquially known as Chicagoland), Indiana is anchored by its largest city and state capital: Indianapolis. Indianapolis, historically a major transportation hub much like Chicago, has a population of 887,000, positioning it as the third-largest metro in the Midwest. Still, its population is less than half as large as Chicago’s and far less diverse: more than 50% of the city’s population is non-Hispanic white, contributing to the city’s relatively-smaller Democratic lean. Furthermore, Indianapolis’ votes are diluted by its surrounding suburbs, which are far less liberal than Chicago’s.

Non-Hispanic whites comprise slightly more than 60% of Illinois’ population, a far cry from Indiana’s 75%. Even more telling, Hispanic, Black, and Asian Americans comprise the remaining 40% of Illinois’ total populace — nearly double that of Indiana’s non-white population.

Illinois’ urban and educated demographic base positions it as a Democratic stronghold, in contrast to Indiana’s more rural, predominantly white, and less-educated population that aligns more closely with Republican policies, especially in the wake of Donald Trump’s populism-fueled rise to the forefront.

These stark differences create a sort of demographic mirror in which Illinois and Indiana serve as regional opposites in the Midwest’s political landscape — while ironically enough, the states are geographic neighbors.

It’s obvious now that Indiana is a redder state than Illinois, a liberal bastion; but this still doesn’t explain why Indiana is such a conservative state in general.

Indiana, As Compared With The Red Midwest

A more fitting comparison for Indiana, based on demographics, party leanings, and political trends, would be its neighboring states of Iowa and Ohio.

Both Iowa and Ohio are less Republican than Indiana: while Indiana supported Trump by a 16% margin, both Iowa’s and Ohio’s margins were kept under double digits by Joe Biden. In fact, until about 2016, Iowa and Ohio were among the nation’s most competitive states.

Iowa was once considered by most forecasters and analysts to be a Democratic-leaning swing state, having voted for Obama by convincing margins in 2008 and 2012.

Ohio, too, voted for Obama twice, likely owing to his appeal among minority voters and a small but significant faction of white rural voters who crossed party lines.

However, starting in 2016, both states shifted significantly toward the Republican party, voting for Trump by eight- to nine-point margins. Since then, they have consistently backed Republicans in both state and federal elections. Neither state has elected a Democratic governor since, despite multiple opportunities, and Ohio has only managed to elect one Democratic senator—Sherrod Brown, whose success was largely due to a favorable national climate and his strong incumbency.

Believe it or not, both Iowa’s and Ohio’s political trajectories closely mirror Indiana’s.

In 2008, Barack Obama coasted on a tide of resentment towards the Bush Administration — both generally towards the prolonged Iraq War, and concentrated in the Midwest as backlash towards the financial crash — to win Indiana, a feat not achieved by a Democrat since 1964. Obama only won by 1%, but it was a resounding affirmation of his success — and an era of Democratic dominance across a usually-divided region.

Unfortunately, these hopes quickly faded for Democrats: in 2010 alone, Democrats lost dozen of House, Senate, and governor’s races in the Midwest. These losses were especially concentrated in Ohio, Iowa, and — you guessed it — Indiana. Democrats lost Senate elections in all three states, and lost a combined 7 House seats in Indiana and Ohio.

In the following elections, Indiana continued to slip out of Democrats’ grasp: the state backed Mitt Romney by 10% in 2012 and handed Trump a whopping 19% margin of victory in 2016.

Between 2008 and 2016, Indiana shifted 20 points to the right — similar to Iowa’s 18% and Ohio’s 12%. So indeed, these states share a common red thread.

Furthermore, the demographic and economic factors contributing to their rightward shifts possess numerous similarities.

Demographically, both states very much mirror Indiana: they are whiter, less highly educated, and more predominately-rural than the nation overall. Ohio does have major urban centers like Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus. Howerver, much of the state is dominated by a sea of overwhelmingly-conservative rural areas and persistently-red suburbs which haven’t undergone the leftward shift seen in other suburban areas like Chicago and Atlanta’s collar counties.

Iowa presents an even more amplified version of these dynamics. Outside of Des Moines, which contains a medium-sized population of 214,000, the state is overwhelmingly rural and similar to the highly-conservative, inner Midwestern states such as Nebraska and Kansas. Notably, the state contains a high percentage of white farmers who tend to be less formally educated, have strong religious affiliations, and have enthusiastically supported Trump’s worker-centric rhetoric.

Today, Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa share strikingly similar political and demographic profiles, though Indiana remains slightly more Republican. This is largely due to Indiana’s demographics: it has a slightly higher proportion of rural areas and lower levels of educational attainment, both of which favor Republicans.

Continue reading: Indiana, Part 2: A Midwestern Dilemma